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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
Many insights in the history of thought have come
through criticism of views held by preceding generations.
To note carefully the critique by American neo-realists of
the once higjhly respected concept of substance may, there-
fore, lead to new insight.
A. THE REALISTS AND THEIR POLEMIC
The problem of this dissertation is to discover whether
the criticisms, both explicit and implicit, which "the six"
American neo-realists direct against the concept of sub-
stance are valid. It is not only the question of whether
the term "substance™ can be largely avoided in the inter-
pretation of reality, as this school of realism contends,
but also of whether the functions once performed by that
concept have been otherwise provided for, or shown to be
no longer necessary. Important concepts in these statements
of the problem need defining.
Precisely what the rejected term "substance" means, can
be determined only after its use in the history of philoso-
(1
i
2phy has been examined A preliminary definition must be
hazarded, however, in order for the problem under considera-
tion to have any meaning* Broadly defined, substance means
that fundamental and underlying reality or substratum which
has attributes, properties, accidents, or qualities.
Logically substance may be regarded as the subject of
propositions about which qualities and relations may be
predicated, without its being a quality or relation itself.
Prom the point of view of metaphysics, substance means perma-
nent "self-existence," in spite of changing qualities. It
is "der selbsta'ndige, beharrliche Tr&ger der unselbstandi-
gen, wechselnden Eigenschaften ( Akzidentien), 9 as Thormejfer
puts it. Loewenberg discusses an "epistemologieal " use of
3the term, but his concept of substance as the union and
permanence within the many and changing qualities and prop-
erties of the object of knowledge or "thing, 11 is really a
particular instance of the metaphysical meaning of the term.
An account of "the six" neo-realists, whose criti-
"'"Chapter II (cf. infra, pp. 25-60) of the present work
is devoted to this task.
2
PWB, 191. This and other abbreviations are explained
in the bibliography.
3Art. II, 11-12.
^The term "neo-realism" in its various forms refers
henceforth to the American school, unless otherwise stated.
<
I

3cisms of substance are here under consideration, will serve
to clarify the problem further*
Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard, William Pepperell Monta-
gue of Columbia, Edwin Bis sell Holt of Harvard until 1918,
and a visiting professor of psychology at Princeton from
1926 to 1936, Walter Taylor Marvin of Rutgers, Walter Bough-
ton Pitkin of Columbia, and Edward Gleason Spaulding of
Princeton, have been "generally called the neo-realists"
since the publication of "A Program and First Platform of
«i 2
Six Realists n± in the Journal of Philosophy in 1910. Though
Woodbridge, McGilvary, and Pullerton may be classed as neo-
realists, "the six" were subsequently held to typify the
movement.
Woodbridge, along with Montague and Perry, was a sig-
nificant pioneer in the movement. Not only were some of
his papers prominent in the formulation of neo-realistic
4
thought, but his personal influence and his support in the
-"•Harlow, BGSR, 53.
p
^This journal will be referred to here by the shorter
title, in accordance with present usage, though some arti-
cles quoted appeared when the journal was known by its long-
er name, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology , and Scien-
tific Method . The "program and First Platform" appeared
originally in vol. 7, 393-401, and was later included in The
New Realism as an appendix. Cf. Holt et al., NR, 471-486.
3
Cell, Art. I, 405.
4Cf. Arts. I, II, III.
% 1 •
4Journal of Philosophy , of which he is editor, have undoubt-
edly helped to organize this particular phase of the reac-
1 P 3tion against idealism. McGilvary and Pullerton wrote
important constructive works and did excellent service in
defense of the colors when the latter were under fire.
This dissertation will he restricted to the views of
"the six" for three reasons. In the first place, the earli-
er activity of these three older realists was "overshadowed"
4 „by the more aggressive tactics of the six. The "Program
and First Platform" which resulted from the meetings and co-
operative work of the six during 1909 and 1910 made them
the most important representatives of the school. In the
second place, there was practical agreement between the six
5
and their three seniors on certain essentials. In studying
the views of the six, therefore, we are dealing with doc-
trines fairly though perhaps not wholly representative of
the entire school. Such a restricted study has the practi-
cal advantage of reducing to a minimum the diversities be-
•"Cohen, Art. I, 263-264.
2
Cf. Arts. I, II, III, IV, V.
3
Cf. Arts. I, II, and WWLI.
4
Harlow, BGSR, 33n.
5
Ibid., 32-33.
1
tween individual thinkers, which are at best quite numerous.
Finally, this dissertation is concerned only with the criti-
cism of substance by the neo-realists , and not with an ac-
count of the entire system of each man except in so far as
references to particular ideas will be necessary in order
to understand the criticisms of substance. The six can fur-
nish such typical criticisms, and one of their number has
1
been particularly outspoken in his denial of the doctrine.
The realism represented by these six, and within which
the criticisms of substance are to be found, can be ade-
quately defined only after a detailed study of all the lit-
erature produced by the group. But since this is not to be
undertaken here, a makeshift definition must be supplied,
p
American neo-realism, as represented by the six here con-
sidered, may be understood as that view which finds, through
analysis, the ultimate constituents of reality to be neutral
entities, and which holds that objects, though immediately
This is the theme of one of Spaulding ! s major works,
The New Rationalism , Por bibliographical data see the bib-
liography.
2
Obviously the term "realism" throughout this disserta-
tion is used in its philosophic sense. Philosophic realism
shares the interest of literary and artistic realism in ob-
jects as they are, and refuses, as do they, to make con-
scious selves the centers of importance. There is little
further harmony between the philosophic and other uses of
the term. Cf. Hocking, TOP, 327-328.
•» *
6known, are in no way dependent upon any mind, divine or hu-
man* This definition omits several important elements in
neo-realism, but it has the merit of distinguishing the lat-
ter from idealism, by its stress upon the object* s independ-
ence of all mind, 1 and from critical realism, by its empha-
sis upon immediacy in knowing and neutral entities in meta-
physics.
In the light of these definitions, it appears that the
problem under consideration may be simply stated as the ques
tion of whether these six realists have shown that there is
no underlying reality in which the qualities of things in-
here, or that persists amid the change of these qualities
and accidents. The importance of the problem may now be ap-
preciated,
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM
Justification for studying the doctrine of substance
lies in the great confusion of tongues on the subject at
present. Much of the disagreement about substance in phi-
losophy has been caused by recent developments in science.
So long as the classical or Newtonian physics was generally
accepted by scientists, substance held a reasonably stable
Haldane is a typical example of the current tendency
to define neo-realism so as not to distinguish it from ideal
ism. Vid. ROR, 261.

7position in philosophical thought*
Two elements in recent science, however, have tended to
arouse discontent with the concept of substance. First of
all, science has brought into question the existence of sub-
stance through its analysis of material "stuff" into mole-
cules, atoms, electrons, and protons The atom, it is held,
is not a substantial entity, but a field of activity, which
constitutes a veritable cosmos in itself. In the second
place, the use of symbols in science has cast doubt upon the
need for knowing anything about the substratum of things.
Much, perhaps enough, can be known, it is claimed, by letting
symbols represent things. The thing itself is not a sub-
stance with attributes, but a mathematical quantity in rela-
tion to other quantities. Some philosophers have concluded
that since substance is not known and really need not be
known, it is an unnecessary hypothesis.
It is important to evaluate the neo-realistic criticisms
of substance in view of the fact that the doctrine has had
2
a long and honorable history. To discard it now would mean
the rejection of established insights in the history of phi-
losophy. Divorce in old age often reflects upon the plain-
^Authority for assertions made here about developments
in science will be given in detail in chapter III.
2
This will be shown in chapter II.
<
tiff, but still, in the philosophic court, criticisms of
any concept must always be heard without prejudice.
The importance of the problem remains even though some
of the six neo-realists have changed their views and others
have followed different interests since the publication of
the joint volume. Neo-realism never became a fully devel-
oped school of thought. Its leaders failed to achieve a
"complete philosophy." On the other hand, the school has
become more and more disorganized since about 1914. Never-
theless, the views once held by the six, and still held in
an enlarged form by some of them, are important in them-
selves for they constitute an alternative in philosophy.
Whether neo-realism has suggested the proper attitude to-
ward substance in the light of recent developments in logic
and science is a question that remains to be answered, no
matter what the state of the school at present.
A further indication of the importance attaching to
the problem of substance rests in the fact that some form of
Holt et al., NR, 36. The New Rationalism , which ap-
peared in 1918, may to some extent be considered a comple-
tion of the neo-realist position, since it treats some prob-
lems not considered in the cooperative volume, and since it
represents an effort at cooperation between Spaulding and
other members of the school. Spaulding says in the preface
(p. viii) , "The present volume is not cooperative as was
The New Realism ... but it is, nevertheless, in part an
outgrowth of frequent discussions with these friends and of
definite attempts to cooperate."
(
9this concept is accepted by the two other main schools of
American thought. The critical realists have maintained,
as Hocking says, "the tradition of an extra-mental sub-
stance.""^ Some idealists, 2 at least, have continued to hold
to the doctrine of substance though they have reinterpreted
it in terms of purposive, conscious experience. Obviously,
the use of the term is quite different in these two schools,
but some of its historic functions have been retained.
Should the neo-realistic objections to the doctrine turn
out to be completely or even partially valid, modification
of the views held by critical realism and idealism would be
in order. If, on the other hand, they can be shown to be
3
invalid, one more barrier retarding the present movement
toward agreement in American thought would be removed. Any
one of these possible results is fraught with considerable
importance for philosophy.
TOP, 341n. Belief in substance is especially charac-
teristic of Sellars, PPR, 274-310, and Santayana, SAF, 182-
191. Cf. Pratt, PR, 64-73.
2
Barrett points out that "present-day idealism" employs
the term substance not as "a substratum of things" but as
"a structure of activities." (PHI, 134, cf. Leighton, MAC,
189.) Some personalists find substance to be "active, caus-
al, purposive personality." (Brightman, Art. II, 48.) For
Hocking substance is rather loosely synonymous with "reali-
ty." (MGHE, 410.)
3Perry rightly observes that "the principle of substance
betrays realism into the hands of its enemy." (Art. IV, 103.)
(c
C. THE SOURCES
10
So far as known to the present writer, an investigation
of neo-realism with regard to its criticisms of substance
has not yet "been made. Important scholars have, it is true,
observed that neo-realists are antagonistic to substance^"
but none has worked out the Implications of this antagonism.
Good handbooks are available for the study and criti-
cism of neo-realism as a whole. For this purpose the books2345 6 7by Kremer, Evans, Hasan, Ray, and Harlow, are useful.
The average text on the introduction to philosophy devotes
1
Cf. Kremer, NA, 302, Verda, NRLS, 110, Sheldon, SSPD,
180-181, Knudson, POP, 413-417, 410.
2
Ibid.
^NROR. While British and American neo-realism are
treated together, they are not confused.
4ROR. Historical material is valuable, but criticisms
are sometimes biased.
5
CNR. This is a good recent exposition of the concept
of consciousness in British and American neo-realism. Its
discussions of the ontological basis of consciousness are
illuminating. Criticisms are made from a position close to
that of S. Alexander,
gBGSR. The growth of critical realism is traced along
with neo-realism.
7Verda 1 s book (NRLS) is helpful in showing the atti-
tude of the Catholic church toward neo-realism, but it be-
trays too strong bias for general use.

considerable space to the movement. Articles too numerous
to mention, which appeared in the Journal of Philosophy and
in the Philosophical Review as well as in other journals of
lesser importance for the next four years after the publi-
cation of "The Program and First Platform," dealt with par-
ticular issues in the movement and with the development as
a whole. None of these writings, however, were systematic
studies concerning the neo-realistic criticisms of substance,
or the significance of that critique for philosophy.
The paucity of recent material on the general notion
of substance is remarkable. Cassirer's Substanz- und Funk-
tionsbegriff
, translated in 1923, 2 and "The Problem of Sub-
stance," a University of California Publication in Philoso-
phy for 1927, edited by Adams, Loewenberg, and Pepper, are
both important systematic studies of the idea. Cassirer
treats the subject from his position as a neo-Kantian phe-
nomenalist, while the contributors to "The Problem of Sub-
stance" approach the issue from many different points of
"*"Cf
. for example texts of such differing method as
Hocking, TOP, 336-376, Leighton, POP, 320-326, 341-342,
Brightman, ITP, 234-236, 77, 112-114, 203-204, and Patrick,
ITP, 278-279, 367-369.
2Abbreviated in the bibliography as SP.
^References will be made to particular articles in this
work and not to the work as a whole.

12
view. Beyond these two works, substance is treated more
or less incidentally.
Histories of substance in addition to the ordinary man-
uals for the history of philosophy, exist, to be sure, in
1 9 3
abundance. Cassirer, Lindsay, 6 and G. E. Moore provide
excellent historical studies of the doctrine. Mabbott pre-
sents important material bearing on the history of substance
in his attempt to restrict the term to the meaning given it
4by Aristotle.
The primary sources for this investigation are, of
course, the writings of the neo-realists themselves. Among
these the cooperative volume, which also includes "The Pro-
gram and First Platform," is of first importance. Perry's
Present Philosophical Tendencies, which was published in
1912, the same year as The New Realism, is probably next in
significance to the latter volume for in it he criticizes
recent philosophical systems from the point of view of the
neo-realists and further elaborates the neo-realistic posi-
tion. This book was written while the cooperative studies
1Art. I.
2Art. I.
3Art. I.
4Art. I.
< »
» *
13
were being made, and it was "this spirit of fellowship," as
Perry says, which justified him in making "an attempt to
summarize the central doctrines of a constructive realistic
philosophy."* Consequently, Present Philosophical Tenden-
cies may be considered representative of the school on many
major issues.
Spaulding's book entitled The New Rationalism is
doubly significant. In the first p±ace, as indicated
p
above, it represents an effort at cooperation with other
members of the school and to some extent may be considered
a completion of the neo-realistic position. A second rea-
son why The New Rationalism is a principal source lies in
the fact that it contains the most explicit criticisms of
substance advanced by any of the realists. As extensive
use will be made of this volume as of any other, except the
one containing the cooperative studies.
A First Book in Metaphysics, by Marvin, came out in
1912. Thus, it is likewise a representative volume. Holt's
book, The Concept of Consciousness, was written by 1908, as
he indicates in the preface (p. xiv) , though it was not
published until 1914. The views contained in it may have
"hpPT, 272.
Cf. supra, p. 8.
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influenced those developed through cooperative study. The
fact that Holt had it finally published indicates that he
believed it a contribution to the program of the school. In
an article entitled "Response and Cognition," which appeared
in the Journal of Philosophy in 1915,1 Holt repudiated some
of the more radical doctrines of the book however. It is
probable that this article made his views more acceptable
to some other members of the school.
Pitkin, unfortunately, did not develop his views into
a system. We are dependent upon his essay in The New Real-
ism
,
2
"World Pictures,"3 and other articles appearing in
philosophical journals, which will be referred to below.
Montague, in some ways the most conservative realist of the
six, supplies important articles in the journals besides
his contribution to the cooperative volume. The Ways of
Knowing , Belief Unbound , and The Chances of Surviving
4Death , contain a more systematic treatment of his views.
Some of these doctrines diverge noticeably from the main
tenets of the school, however.
•'Art. II.
2,lSome Realistic Implications of Biology," pp. 378-467.
3Included in Pullerton (Ed.), EHWJ, 195-229.
4For the date of publication and further information
see the bibliography.
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These writings make up the chief sources for the pres-
ent inquiry, though other books and many more essays by
these six realists will be referred to as the argument pro-
ceeds. Criticisms of the neo-realistic principles will
naturally be drawn from sources of a manifold and diverse
nature. While there is important neo-realistic literature
from the period between 1901, when Perry's review of
Royce ! s lectures on The World and the Individual appeared,^"
and 1910, the year the platform of the school was publish-
ed, reference will be made mostly to material that was pub-
lished about 1910 or afterward. By that date the neo-real-
istic convictions were more articulate, and the movement
was more definitely organized as a school. It is unneces-
sary to squander attention on opinions that do not repre-
sent the mature judgment of the school.
D. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
While the scope of the problem under consideration has
already been intimated, it must be made more explicit.
This may be done by stating, first of all, what the prob-
lem does not include.
Art. I. This review may be regarded as the opening
shot fired in the neo-realistic attack on idealism, though
it has not yet been generally recognized as such. (Cf.
Harlow, BGSR, 24, 29.)
i1
•
;
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The present inquiry is not to be understood either as
a systematic exposition or a detailed criticism of the fun-
damental neo-realistic doctrines. The latter will be dis-
cussed only in so far as they have a bearing on the doc-
trine of substance.
Nor will any interest be manifested in the detailed
contradictions and divergences among the views of the six
realists. Such discrepancies will receive attention to the
extent that they may determine the attitude of the school
as a whole toward the concept of substance, but not beyond.
Many of these divergences have been previously investigated
by others, and hence they require no further study here.
Again, the complete pattern for a normative doctrine
of substance will not be sought, in case the neo-realistic
strictures on the concept turn out to be invalid. It is
intended merely to inquire whether the neo-realistic po-
lemic has made it impossible to hold the concept longer.
The implications of a normative doctrine of substance would
themselves compose a further problem.
It is quite clear that such external questions as the
genesis of neo-realism, its relation to critical realism,
the reaction against idealism, and its present vitality or
lack of it, are totally irrelevant to the main problem.
More positively defined, the field of study may be said
»1
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to lie within one aspect of the philosophic views held "by a
group of realists who represent a larger school, hut whose
convictions on substance typify the definite movement in
American thought to deny that this concept has an intelli-
gible meaning or function. It is the sole province of this
work to examine the validity of that denial.
E. METHOD OP PROCEDURE
Considerable difficulty has been experienced in select-
ing the proper method of procedure. It would seem, on first
thought, that the simplest method would be to consider sepa-
rately and in order the explicit and the implicit objections
of neo-realists to substance. There are serious obstacles
standing in the wa^ of such a method, however.
The first difficulty is that most neo-realists, with
the notable exception of Spaulding, do not present system-
atic and explicit criticisms in a thorough-going way."*"
o
Marvin, it is true, sets up formal objections to substance,
but he does not develop them. For the most part he pre-
supposes that substance no longer pla^s a role in philoso-
phy. With the other four, the criticisms are generally im-
1
Of. Spaulding, NR, 25-29, 30, 40-42, 177-178, et
passim*
2
PBM, 174-175, 178, 185, cf. Art. II, 51n.
•r
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plicit. 1 It would be unprofitable to consider Spaulding 1 s
criticisms separately, unless it could be shown that each
of them represents fairly adequately the opinions of the
other five. But this could be done only by considering the
implicit arguments against substance held by the others.
Such a plan would mean intermingling the explicit and the
implicit arguments.
A second barrier in the way of considering the explicit
arguments separately is the fact that each of the six,
2Spaulding included, blends the formal with the informal or
implicit criticisms. Specific criticisms are closely knit
with constructive arguments for the neo-realists 1 own sys-
tems and they depend for their cogency upon the establish-
ment of realistic theories. Consequently, to pluck them
from their setting would result in undue abstraction.
Yet a third and even more weighty argument against
considering the formal criticisms separately consists in
the fact that, broadly speaking, they can all be reduced
to one fundamental criticism, and this one depends for its
Perry formally criticizes substance in an article
that appeared in 1928 (cf. Art. XII), but previous to that
time he had for the most part assumed the invalidity of the
concept. Hasan rightly observes that American neo-realists
largely presuppose the thesis that "there is no substance,"
(ROR, 166.)
2
Cf. the criticisms by Spaulding cited above, p. 17,
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force upon the demonstration of a constructive argument.
In a sense, the specific criticisms turn on the validity
of analysis as a final method of explanation. Typical ex-
plicit criticisms, such as the following, are all phases
of the one contention that substance can be dissolved by
complete analysis.
The fallacy of pseudo-simplicity, condemned by the
realists,'1' is a case of incomplete analysis. Marvin's be-
lief that "the hypothesis [of substance] explains nothing,"2
since it gives no reason for change and since the thing is
4
only its properties, results from his conviction that sub-
stance is a mist that is dissolved by the sunlight of analy-
sis. Spaulding's claim that substance is a result of the
naive and uncritical fashioning of thought about physical
things, rests on the belief that the knowing relation has
not been completely analyzed. The argument that substance
has been wrongly harbored by the theory of internal rela-
tions, arises from the belief that the truth about any ob-
•''Holt et al., HR, 12-14.
2
PBM, 178.
5
Ibid # , 185.
4
Ibid., 174. Cf. Perry, Art. IV, 103.
5NR, 29, et passim.
6Ibid., 40-42, 177-178, 37-38, 213.
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ject lies in the simple entities to which analysis can and
does reduce it. The rejection of substance because, even
if its nature were known, it would not explain all objects,"*"
rests upon the belief that analysis terminates in entities
that are adequate for the explanation of all objects and
situations.
Since the specific arguments of the realists against
substance reduce to the contention that the latter repre-
sents incomplete analysis, and hence incomplete truth about
the object to which it is ascribed, the genuine significance
of the realistic critique could be appreciated only after
the method of analysis had been carefully scrutinized, and
after its application to specific objects had been taken
into account. Such a task would plunge one immediately in-
to the internal or implicit arguments against substance.
It seems proper, consequently, to treat the problem
of this dissertation primarily from the standpoint of real-
ism's internal or implicit criticisms of substance. The ex-
ternal or explicit criticisms of substance will be treated
in connection with, and as introductions to the former. But
realism 1 s fundamental arguments against substance are im-
plicit in the arguments for its own views*
AMarvin, PBM, 174-175. Of. Spaulding, MR, 173-174,
156-158.
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In answer to the possible objection that this method
will require one to consider most of the major issues in
neo-realism, it may be pointed out that this would be nec-
essary so far as they concern substance with any method
that might be chosen. The context in which specific criti-
cisms occur, and their significance for the rest of the
neo-realistic system, would have to be explained in any
case. A second difficulty with this method is that the
measure of agreement attainable among the six realists on
these major issues is, in some cases, relatively slight.
And, it may be further objected, the completeness with
which each of the six discusses fundamental issues, varies
widely. But the problem of diversity among the views of
the six would be encountered with equal seriousness, re-
gardless of the method followed.
Because of the diversities among the views held by
these six neo-realists a possible third method has some
merits. Each of the six realists might be studied sepa-
rately so far as their views are relevant to the doctrine
of substance. This method would probably lead more than
any other to exhaustive information about the fate of sub-
stance at the hands of individual neo-realists. In order,
however, that results which represent the position of the
whole school might be obtained, it would still be necessary
to make a comparison of the results obtained from a study
19i »v 0 *3*a^ B v»i»J.w, toi l oX.'.. i.W iW i*
X v G If w X V VXXw ,-4 .a \Jl**J . l^v XOTIW A XJ XV Xilo * \J s. ; #14-- • w X"X/i, It
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of each realist. Such a plan would make the dissertation
unduly long.
The second method appears to involve fewer difficulties
than the others and to combine "brevity with thoroughness,
as well as to provide as much directness as is possible in
so complex a problem, and is therefore adopted. The re-
mainder of the dissertation divides itself naturally into
seven chapters.
In order to understand clearly the concept that is
criticized by the neo-realists, a brief history of the doc-
trine must first be presented. Perry points out that tra-
ditional realism has been "confused and compromised by an
alliance with substantialism, " and Spaulding shows that
the kinds of systems which his own opposes are the "sub-
o
stance-philosophies" and the "causation-philosophies."
Chapter II will be devoted to the role which substance has
played in the history of thought.
The chief sources for the dispute about substance are
to be found, as pointed out above, in recent scientific de-
velopments, and especially among those in the field of
physics. A brief consideration of the more important re-
cent developments in the scientific realm will show more
•
•^t. IV, 103.
2m, 9-10.
1
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clearly the present acuteness of the problem under considera-
tion. Chapter III is designed to serve this purpose.
Since the whole neo-realist ic attack upon substance,
as well as much of realism's own constructive argument, de-
pends upon the validity of the analytic method, the first
chapter dealing directly with the neo-realist criticisms
will be concerned with this method. The significance of
analysis for the problem of substance is treated in chapter
IV.
1
There is no material substance, according to these neo-
realist s. Physical objects can be reduced without residue
to relations. The fundamental elements of matter are simple
and neutral in quality. Whether this is true, constitutes
the problem in chapter V.
That mind is no substantial entity or "receptacle" most
neo-realists are persuaded. The problem of mind or conscious-
ness has received more attention by the realists than any
other, but as to what mind actually is, there is less agree-
ment than on many other issues. Chapter VI is devoted to the
question of whether mind is a substance.
Substance is also denied as an ultimate principle in
ontology. Being, both in its subslstent and existent phases,
1Further justification for this organization into chap-
ters will be presented as the argument advances.
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involves no substance. Rather must it be thought of as a
complex system of terms in relation. The validity of this
interpretation will be considered in chapter VII.
Chapter VIII, the final one, will embody the conclu-
sions and summary of the entire dissertation.
The historical usage of the term substance may now be
examined.

CHAPTER II
SUBSTANCE IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT
Two reasons for considering the role which substance
has played in the history of thought grow out of the problem
of this dissertation. One is that the precise nature of the
concept rejected by the neo-realists must be known in order
to evaluate criticisms of it. A second is that realism it-
self has been traditionally associated with the doctrine.^"
The rejection of substance by the new realists is more re-
markable since the older realistic tradition held firmly to
the concept. A brief survey showing only the most important
functions substance has performed in the philosophic tradi-
tion is, therefore, next in order.
A. THE PERIOD BEFORE ARISTOTLE
Regardless of whether the motive behind early Ionian
2thought was theological or scientific in a purely secular
•••perry, Art. IV, 99-100.
2
This is Hack f s thesis in GGP • Note especially pp. vi,
144, 145, 147.
•»
4
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sense, "it is the concept of substance which historically
marks the line of distinction between investigation and
myth. " The earliest Greek philosophy that was worthy of
the name dealt with the everlasting something that underlies
all things. "The first philosophers," says Aristotle, held
that the being "of which all things that are consist[s],"
was a "substratum" which "remains," and "nothing else comes
to be or ceases to be. . . . " The "beginning" of things,
4 5
i. e. the dpfttft was substance for the early Greeks.
^"Burnet (EGP, 13-15) believes Ionian science was secu-
lar since it had made a complete break with Aegean religion.
Even where the term "God" (&*6?) is used it is without a
religious significance, he asserts. The point is that no
matter what quality was ascribed to ultimate being, or what
motive led to it, some kind of substance was believed in
even from the first
.
Cassirer, SP, 151. "Philosophy dates her origin,"
says Weber, from the time when these early philosophers
"relegated the traditional gods to the domain of fable, and
explained nature by principles and causes" (Weber and Perry,
HOP, 8). These "principles" and "causes" were substances,
or were dependent upon them.
3
Met. A, 983b 6, 7, 15, 16.
4
Burnet (ibid., 10-12) points out that the term a/a^n is
Aristotle's word for the first substance, and that it does
not appear in any of the genuine writings remaining from the
other earlier Greeks. He believes that among earlier think-
ers <£ocyi«»was the more common term for ultimate being. This
is also Cassirer 's view (Art. I, 500).
5
Even if cx.pxn were not used before Aristotle to indi-
cate ultimate being, the reality in question was believed to
be an Urstoff that was permanent and seemingly more real
than tne elements that changed. It also had affinity with
the concept of cause. (Cf. G. E, Moore, Art. I, 612-613.)
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Substance"'" for the Ionian physicists was "material
cause.
"
2 Thales (c. 625-547 B. C.) taught that there was
but one first principle or substratum and that it was
3 /
water* The principle of the aire ip or embraced by Anaximan-
der (c. 610-547 B. C.) contains the suggestion that the
source of sensuous being cannot have the same properties
that this sensuous being itself has. Theophrastus, who may
have known Anaximander 1 s Trepl pucrecos; reports that the in-
finite and eternal atmosphere was for Anaximander a homo-
geneous structure in which such opposites as the warm and
the cold, the wet and dry lie together unseparated, but from
which they arise. 4 Anaximines ("flourished" sometime be-
tween 585/4 and 528/24 B. C.) made "air prior to water, and
the most primary of the simple bodies. ..." Air, the
generative principle of things, is in continual motion of
Q
condensation or rarefaction. This accounts for the differ-
*The term "substance" was not clearly defined before
Aristotle. The reality referred to by h.^^ or cpuc/ris here
meant
.
2Aristotle, Met. A, 984a 17.
3
Ibid., 983b 21, 984a 3, 28.
4Quoted by Burnet, EGP, 52-53. Cf. Cassirer, SP, 151.
5
Aristotle, ibid., 984a 5.
QCf. Burnet, ibid., 73, for selections from a monograph
written by Theophrastus on Anaximines.
• *
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ences between particular things, though they are consti-
tuted by the same substance.
While these early interpretations of reality involved
belief in some kind of substratum, the relation in which
the underlying substances stood to their changing forms was
not elaborated. This relationship was a problem that re-
ceived adequate attention only at a much later time,"1' Plato
sought expressly to define it.
In the next phase of Greek philosophy the materialistic
determinations of substance advocated by the Milesians were
superseded by more ideal conceptions. For the Pythagoreans
and Heraclitus the permanent element in being consisted "not
in an unchangeable material substratum, but in certain con-
stant proportions which persist in all Becoming, Accord-
3 „ing to the Pythagoreans "number was the substance of all
things," Number accounts for the connection and inner har-
mony of things giving them their definite character. Pro-
^Q. E. Moore, Art. I, 612,
p
Cassirer, Art. I, 500.
Little is actually known about the life and character
of Pythagoras. It is established that he "flourished" about
the year 532 B. C, but the dates of his birth and death are
unknown. The figure of Pythagoras was soon submerged in the
tradition of "Pythagorean!sm.
"
4
Aristotle, Met., 987a 19, cf. 985b 34, 986a 16, 17.
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portion and measurement are principles determining the nature
of becoming.^" Heraclitua (c. 544-484 B. C.) found the de-
termination of things in an immanent law, or \6yo9 which gov-
2
ems events and retains them within limits, Everything
proceeds from a dry and warm principle and eventually returns
3 4to it, yet all is flux. Nothing is immutable in this eter-
nal process except the Law which governs it. The "form" of
things is the hoy09 •
This logical view of substance which had its rise in
Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans was developed further by
Parmenides (c. 540-470 B. C.) and the Eleatic school, Par-
5
menides believed that thinking and being are one. Thought
occurs within being. The latter is determined by attributes
ascribed to it by the former. Being is the immutable, in-
divisible, and eternal substance grasped by thought. Be-
lief that there is something beyond being is illusory,
1mOf the opinions of Pythagoras we know even less than
of his life," says Burnet (EGP, 92). Information about Py-
thagoreanism is gathered from diverse secondary sources (Cf.
Burnet, ibid,, 93-112).
2Frs, 2, 114, 115 (Diels, FVS, I, 77, 99, 100).
3Prs, 30, 31, 51 (Diels, ibid., 84, 87),
4Frs. 53, 58, 59, 60 (Diels, ibid., 88-89).
5Fr. 8 (Diels, ibid., 157).
6Cf. Cassirer, Art. I, 500.
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A third attitude toward substance in the pre-Aristo-
telian period is represented by Einpedocles (c. 495-435 B. C),
Anaxagoras (500-428 B. C), and Deraocritus (c. 460-370 B. C.).
In a sense these three were able to reconcile the Ionian in-
terpretation of reality with the more idealistic views of
Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and Parmenides. Their conclu-
sion was that there are certain elements within nature which
produce by their mutual relationships the diversity and
change in reality but which are themselves incapable of
change.
Democritus* views of the ultimate substance became es-
pecially important. Substantiality he attributed to the at-
oms. They were held to be infinite in number, simple in
nature, and indestructible. The manifold of sense phenomena
results from the differences in position, shape, arrangement
and spatial motion among the atoms and hence it has only sec-
ondary Being. Genuine Being belongs only to the atoms and
2
empty space, the latter being necessary for their motion.
Empedocles held that the four elements, air, earth,
fire and water, form particular things through mixture and
separation according to the two principles of Love and Hate.
(Prs. 8, 9, 17, 20, 21 (Diels, FVS, 226-227, 229-233).) An-
axagoras believed there were innumerable elements (o^p/uo/to.
)
of peculiar composition which were brought into combination
and separation by the eternal mind (^ous»)« (Prs. 1, 4, 6, 9,
12, 13, 14 (Diels, ibid., 399, 400, 402-406).)
Frs. 125, 156, 164, 167 (Diels, ibid., II, 85, 91, 93,
94).
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With Plato (427-347 B. C.) a marked change in the con-
cept of substantiality appears. It is form and not matter
which determines the substance of things, according to Plato.
The idea or form alone has genuine and constant being, while
sense phenomena "become" and never "are."^ They owe what
2being they may possess to their participation in the ideas.
3 4
These ideas are eternal forms within the intelligible
world which produce "copies" in the phenomenal world. They
6
impress themselves upon an eternally given matter, the meta-
7
physical status of which is not quite clear.
The extent to which the ideas or forms of Plato are in-
tegrated in one system is disputed among the interpreters of
his works. There is at least some connection between them,
however, and they bear a special relation to the idea of the
1Tim# , 28A.
2
Phaed., 100D.
3Plato uses both the terms els or and^ea, though the
former appears more frequently. Cf. , Phaed. , 740, Rep,, X,
596A.
4Symp., 211B, Phaed., 100B.
5Phaedr., 250B, Tim., 52G.
6Tim.
, 50C-52C.
7Tim., 51AB. If the status of matter were more clear,
the relation of the intelligible to the phenomenal world
would also be more understandable.
j—
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good. 3" "The Deity" or "Creator" works through these ideas
2
to bring about certain phenomenal occurrences, Aristotle
rightly complained that the poetic language of Plato ob-
scured the precise relation between particular things and
their forms. He did not, however, succeed in establishing
adequate ground for his chief criticism of Plato, namely,
that the forms were external to "the particulars which share
4in them. ..." Some of Plato 1 s language does indicate such
a dualism, but elsewhere and particularly in the Timaeus,
which represents his more mature thought, he refers to the
presence of forms in matter. It is from the interpretation
and criticism of Plato's views that Aristotle developed his
own doctrine of substance.
B. ARISTOTLE
The history of substance as an object of definition be-
gins with Aristotle (384-322). Some of his interpreters are
content to emphasize only two senses in which he used the
Cf. Symp., 201C, Rep., VI, 506A, 509B, VII, 517C, 518D.
2
Tim., 30E, 31A.
3Met., A, 991a 21.
4Ibid. f 991a 14.
5
Cf. 500-51B.
1
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term substance (uTrokefafYois) # There is considerable evi-
dence, however, for three uses which he made of the concept,
one of which is logical and two metaphysical He states ex-
plicitly that "there are three kinds of substance— the mat-
ter.
. . ; the nature [form^. . • ; and again thirdly, the
particular substance which is composed of these two, . . ."
A brief consideration of these three phases of substance fol-
lows.
In the first place, substance means for Aristotle the
c t t 3
material substratum (urroKei/At vt\ uXtj) , or material cause.
4
One of the two causes to which the original four reduce, is
the material. Matter, the potentiality from which all actual
5 6things except God arise, is substratum and substratum is
1Cassirer (Art. I, 500) and Geiger (Art. I, 272) believe
Aristotle used the term to refer to individual things ( "first
substances") and to universal qualities ("substances of the
second degree"). Ross seems to restrict Aristotle's use of
the term to the substratum in which qualities inhere (cf.
ARI, 166) , while Mabbott asserts that substance in the first
sense emphasized here by Cassirer and Geiger is the main ele-
ment in Aristotle's view (cf. Art. I, 186).
2
Met.,A, 1070a 9-12, cf. Z, 1035a 1-3, H, 1043a 27-28.
3Ibid., H, 1042a 26-27,A, 1022a 18-19.
4Formal, efficient, and final cause are the same. Cf.
Phys., ii f 198a. 26.
^et., especially Bk.& , 1045b 36ff, H, 1042b 9, 10.
6Ibid., Z, 1029a 3, A, 983a 30,A , 1024b 9.
*
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substance.^" It is the material substratum that has the prop-
> 2
erties possessed by the apx°-L of the early Greeks. God is
pure actuality, eternal and the "unmoved mover," who lacks
nothing. 0 Matter, along with form, is eternally given and
is never found apart from form, though form in its purest
state may exist apart from matter.
Aristotle used the term substance, secondly, as synon-
ymous with essence or form. Formal cause is essence and
Q
essence means substance. Essence or form and matter exist
together, the latter being that from which a thing is gener-
ated, and the former "that which the matter is at any time
coming to be.
. .
"^ Substance as form or essence means
the true "nature" of things. It is the "universal" and the
"genus" of "each thing, n yet it exists only in these par-
get.
,
Z, 1028b 35, A, 1017b 23.
2
G. E. Moore, Art. I, 613.
S
Met L,A, 1072a 24, b 29, 1074b 26.
4
Ibid., 1069b 35.
5
Ibid., 1073a 4.
6
Ibid., A, 983a 27, 988a 34, A, 1013a 27, Z, 1038b 5.
7Ibid., B, 999b 13.
8
Ibid.,A, 1015a 12-14, 10, 1017b 22, 25.
9
Ibid., Z, 1028b 33, 34, 1038b 17-23, 1040b 26.
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ticular things. Form is actuality.
It was the third meaning of the term, namely the logi-
cal, that was most significant for subsequent thought, es-
pecially that during the Middle Ages. Substance is the sub-
ject of predication, but it cannot be predicated of anything
2
else. As logical subject it is a complex, constituted by
/ 3
the union of essence or form withu'An* To this complex
Aristotle ascribes individuality. It is the "first sub-
4
stance" i^rpcjr n oo<rto) . The qualities and attributes of sub-
jects are "substances of the second degree" (ffcure^at eio-tai ).
They do not have "being in the full sense, but are qualities
5
and movements of it. ..." While they do not exist apart
6
from individual things, i. e. the first substances, they
are the determinations without which the individual things
7
could not be thought. Such changes as those of quality,
o
quantity, and location occur, but their subject persists.
1H, 1043a 27, 1050a 17, 1051b 31.
2
A, 1017b 13-15, Z, 1028b 35-36.
ZA, 1070a 12, Z, 1035a 2, H, 1043a 28.
4
Z, 1028a 30, 1037b 3.
5A, 1069a 21-23.
Q
Cf
. ,
supra, p. 34n9.
7
Z, 1028a 15-30.
JL 9 1069b 6, 8, 9.
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There is a confusion here which Aristotle does not dis-
pel. The trend of his logical thought seems to be that the
subject is the whole complex individual thing. 1 On the oth-
er hand, subject is that Something in which attributes in-
here. This would seem to imply that the ultimate subject is
the matter which is determined by form, but Aristotle does
I
2
not say so explicitly.
Thus for Aristotle the u-rroKf 'i/ifvow of the universe con-
sists of the two elements, form and matter. In an individu-
al thing these two elements are found in such a combination
»
as to distinguish it from other things. For purposes of
logic, substance is that something to which predicates may be
ascribed, but which cannot itself be a predicate of anything
else.
If this interpretation of Aristotle is allowed, Spauld-
ing's thesis that the whole Metaphysics is "couched in terms
of the particular thing '*5 appears to be an exaggeration. In
the first place, Aristotle discusses the metaphysical as-
pects of substance even more than he does the logical. It
should be noted, secondly, that the mainspring of Aristotle f s
Cf. supra, p. 35n3.
G. E. Moore points out this difficulty (Art. I, 613).
'NR, 30n, 31.
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thought came chiefly from Plato. The model for Plato's
thought was ideas, not physical things. One of Aristotle's
most important objectives was to show that the eternal forms
do not exist external to matter, as he believed Plato had
held. 1 Here is the motif for his theory that matter and
form are eternally coexistent in all things save in God. It
is true that Aristotle's thought played a dominant role in
succeeding centuries, but it is scarcely justifiable to hold
that the entire history of philosophy has been "thingized"
2by the Aristotelian tradition.
C. SCHOLASTICISM AND THE MIDDLE AGES
Original thought about substance did not appear again
until the time of the Scholastics, though the term was used
in frequent and important senses during the intervening
centuries.
Neo-Platonism, a .
.
syncretism ... of the differ-
ent systems of Grecian philosophy" bearing traces of Philo,
Neo-Pythagoreanism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism, received
its clearest statement from Plotinus (204-270). According
"^This summarizes Aristotle's criticisms of Plato. Cf.
Met., A, ch. 9.
2Spaulding, NR, xvii. Cf. Leighton, MAC, 187n.
3De Wulf, HMP, 75. Cf. Whittaker, NP, xi, x.
*
38
to him particular things are emanations of the infinite and
substantial One ifLiretpov ), God, the supreme form, mani-
fests or differentiates himself in three stages of increas-
ing imperfection, namely, intelligence, soul, and body or
p
matter. Each stage contains both form and matter, with the
latter predominating in proportion to the stage of imperfec-
ts
tion.
In the literature of the Patristics the term uTro'o-ra.
(the equivalent of the Latin substantia ) denotes "the com-
4
plete definition of an individual, . »
,
n thus carrying to
its logical conclusion the Aristotelian conception of a com-
plex and ultimate subject. It was used to designate the per-
sons of the trinity. 5 «Ehe term ooo-u also figured largely in
Christological disputes. Augustine (354-430) employs the
Enneads
, V, sec 0 2, 493, sec. 4, 517, sec. 1, 487, 488
(Bakewell, SAP, 371-373), VI, 9, sec. 6, 763E (Bakewell,
ibid., 368-369).
2
Ibid., V, 9, sec. 4, 557E (Bakewell, ibid., 353-354),
IV, 7, sec. 8 (Bakewell, ibid., 345-347), V, sec. 2, 494
(Bakewell, ibid., 373-374).
3Ibid., II, 4, sec. 6, 162C, sec. 13, 167 (Bakewell,
ibid., 378-382).
4
G. E. Moore, Art. I, 613.
50rigen, De Principiis
.
I, 2:2 (Ayer, SACH, 193), Soc-
rates, Hist. Ec. » I, 8 (Ayer, ibid., 306).
6Tomus ad Antiochenos (Ayer, ibid., 349-352).
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theory of matter and form to account for the dual constitu-
tion of corporeal substances,^" though some passages in his
writings indicate that he "believed matter to be a chaotic
2
mass brought forth from nothing by the Creator.
While the Scholastics had much to say about the term
substantia their contribution, excepting that of Boethius,
consisted chiefly in elaborating and clarifying the doctrines
of earlier thinkers, and in particular those of Aristotle.
Boethius (470-525), however, was regarded by many of his con-
temporaries as the superior of Aristotle. His translations
and commentaries served as the chief source of Aristotelian-
ism down to the end of the twelfth century, and some of his
original treatises supplied the place of unknown portions of
3
Aristotle. There were three important problems in which the
nature of substance was an issue, viz., the status of univer-
sals, the relation of mind and body, and the principle of in-
dividuation.
The controversy between realism and nominalism marked
the reappearance of the Platonic-Aristotelian problem con-
•^Confessiones
. XII, 3, 4, 6, 25. Cf. De Quant itate
Animae
.
XIII, 22.
2
Ibid., XII, 7, 8, 11, XIII, 2, 3.
De Wulf, HMP, 145. Abelard»s discussion of Boethius
(Glosses, in McKeon, SMP, I, 208-258) makes Boethius* in-
fluence plain.
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cerning the status of universals. Porphyry (c. 230—300),
a Neo-Platonist , had formulated the problem in his intro-
duction to Aristotle* s De Categorlis , a work later translat-
ed "by Boethius.* For realism, which was represented chiefly
pby John Scotus Erigena (c. 810-880), Anselm of Canterbury
(1033-1109)
,
3
William of Champeaux (1070-1120)
,
4 Bernard of
Chartres (first half of twelfth century), and Walter of
Q
Mortagne (d. 1174) , universals were the producing and de-
termining substances and were ante rem . They were definite
and independent realities individualizing themselves in spe-
cies and concrete particulars. Nominalism, represented
chiefly by Roscellinus (flourished towards end of eleventh
century)
,
required one to hold that only individual things
are truly real. Universals are merely names or words
( voces ) , and these are human designations for elements in
Isagoge of Porphyry
. Cf. Boethius 1 In Isagogen
Porphyr 11 commenta {Mc&eoh , S1IP, I, especially, 77-81,
209 )
.
2
De Divisione Naturae
.
IV, 8, 9 (McKeon, ibid., I, 125-
130, 135-139).
3
Monologium
. 27, 25, 26.
^e Generibus et Speciebus (De Wulf, HMP, 179).
5De Expositlone Porphyrli (De Wulf, ibid., 181-182).
Cf. John of Salisbury, Metaloglcus
,
II, 17 (De Wulf,
ibid., 188).

41
individual substances, 1 They are post rem for the nominal-
ist, according to Abelard's later formulation. The trinity
turns out to be three substances (i. e, tritheism) •
Mediating theories between these extremes were soon put
forth. Adelard of Bath (late in eleventh century) taught
that universals are the "indifferent" or super-individual
elements in particular things. Abelard's (1079-1142) "con-
ceptualism," according to which universals are the indispen-
sable means or qualities by which the intellect conceives
4
objects, brought temporary cessation in the debate, Eis
solution of the problem was acceptable in the main to the
Arabian philosophers. A modified nominalism held the cen-
ter of thought in the following periods of the Middle Ages.
A second problem in scholastic thougjht which involved
the concept of substance was that concerning the nature of
the soul and its relation to the body. The mystics, particu
^•John of Salisbury, Metalogicus
,
II, 17 (De Wulf, HMP,
159).
2
Letter of St. Anaelm to Fulco (De Wulf, ibid,
, 175)
.
5De Eodem et Diverso (De Wulf, ibid,, 187).
^Glosses on Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius (McKeon,
SMP, I, 219, 222, 234, 235, 237, 254).
Avlcenna held that universals were "ante multiplicita-
tem, in multiplicitate, et post multiplicitatem" (Windelband
HOP, 299),
1C
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larly Hugo (1096-1141) and Richard (d. 1173) of St. Victor,
continued the Augustinian tradition that soul and body are
two different substances • Such dualism is to some extent
overcome by Aquinas (1225-1274) in his theory that the soul
or substantial form of the body gives the latter its actual
existence and constitutes the formal principle of all its ac-
g
tivities, but this is scarcely more than a reaffirmation of
the mutual dependence of form and matter enunciated by Aris-
totle, and is still dualistic. John of Salisbury (d. 1180)
taught that there is some relation between the sensations and
3
perceptions which enter into the mind. A substantial soul
was not asserted, but the status of universals or concepts, a
problem inherited from the controversy between realists and
nominalists, was further elaborated. Moderate realism was
4his conclusion.
The third problem which concerned substance was that of
individuality ( principium individuationis ) . The Arabians,
represented by Averroe's (1126-1198), argued that matter bear-
ing living forms is self-subsistent , and that the active in-
^De Wulf, BMP, 216-218.
2Sum. Theol.
.
I, 75, Art. 5 (Ans. 3, 4), Art. 7(3), Art.
4(2), 76, Art. 4 (Ans.), Cont . Gent
.
,
II, 56, 54.
5Metalogicus
. IV, 15, 16, 20, 32 (De Wulf, ibid., 201).
4Ibid., II, 20 (De Wulf, loc. cit.).
6
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tellect is an eternal form that may exist apart from the in-
dividual man except during the act of knowing. In the latter
case there is an accidental union of the two."*- Duns Scotus
(1270-1508) held that the soul is individualized as an origi-
nal fact, i. e. even apart from its relation to the body.
'What is "proper to all members of any species," i. e. their
universality, "follows from the specific nature," or definite
and individual form, of each. 2 William of Occam (d. 1347)
followed Scotus in emphasizing the reality of individuals or
original forms. Universals are products of comparative
thought. They are "signs" in the mind designating common
3
characteristics of different objects. Aquinas found the
principle of individuality in the capacity of matter to as-
4
sume quantitative differences. Nieolaus Cusanus (1401-1464)
maintained that there was a certain element of universality
in each individual. Every individual in a sense mirrors the
universe. 5
1
0f. Commentary on De Anima
.
iil (De Wulf, HMP, 235, 234).
p
Commentaria Oxoniensia , Bk. I, Dist. 3, Quest. 4, Art.
2 (McKeon, SMP, IT, 32§) , Art. 6 (McKeon, ibid., 349-350),
cf. preliminary discussion of the question (McKeon, ibid.,
319, 314).
5Quodllbeta
,
I, Quest. 13 (McKeon, ibid., 360-361, 365).
4
Sum. Theol.
. I, 75, Art. 4 (Ans.), Art. 5 (Ans. 2), 3,
Art. 7 Uns.j, ill, 77, Art. 2 (Ans. 2).
^octa Ignorantia
,
III, 4 (cf. De Wulf, ibid., 457-458).
(J
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The classic formulation for the doctrine of substance
among the Scholastics was given by Aquinas, His predecessors
had elaborated the categories of the accidents, especially
those of quality, quantity, relation, time, and space. The
most important problem concerned the relation of substance
and accidents, Aquinas advocated the doctrine of a real dis-
tinction between the faculties and the substance of which
they are qualities,^" though he argued that the latter are in
o
re , A substance was held to be a thing whose nature is not
to exist in another, while an accident was considered a thing
whose nature is to exist in another. Just how the substance
sustains or supports its accidents was not further explained
by Aquinas.
In Scholasticism substantia and essentia are frequently
4
employed as synonymous terms, though in their more proper
usages the former refers to the subject and the latter to its
attributes, or accidents. However abstract the scholastic
disputations over the relation between these two aspects of
1Sum. Theol.
, I, 3, Art. 3 (Ans.), 85, Art. 5 (Reply 3),
84, Art. 1 tReply 3).
2
Ibid., I, 84, Art. 1 (Ans). "... Separate substances
are subsistent quiddities" ( Cont. Gent. II, 93).
Cont. Gent.
. I, 25, Sum. Theol. , Ill, 77, Art. 1 (Obj.
2), I, 54, Art. 3 (Obj. 2).
4Sum. Theol.
. I, 29, Art. 2 (Ans.), 3, Art. 3 (Ans.).
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being may have become, two empirical facts stood out clearly.
The first was that the world as found is differentiated in-
to various beings or substances, each of which is relatively
independent of the others. The second consisted in the ob-
servation that there are qualities, relations, and the like,
which exist not alone, but as belonging to the substances
and as needing them for their support » The problem of how
these accidents are "supported" was bequeathed to modern
thought
.
D. CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM
The reign of Aristotelianism which had been so promi-
nent during the Middle Ages was largely terminated by the
scientific developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. After the establishment of the heliocentric sys-
tem by Copernicus and Kepler, and the acceptance of the
Galilean theories on dynamics, the concept of substance re-
sembled more nearly the pre-Aristotelian doctrines of the
Pythagoreans and of Democritus. Substance was reckoned as
the unchanging magnitude within the transformations of phe-
nomona.
2
Royce, Art. I, 634.
2Cassirer, Art. I, 500-501.
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Descartes (1596-1650) believed that the magnitude of
motion in the world remains constant. The world of bodies
is completely closed in itself and admits of no interference
from the outside. "Causality" takes place in the realm of
extension according to mechanical law. But true substance,
that which "exists in such a way as to stand in need of noth-
ing beyond itself in order to its existence,"
1
is God. Mat-
ter is one of the two other kinds of entities which may be
called by this "common concept," even thougji they are "cre-
ated substances," and hence not substances in the truest
g
sense. These secondary substances are mind and body, whose
"principal attributes" are respectively thought ( cogitatio )
and extension ( extensio ) . The chief problem became that of
determining how these two widely differing realities could
enter into that relationship which exists between the soul
and body of man.
The Occasionalists took up the problem of the relation
between thinking and extended substances and concluded that
their "apparent" interaction can be explained only by the
mediation of God. God intervenes "on occasion" of each vo-
1Prlnciples
. I, 51.
2Ibid., I, 52.
3
Ibid., I, 53, 54.
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lition to excite in the body the proper movement, or "on oc-
casion" of corporeal action to produce the corresponding per-
ception in the soul."'" Since God is the efficient cause of
all perceptions and movements in human subjects, the latter
are really only modes of the former. Geulincx (1625-1669)
2
held that God acts in human beings, and Malebranche (1638-
1715) that God thinks in them. 3
For Spinoza (1632-1677) substance is the one concrete
whole of reality. 4 It is causa sui , "id quod in se est et
per se concipitur ." and is identified with God. It is both
the natura naturans and the natura naturata of the Scholas-
6
tics. There are infinite attributes of the one substance,
7
though only two of them are known, thought and extension.
1Weber and Perry, HOP, 256.
2
Metaphysica
.
V, 194-195 (Nagel, SPAG, 54).
^eber and Perry, loc. cit.
4
Some interpreters condemn Spinoza (cf. Windelband, GNP,
I, 218-219, Caird, SPI, 134, and Fischer, GNP, II, 359-360)
for the abstractness of his concept of reality. Since, how-
ever, what concreteness there is must be in reality, and since
substance is all of reality, substance is so far concrete.
5
Ethics
,
I, def. 3.
6Ibid., I, def. 6.
7
Spinoza discusses only these two, pointing out that sub-
stance is comprehended "now under this and now under that" at-
tribute, though both are "the same substance" (ibid*, II,
prop. 7, schol.). He admitted that only these two are known
in one of his letters (LXIV, Van Vloten edition).
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Particular things are modes of substance, deriving their re-
ality from the latter. 1 They are of two kinds, correspond-
ing to the two kinds of attributes. Knowledge is possible
because there is a complete parallelism between the two kinds
2
of modes. Mind and body are concrete examples of this fact.
Leibniz (1646-1716) held that substance is spiritual
force. Matter cannot be ultimate, for it is infinitely di-
visible. Even motion, which had been regarded as a form of
extension, is not as real as the force or cause of this mo-
4
tion. The true reality of things, their substantial form,
5
rests in such a unity as is found only in a soul or "I."
There are many substances or monads besides the supreme mon-
Q
ad, God. Each created monad depends upon God, but is com-
7
pletely separate from the others, although they all stand in
Q
a preestablished harmony. Substances differ in the degree
1
Ethic
s
. I, def. 5.
2
iiOrdo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio
rerum, " says Spinoza (ibid., II, prop. 7).
New System (Cassirer, LPW, II, 260).
4
Discourse
.
18,
5
New System (Cassirer, LPW, II, 265), Discourse , 12.
Discourse
. 32, Monadology , 47.
7Discourse
. 14, Monadology , 7, 9, New System (Cassirer,
ibid.
, 266)
.
qConcerning Preestablished Harmony (Cassirer, ibid.,
273), New System (Cassirer. ibid.. ^68-269).
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of their intelligence, some being rational, others merely
sentient but incapable of conscious reflection, and some
purely simple.^" The monads are logical subjects from which
2
all their present and future predicates may be deduced.
Movement and change are shifting circumstances of one remain-
ing fact. This problem of identity in change forms one of
the major issues regarding substance in modern thought.
The continental rationalists considered substance pri-
marily from a metaphysical standpoint, but the British em-
piricists were more interested in its epistemological sig-
nificance.
£• BRITISH EMPIRICISM
In British empiricism substance appears as a "category"
in which experience is ordered.
Locke (1632-1704) believed that knowledge arises only
from sensations or "ideas. * These may be simple^ or com-
Monadology. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 82. 83.
2
Letter to de Voider (Cassirer, LPW, II, 340), Discourse,
8, Letter to Arnauld (Cassirer, ibid., 202-203).
Letter to de Voider (Cassirer, ibid., 292, Monadology,
12 , 13,
The term "idea" stands for "whatever is the object of
the understanding when a man thinks. . , ." (Essay, bk. I,
ch. i, 8),
5Ibid., bk. II, ch. i, 24, 25, ch. ii, 1, 2.
t X
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plex,^" the latter "being the result when the landerstanding
2
orders the former into certain modes. Substance is such a
mode of connection but it is not a new reality supplied by
the mind. . . . Substances are such combinations of sim-
ple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular
»i4things. . . . " The simple ideas delivered by sense are as-
cribed to a substance or substratum ". « • though it be cer-
tain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we sup-
pose a support. 11 The traditional formula of substance and
accidents is "of little use in philosophy.
"
6
While the substratum of things is unknown, there is a
"real essence" which is "the foundation of all those quali-
ties which are the ingredients of our complex idea. ..."
Dewey believes it can be shown that Locke intended both pri-
mary and secondary qualities to be construed as dependent up-
Q
on the object, whereas the usual interpretation is that this
1Essay, bk. II. ch. 12.
2
Ibid., bk. II, ch. xii, 3.
Cf. ibid., bk. II, ch. i, 2, where all knowledge is
restricted to experience.
4
Ibid., bk. II, ch. xii, 6, ch. xxiii, 1.
Ibid., bk. II, ch. xxiii, 4, cf. 5.
6
Ibid., bk. II, ch. xiii, 19.
7
Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. vi, 3, cf. 2, 6.
Q
Art. I, especially pp. 24-27, 33.
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is true only of the former.^* But regardless of where the
basis of the qualities may be, their substance cannot be dis-
cerned with finality. Locke asserts that "power" is "a great
part of our complex ideas of substance,"^ but he does not
elaborate an alternative category to the troublesome sub-
3
stance.
Berkeley (1685-1753) found substance to be entirely
4
spiritual. What had been believed to be a material sub-
stance external to the mind is reduced to a mental reality.
Neither so-called primary nor secondary qualities have any
g
existence apart from mind. They are ideas which result in
7
the knowing subject from the activity of the divine mind.
QThe reality of ideas "consists only in being perceived,"
^"Justification for the usual interpretation seems to
follow from bk. II, ch. viii, 9-15 of the Essay.
2
Ibid., bk. II, ch. xxiii, 7.
3Whitehead, PR, 222.
4
Berkeley's advance in thought about substance consisted
in the fact that ".
.
.he gave up substances outside of
spirits," says Preedman, SCB, 51.
5This is the theme of the Dialogues and is given much
attention in his other chief works,
g
Dialogues, I (Everyman Edition, 207-240), Principles,
3.
7Principles. 28. 29, Dialogues, III (Everyman Edition,
266) .
8
Principles, 139. 2. 8. 25. 137.
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hence they are passive and inert.**" On the other hand, "a
soul ... is an active being, whose existence consists . . .
2in perceiving ideas and thinking, " Thus it may he consid-
ered a "spiritual substance." While spirit is "the only
substance or support -wherein unthinking beings or ideas can
ii 4
exist" it cannot itself be or be like an idea. Yet it is
not so obscure as the "I know not what" of Locke. Rather is
5
it immediately known as an active agent. Other spirits are
known through notions.
The concept of substance is not found in sense impres-
sions, according to Hume (1711-1776), hence it has no posi-
tive significance for knowledge. It is merely a product of
the imaginative power which combines the qualities or simple
ideas that are frequently together and gives them "a par-
7 8ticular name," "We have
. , . no idea of a substance"
either as applied to physical things or the human soul. The
Principles
. 25, 27, 139.
2
Ibid 0
,
139, 28.
3
Ibid., 139, 27, 89.
4
Ibid,, 135.
5
Dialogues
. Ill (Everyman Edition, 267, 269).
Principles
. 89.
7
Treatise
, bk. I, pt. i, sec. 6.
QIbid., pt. iv, sec. 5.
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former are nothing apart from qualities or perceptions,^" and
these are in no way bound together. The latter is merely a
"heap or collection of different perceptions'* which is wrong
ly endowed with identity. There is "a propensity to feign"
continued and substantial existence, but there is actually
no such reality.
Thus do the British empiricists minimize the importance
of the doctrine of substance. So far as material objects
are concerned, substance is either non-existent or unknown.
It occurs in experience, but for Hume it is present only as
a mode of connection or convention. Berkeley makes it a men-
tal reality but does not elaborate its nature beyond stating
that it is a simple, active, agent in which ideas exist.
P. GERMAN IDEALISM
In the philosophy of Kant (1724-1804) substance is a
universal and necessary "category" of thought. It is not a
"habit" by which impressions are ordered, as Locke and Hume
had held, but it is a synthesis of these sensations accom-
plished a priori by the mind in order that it may think the
Treatise
,
bk, I, pt. iv, see, 4.
Ibid., sees. 2, 6.
Ibid., sec. 2.
i
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objects before tt. Unless there is Something persisting in
the stream of appearance it would be impossible to make in-
2
telligible the order of phenomena.
There are two different ideas here, as Calkins points
out. On the one hand, substance is the category supplied
to sensations by thought. In this sense it is "permanence M
(Beharrlichkeit)
. On the other hand, substance is "the
permanent" (das Beharrliche) , and in this sense, which is
the one Kant seems more often to mean, it is that which
stands to its attributes in the relation of subject to predl-
cate. With this usage the category is "assigned a place
among the categories of relation, but rather as the condition
of relations than as itself containing a relation." Sub-
stance as the permanent is the presupposition of all change.
It is that which undergoes transformations.
Kant does not give a satisfactory answer to the question
of precisely what this "permanent-required-by-change" is. In
1
KdrV, A 77-80, B 103-106.
2
Ibid., A 183, B 226.
^PP, 555.
4
The title of the first Analogy is "Grundsatz der Be-
harrlichkeit der Substanz" (ibid., A 182, B 224).
5
Ibid., A 186, B 229.
6
Ibid., A 187, B 230.
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the first Analogy he seems to identify substance and time,"*"
though he suggests in a later section of the same work (sec-
2
ond edition) that the permanent is identifiable with space.
Whatever may have been his conclusion about the inherent
nature of substance, Kant did not consider it a category co-
ordinate with the others. Rather was it held to be \ , .
the condition of the categories, that to which the categories
are applied." It made the other categories intelligible.
Substance, along with the other categories, applies
4
only to phenomena, but not to things-in-themselves. The
real substratum of all things is unknown. Thus the tran-
scendental self or soul is an unknown substratum beneath its
5phenomenal manifestations,
Hegel (1770-1831) made substance a category which is
both "the totality of accidents" and "the manifold ( Reichtum )
of all content, 11 Thus it is the reality that is actualized
7in particular phenomena. By virtue of its being a system of
KdrV, A 182, B 224-225.
2
lbid., B 292.
Calkins, PPP, 556.
4
Cf, the section on "phenomena and Noumena," A 235-260,
B 294-315, also A 137-147, B 176-187.
5
Ibid., B 155, 157.
Encyclopadie
, art. 151.
7
Ibid., Art. 153.
44
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attributes it is a concrete universal, "a self-subsistent
unity, like the substance of rationalistic philosophers, 1,1
At its highest level substance becomes a "subject," the
thought-unity which breaks itself up or expresses itself in
2its own particulars. The Absolute is a substance which as
thinking subject actualizes itself on various levels, or at
3
different stages of the dialectic.
For Schopenhauer (1788-1860) substance is unconscious
4
will, the true ground of all changing phenomena. Hartmann
(1842-1906) made the Unconscious the permanent and unchange-
able reality of which the modes are the changing accidents.
Lotze (1817-1881) found substance in conscious experience.
For him there is an infinite substance or soul which is the
Q
unity harmonizing variety and change.
G. MISCELLANEOUS THEORIES
The Scottish school of "common sense," lead by Reid
(1710-1796), stoutly opposed Hume 1 s sensationalism by assert-
22,
1Lindsay, Art. I, 913.
2Encyclopa!die
.
art. 213.
3Cf. ibid,, arts. 213, 244, 574, 575, 577.
4Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung
,
arts. 21, 23, 28,
5
The Philosophy of the Unconscious
,
II, 222-244, 276-297.
6Metaphysics
,
arts, 37, 96.
c
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ing the common sense view that objects exist independently
of perception, their qualities inhering in a substratum. The
1
subject of the qualities is the true object. While the re-
lation of qualities to their substance remained somewhat ob-
#
scure, it was thought to be distinguishable from other rela-
tions without argument.
Renouvier (1815-1903) held that there is spiritual sub-
stance which signifies the coexistence and succession of phe-
nomena. In the writings of Avenarius (1843-1896) and Mach
(1838-1916) the concept of substance has an essentially bi-
ological significance. It serves the "economy of thought"
for it is "a means of correlating a multiplicity of experi-
ences, and giving them one name."5 But this is only a nomi-
nal and not a real unity.
Scientific developments in the nineteenth century had
significant results for philosophy. There was a growing
distrust of metaphysical speculation contemporaneous with re-
4
newed interest in the philosophy of nature. The tendency
was to interpret the nature of things in scientific formulae.
This movement in thought as it has continued into the twenti-
essays
.
I, ch. II, 5 (Stewart Edition, II, 36).
2Lindsay, Art. I, 913.
3
Cassirer, Art. I, 502.
4Calkins, PPP, 397.
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eth century has had a marked influence on the concept of sub-
stance. This is the problem to be considered in the next
chapter. But before beginning that inquiry it will be in-
structive to summarize the historical uses of the term sub-
stance*
H. SUMMARY
Prom this brief survey it appears that the most impor-
tant functions which the term substance has performed in the
history of thought are the following.
First, it has served as the substratum which consists in
physical and mental potentialities. As substratum it has
been quantitatively and qualitatively monistic as well as
quantitatively and qualitatively pluralistic. Secondly, sub-
stance has been thought to consist in number, or in the ele-
ment of proportion, connection, or harmony that obtains in
all becoming. Third, it has been thought of as both formal,
or final, and material cause. In the fourth place, it has
been considered the active, or passive, known, or unknown,
subject in which predicates and qualities inhere, and also
these qualities themselves apart from their subject. Fifth,
it has denoted both universality and particularity, individu-
ality and generality. Sixth, substance has been held to be
not only a convenient though unessential habit of associating
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perceptions, but also the universal and necessary category
without which knowledge is impossible* Seventh, it has been
made the conscious as well as the unconscious unity or perma-
nence in change, the noumenon of changing phenomena.
In the light of these conclusions there appears to be
much evidence for Muirhead's thesis that "the problem of sub-
stance may be identified with that of Philosophy in gener-
nl
al. The variety of meanings which the concept of substance
bears has resulted from the efforts of different philosophers
to attain ultimate explanations for things. Through these
differing interpretations runs the relatively common theme
that there is an enduring ground of changing phenomena which
gives rise to various forms, but maintains their connection
and identity. Substance has meant primarily an independent
and self-contained or self-existent reality upon which lesser
2
realities depend for their nature and continuance.
Spaulding ! s thesis that the whole history of philosophy
has been "thingized" by the concept of substance seems,
therefore, questionable. His view indicates an oversimpli-
fication of history. It emphasizes the logical to the ex-
1
Art. I, 197, 175.
2
Cf. Hoernle, SGM, 102.
3NR, xvi, xvii, 29, 30, 35.
i
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elusion of the metaphysical meanings of the term. Substance
as formal or final cause, as the element of proportion in
becoming, or as the permanent element in change, does not
fit into the "thing" formula.
Recent developments in science which have led to the re-
newed criticism of substance as a significant concept in phi-
losophy may now be observed.

CHAPTER III
SUBSTANCE IN RECENT SCIENCE
According to classical or Newtonian physics matter was
a stuff or substratum manifested in such attributes as mass,
extension, motion, and impenetrability. Change, and the
supposed creation and disappearance of material objects were
considered transformations, according to rigid laws, of the
fundamental and enduring matter. 1 Within the three-dimen-
sional frame-work of space, eternal and changeless particles
of matter were thought to advance through a one-dimensional
2
time. Particles are in motion, it was asserted, because of
external forces exerted upon them. Everywhere in space,
not only in its "empty" parts but even in apparently solid
bodies, a mysterious substance called ether was commonly pos-
4
tulated.
During the next century and a half it was held that the
^itehead, SMW, 73, 74, 70, 78, 80.
2
Ibid., 76, 79, AOI, 167-169.
3Whitehead, SMW, 61. Cf. Buckley, SHP, 38-39, 42-43.
4Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 208-209.
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elements constituting the physical world were material sub-
stances But, as will be shown below, by the end of the
nineteenth century fixed or inert substances with intrinsic
properties were seriously questioned, and within the first
quarter of the twentieth century they were largely denied by
scientists ,
"
The neo-realists , who believe the difference between
science and philosophy is merely one of degree and not of
2
kind, have concluded, partly because of these scientific
findings, that there are no complex substances which are bas-
ic to reality, and which hold together and explain it. Rath-
er is such explanation to be found, they believe, in ultimate
entities which are simple and externally related. The criti-
cisms of the concept of substance by these realists will be
more clear after its fate at the hands of scientists is ob-
served.
A. SCIENCE AND MEASUREMENT
Substance as an important concept is minimized, in the
first place, by the prevalent belief among scientists that
^"Cf. Lindemann, PSQT, 1-12.
2
Holt, et al., NR, 42, 36, 57. Marvin goes so far as
to say the "great metaphysical discoverer and explorer H is
the scientist and not "the professional philosopher" (Art.
Ill, 312, cf. 313).
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objects are to be defined in terms of certain measurements.
The common sense belief in substantiality is obviously-
challenged by the conviction, which is even more widely held
now than formerly, that reality is different from its appear-
ances. For such scientists as Eddington, Jeans, Millikan,
Whitehead, Einstein, Planck, Weyl, and many others, the fa-
miliar world of tables and chairs and people is not the real
world, but the latter* s appearances. What the plain man
takes to be a substantial object therefore may actually be
something quite different.
But, some scientists assert, there is "nothing substan-
g
tial" even about the so-called "real world" with which sci-
ence is concerned. What had been thought to be substantial
things by the scientists themselves are now reduced to meas-
urements. Newton had realized that the nature of things can
be given a mathematical or metrical statement. Mass, the
defining property of matter, was stated mathematically as the
weight of a given object divided by the gravitational con-
stant of the place where the measurement was made. Thus by
the end of the seventeenth century "a satisfactory basis of
measurement" had been found. But even the material sub-
"Cf. Joad, PAMS, 9, 12, 112.
2
Eddington, NPW, x, xii.
Whitehead, SMW, 66.
1t
64
stances of Newton are now representable by more minute calcu-
lations than he ever imagined possible. As Eddington says,
The whole trend of modern scientific views is to
break down the separate categories of 'things, 1 'in-
fluences, 1 'forms, 1 etc., and to substitute a com-
mon background of all experience. Whether we are
studying a material object, a magnetic field, a
geometric figure, or a duration of time, our scien-
tific information is summed up in measure. 1
The scientist deals henceforth with sets of measurements,
not with things, and "substance" turns out to be "one of the
greatest of our illusions."
Measurements for the scientist are, at least for all
practical purposes, the "things" that make up reality. This
amounts to a reapplication of the Pythagorean doctrine that
qualitative conceptions must be replaced by quantitative re-
lations before thought begins to grasp its objects. 3 Instead
of talking about the force with which an elephant would
strike an object after sliding down a grassy slope, the phys-
icist reckons that a mass of a certain amount, e. g. , two
tons, would gain a certain force when proceeding down an in-
clined plane of 60° , after the coefficient of friction had
been calculated. 4 The same procedure would be followed where
1
NPW, x-xi, cf. 253, 252.
2Ibid., xiv.
Millikan, ELEC, 4. Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, PA,
206.
4
Eddington, ibid., 251-252.
•4
>65
very small objects were under consideration.
Whitehead points out that the quantitative determina-
tion of objects means nothing for science until the pattern
in which these quantities occur is also discovered, 1 This
would mean that measurements or quantities which behave ac-
cording to law are the "things" of science. It would still
be possible, however, to express these complex facts in
mathematical formulae.
Even if there were more to an object than could be gath-
ered up into its mathematical formula, say the scientists,
such a further element would be unimportant. The only fac-
tors that determine one»s interpretation of reality can be
quantitatively expressed. For the physicist the indefina-
bles, in terms of which he expresses other concepts, are
length, time, and mass. All of these are numerical con-
2
cepts. The troublesome problem of how qualities inhere in
a substratum need not concern the scientific investigator,
for he knows what the object is in his measurements.
The concept of substance is accordingly denied, or at
least minimized, by scientists in their belief that objects
1NAL, 17-19.
2
Lindemann, PSQT, 13.
Bddington, as noted above, finds that the reduction of
objects to measurements makes substance an illusion, but, as
shown in chapter II, the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers or
measurement is still the affirmation of a certain kind of sub-
stance.
a
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are certain quantities or measurement s.
B. THE RELATIVITY OF MEASUREMENT1
A second aspect of scientific thought which has had im-
portant consequences for the concept of substance is an
elaboration of the first . It consists in the discovery that
all measurements are relative. There is no fixity either in
the object measured or in the instrument used for measuring.
Solidity in the physical world, as conceived by the
2
classical or Newtonian physicists, was undermined by the
Fitzgerald theory of contraction. It was discovered by
Fitzgerald that a rod contracts when held along the line of
motion. The field of electrical forces which constitutes
the volume of the rod is changed by its velocity in a way
that does not happen when the rod is held across the line of
•3
motion. With the change in the fields of force which con-
stitute the rod there results a change in the rod's length.
Thus, unless the earth were at rest, it would be impossible
to gain an exact measurement of any object, 4 for the motion
Scientific developments are treated here more in their
logical than chronological order.
p
The atomic and electronic theories of matter, which al-
so undermined the idea of solidity, are elaborated below.
3Buckley, SHP, 219.
4
Eddington, NPW, 6-8.
o<*
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of the earth disturbs the fixity of the measuring rod's
length*
On the other hand, as Lindemann observes, the applica-
tion of any measuring device, even that of light, exerts suf-
ficient pressure on the objects measured as to change their
original character. The margin of error is the more signifi-
cant the more minute the measurement.^" There is accordingly
no metrical justification for asserting a solid or fixed sub-
stance, for such a reality cannot be established by the most
exact calculations science affords. If there is such solid
and fixed substance there is no way of ascertaining it.
Einstein has shown on a larger scale the relative in-
exactitude of measurement. According to the frame of space
in which men on this planet measure, objects have certain
definite quantitative values. Measurements on other planets
must be made according to different frames of space from
those employed here. Because the various planets are in mo-
tion relatively to each other measurements obtained on one
differ from those obtained on another. Measurement of the
speed with which an airplane travels from Boston to New York
by one of the plane's operators would doubtless vary widely
from a calculation made on Mars. Man need not ask whether
his frame of space is the right one, for it is the only one
^SQT, 15-19.
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for him . Yet in his calculations, he must remember that his
1 His not the only one there is. Thus . , the general
statements of phenomena are not capable of expression in an
invariant form. " Universal and fixed, determinations of
things are impossible.
Laws of nature are then invariables between variables.
In spite of relativity in measurements, the quantities which
are taken to represent objects bear reasonably constant rela-
tions to each other. It is this element of constancy, as
Heraclitus long ago saw, which prevents the universe from
dissolving into chaotic flux. But the elements which bear
these relatively constant relations are not fixed substances.
4They vary with the passing of time.
Substance as the fixed and solid stuff of things cannot
be predicated because measurements are only approximate. It
might be asserted on faith, but faith in what is unverifiable
has no place in scientific calculations. If there is fixed
substance there is no way of proving it.
Eddington, NPW, 20-55. Cf. Spaulding, WAI, 184-188,
Whitehead, SMW, 167-173.
2
Buckley, SHP, 225.
3Spaulding, ibid., 190-191.
4Cf. Whitehead, ibid., 172.

C. THE QUANTUM THEORY
Not only does the relativity of measurement make it
highly improbable that there is a fixed and solid stuff or
substance in things, but the experimental study of physical
objects yields results harmonious with that conclusion. Mat
ter is no longer believed by experimenters to be a solid sub
stance. Rather is it demonstrated with some conclusiveness
to be constituted by fields of electrical force.
When the neo-realistic movement was developing in Ameri
ca there was less agreement among physicists concerning the
ultimate nature of matter than there is at present. There
was, however, a rather general conviction that, whatever mat
ter is, it at least is not an underlying and solid stuff."
1"
Subsequent discoveries enabled physicists to show more defi-
nitely the absence of stuff and the presence of electrical
energy. Today it is "the accepted conclusion" that "all va-
rieties of matter are composed of two elementary constitu-
ents—.protons and electrons."
Matter had long been reduced to molecules and atoms be-
fore the electronic hypotheses were developed. In the first
half of the nineteenth century a renewed study, by such sci-
Cf. Holt, COC, 116-117.
2
Eddington, NPW, 3. (This book was published in 1928.)
But cf. infra, 75-76, where the possibility that electrons
are solid is considered.
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entists as Dalton and Avogadro, of the atomism bequeathed to
modern thought "by the Greeks, yielded the important insight
that these atoms combine in certain groups according to regu-
lar laws. 1 The number of ultimate and necessary elements
was thus reduced to seventy. Chemistry as a modern science
2
sprang from this achievement. But in the second half of
the last century, it became clear through experiment that the
atoms making up the molecules were not indivisible as former-
ly supposed • Evidence was found which showed them to be ag-
gregates of separate and electrically charged particles.
These particles have come to be known as electrons. By the
turn of the century this "atomic theory of electricity" had
"compelled the abandonment of other points of view. "^
The solidity or substantiality of matter was at first
little altered by the theory that electrical charges are the
primordial elements within matter. Mass was supplied to the
atom, it was believed, by the positive electron, whose mass
was about equal to that of the lightest known atom, viz. the
hydrogen atom. Negative charges, on the other hand, were
^•Haas, NP, 45-46.
2
Millikan, ELE, 2.
3Bohr, Art. I, 642. Cf. Haas, ibid., 46-55.
4Millikan, ibid., 23.
. .
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supposed to "be embedded in this positive jelly-like sphere,
and were thought to have a mass which was only 1/1,845 of
that ascribed to the hydrogen atom."1"
In 1911 Rutherford introduced Mthe greatest change in
our idea of matter since Democritus. " He showed that rela-
tively speaking there is as much empty space within the atom
as there is in the heavens between the planets. Whatever
mass the atom may retain is furnished by the protons or posi-
tive charges within it, but these are much smaller than was
formerly supposed. It is estimated that the diameter of an
electron is only about 1/50,000 of the diameter of an atom,
and that the atom T s nucleus, formed of positive charges, is
very little larger. 4 With the atom shown to be as porous as
the solar system, a reversion to the theory of matter as
solid substance is unthinkable, regardless of how details of
this insight may be enlarged upon.
So far, at least, science has been content to believe
-"-Of. Millikan, ELE, 179, Eddington, NPW, 2, Bohr, Art.
I, 642.
2
Eddington, ibid., 1.
Bohr, loc. cit.
4
Eddington, ibid., 3. Millikan estimates that the nu-
cleus is in no case more than 1/10,000 the diameter of the
atom (ibid., 191).
5
Millikan says the atom is 'mostly hole" (loc. cit.).
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that matter is sufficiently explained by these two primor-
dial elements, protons and electrons. There is as yet no
evidence for a "sub-electron."^ Some scientists do, however,
postulate an imponderable "medium," termed "ether," in
which the electrons and protons act upon each other. White-
head, on the other hand, regards such an hypothesis as an un-
necessary and "muddled notion confusing many different rela-
ii3tions under a convenient common form of speech.
It now appears that the nature of a material object can
be grasped when the behavior of its constituents, namely the
electrons and protons, is determined. The activity of the
electron, some scientists think, is intermittent. It does
not continuously traverse a given path. Rather does it ap-
pear at a series of discrete positions in space, much as an
automobile might, which travels not along a highway, but
whose course allows it to appear on the highway only at each
4
successive milestone. The electron is a whole field of vi-
brations and not a single movement in the air. Steady endur-
^•Millikan, ELE, 178.
2Mills, RMS, 90.
3C0N, 18, SMW, 145.
Whitehead, SMW, 50.
^itehead, ibid., 51-52. Cf. Rougier, PNP, 71-72,
Mills, ibid., 100.
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ance of matter is to be accounted for by the fact that these
fields of force prolong their vibrations, as a sustained
note of music may be a prolonged series of vibrations. The
"essence" of the atom is "the electro-dynamic law according
to which the discoverable elements of the electron and the
Mlproton form and seek to maintain themselves in a system."
Planck, whose work has figured prominently in the origin
p
and development of the Quantum Theory, maintains that there
is a quantum of action, namely, 6«52, 10~27 erg, sec, by
which objects as fields of activity can be measured. He held
that energy itself is atomic, and that it is emitted from the
atom and hence from the molecule in these tiny units or ir-
3
reducible quanta. Thus the activity of a given unit of mat-
ter can be measured by this rule. The nature of a thing is
determined by the number of vibrations, i. e. the number of
these minimal units emitted, per second.
Since the physical world is "a field of incessant activ-
ity there remains no ground for the theory that matter is
1
Muirhead, Art. I, 179.
o
Lindemann, PSQT, 3-4.
Planck, ODQT, 17.
4Whitehead, NAL, 11.
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a fixed and substantial stuff."*" \ • • The conception of
substance is wholly lacking" in science, says Bddington, and
"that which most nearly replaces it," namely, the electric
charge, is not "exalted as star performer above the other
2
entities of physics." Thus, a stuff-like substratum is re-
jected by the scientists. Physical things are certain kinds
of activities.
D. THE NATURE OP ELECTRONS
In order to determine whether the concept of substance
in any of its other forms remains intelligible for philoso-
phy after these developments in science have been recognized,
it is necessary to know something about the inherent nature
of the electrons themselves. But at this point the problem
passes from the province of science into that of philosophy.
Science has no answer to this question concerning the
true nature of the electron. 3 The latter is rather "the
fundamental entity with which modern science starts. n As
1
Cf. Weyl's criticisms of material substance in WIM,
1-18. He concludes: "ich bin fest davon flberzeugt, dass die
Substanz heute ihre Rolle in der Physik ausgespielt hat"
(ibid., 18).
2NPW, 274, cf. 273, 318-319, 241.
3Thomson, OS, I, 288, Bddington, NPW, 260.
^ills, RMS, 89, cf. 102.
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pointed out above, science begins with unknowns and lets
their measurements represent them, but it never solves the
problem of what the intrinsic nature that is measured may
be* The scientist can measure and describe a recurring fact,
but he cannot explain what that fact which recurs is in it-
self.
On the one hand, there is a movement in philosophy to
retain a materialistic view of electrons.^" The internal hap-
penings of atoms are interpreted as the locomotion of materi-
al parts. Whatever vibrations take place are, it is held,
movements of actual bits of material stuff, Sheldon argues
that the electron may itself be considered a "material stuff"
since it "moves continuously from place to place" and since
it possesses an integrity or individuality of its own which
prevents it from being encroached upon by other elements out-
's
side it self, ~ Lenzen believes that the attributes of con-
stancy, objectivity, and extensiveness attaching to all phys-
ical bodies justifies one in postulating material substance.
That which maintains a certain integrity or constancy and
acts as a unit, whether extended or unextended may, it is
true, be considered a substance. But whether such behavior
htougier, PNP, 152-153.
2Art. I, especially pp. 548-550.
3Art. I, 156, 153.
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is possible for a purely material substance may be seriously
questioned.
On the other hand, Leibnizian philosophers hold that
electrons are of the nature of mind, and that the fields of
force which science talks about are forms of conscious ener-
gy.
1
Eddington, turning philosopher for the time being,
points out that the vibrations or fields of force which are
the electrons of the brain in some way turn back upon them-
selves and become consciousness, or at least support con-
sciousness. This first-hand information about the background
of these electrons serves as a clue to the nature of all
2
electrons, he believes. Idealistic philosophers contend
that the attributes which science ascribes to electrons, chief
among which is activity according to pattern, receive the most
adequate metaphysical explanation when conscious life is made
the foundation of material things.
A third view, which attempts to mediate between the
idealistic and materialistic interpretations of the physical
world, advocates the further reduction and analysis of these
supposedly ultimate elements discovered by physics. Elec-
Such philosophers believe in the "dematerialization of
matter," as Rougier puts it (PNP, 62-67, 149).
2NPW, 260, 267-268, 276, 281.
Cf. Whitehead^ second lecture in NAL.
i
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trons are reduced to simpler properties which qualify in-
stants in time and points in space. These final elements re«
suiting from the analysis of matter are "neutral entities. n^
As ultimate simples they somehow get themselves arranged in
such complexes as are customarily called material things.
The fact that these entities are never found except in com-
plexes that are not neutral in quality, constitutes a diffi-
culty which advocates of this view recognize but do not con-
sider serious.
But the issue concerning the ultimate nature of elec-
trons for philosophy cannot be settled here. Regardless of
what their complete and ultimate explanation may be, as
fields of force they have at least been shown to retain a
certain constancy througih given periods of time. They are
also known to change when brought into proximity with other
fields of force. The change induced need not alter the char-
acter of the original field altogether. It matters little
what the philosopher may choose to call this reality that is
a field of activity, or what quality he may ascribe to it.
But the reality itself does have significance for thought
about the concept of substance.
-'"Holt, COC, 118.
**
I
E. THE EVOLUTION OF FORMS
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While physical sciences occupy the center of the stage
in contemporary thought, and are, therefore, chiefly respon-
sible for the acuteness of the problem of substance, some
other sciences have also contributed to the controversy. De-
velopments in biology and psychology have made it necessary
once more to examine the concept of substance.
In biology the theory of evolution has affected the no-
tion of substance. According to the Scholastic conception of
eternal and substantial forms, which had been derived from
Aristotle, there were Real Kinds forever ready to be individ-
ualized and discovered in experience. Forms or types of be-
ing were once created by God, the supreme being, and were
thought to stand in a hierarchy of perfection. 1 Growth of
forms was not recognized by the Schoolmen.
Darwin, however, sought to show that changes from spe-
cies to species took place through a series of minute modifi-
2
cations of a few primitive forms. More recent biologists
have abandoned this view for the theory that the diversity be-
tween species indicates the emergence of new types, perhaps
related to earlier forms, but so distantly as to be consid-
1Cf. supra, 44-45, also Sum. Theol.
,
I, 44, Art. 1 (Ans.).
2Origin of Species
, I, 161-163, 260, 6, 515, II, 94, 99,
104 , 115.
1
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ered unique and distinct. The "orderly sequence of events,"
these scientists argue, "appears to present from time to time
something genuinely new. "^
Either of these hypotheses concerning the origin of spe-
cies is significant for substance. If all species are deriva-
ble ultimately from the same genus or from a few primitive
2
forms the doctrine of Real Kinds must be modified. The
growth of forms into more complex species would make the lim-
its of each type hard to discern. This difficulty would ob-
tain in the relation of all so-called species to each other.
In short the formula of substance and attribute would be only
a means of vague classification for individual forms and not
3
an instrument for their clear distinction. And if, on the
other hand, evolution gives rise to the genuinely novel, one
must conclude either that new substances themselves arise or
that new forms of the one substance appear. Substantial
forms would be, according to this theory, created or mani-
fested in the evolutionary process. New substances would
then appear in time. They could not have existed eternally.
Accordingly, the theory of evolution raises the problem
of permanence and change, identity and diversity, universali-
"hlorgan, EE, 1.
2
Cf. Temple, NMG, 102.
Whitehead, Lectures on "The Function of Reason," Har-
vard University, 1937.
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ty and individuality. These issues have been, as noted
above, 1 associated with the problem of substance. The prin-
ciple of evolution focuses attention once more upon the char-
acter of substance.
F. PSYCHOLOGY AND SUBSTANCE
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and
the opening years of the twentieth, psychology came more and
2
more to be recognized as a separate science. Beginning in
that period and continuing to the present there have been de-
velopments which have made the question of substance in con-
sciousness a vital issue.
As early as 1884 James urged the importance of the
"transitive" over the "substantive" elements in the stream
of consciousness. Wundt, Yerkes, Mtfnsterberg, and Titchener,
were leaders in a movement to study consciousness by observ-
ing its structure. 4 This school of "structuralists" in psy-
chology held that consciousness is a compound of states. By
discriminating the items of which a person may be aware at
any given moment, e. g« the sensation blue, or a feeling of
1
Cf. pp. 58-59.
2J. S. Moore, POP, 19.
3Bentley, Art. I, 383.
4
J. S. Moore, ibid., 27.
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1
anger, it was supposed that consciousness was explained.
With the development of experimental methods in psychology
the "structuralists" have tended less and less to distinguish
2
themselves from other schools. Yet the inclination persists
to explain consciousness atomistically, i. e. by its reduc-
tion to parts. It is clear that if mind or consciousness is
only a loose aggregate of states or elements, there is little
ground for "belief in mental or spiritual substance.
However, other schools of psychology have strongly op-
posed explanation of consciousness by mere analysis. Ge-
4 5 6
stalt, functional, and dynamic psychologists have empha-
sized the organic, and active unity of consciousness. Repre-
sentatives of these schools have employed the method of
analysis but they have been more concerned with the whole of
consciousness than with its parts. Their views would permit
the conclusion that the self or spiritual substance is the
element of wholeness and permanence in conscious experience.
1
Piper and Ward, PMK, 101.
2Nafe, Art. I, 128-129.
^The concept of the "subconscious" employed by psycho-
analysts does have some affinity with the doctrine of sub-
stance, however.
4Murchison, P030, 145-187.
5
Ibid., 59-78.
6Ibid., 327-336.
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It is, however, doubtful whether they would concede that be-
lief in a soul-substance which is transcendent to the stream
of conscious experience is justifiable. Modern scientific
psychology with its emphasis on experimental verification
has almost unanimously rejected this older theory of soul-
substance."''
The question of whether there is or is not spiritual or
mental substance, and if so, what its nature is, cannot be
considered closed. According to metaphysical behaviorism
o
there is no non-physical consciousness at all. Of the
schools which allow that consciousness is a unique and non-
physical reality, some deny its substantiality, others pro-
pose views consistent with it. The philosopher must formu-
late his concept of consciousness in the light of evidence
which all these schools present.
(J. CONCLUSIONS
Prom these developments in science one may conclude that
there is evidence for abandoning substance in some senses,
and for retaining it in others.
Among physicists there is rather general agreement that
matter is not a solid, stuff-like, substance in which such
^J. S. Moore, POP, 8.
2
Murchison, P030, 281-306.
1 c
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qualities as mass, motion, extension, and impenetrability
inhere. There is no solid block of substance which is mani-
fested in particular physical things. Nor can matter be con-
sidered a sum of indestructible atoms which become related in
such fashion as to account for the apparently solid and sub-
stantial character of material objects.
However, the conclusion of physicists that material ob-
jects are fields of force within which there are other fields
of activity may not make necessary the complete rejection of
substance. If these fields of activity are relatively con-
stant though subject to change when outside influences play
upon them, the philosopher may hold that substance in some
sense still remains.
In the first place, the historical conception of sub-
stance as the potentiality out of which particular things
arise does not appear to have been denied by contemporary
physicists. The capacity of electrons as fields of force to
become related so as to constitute now this thing and now
that may be explained by a theory of substance. Matter still
has the potentiality of assuming many different forms. Sec-
ondly, substance as the formal cause of physical things may
also be left to philosophy. The fact that the potentialities
for particular things actually become those particular things
may be due to a substantial or formative element in reality.
i
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Finally, substance as the element of unity or permanence in
change remains an intelligible concept in spite of research
in physics* Given fields of force are altered by the influ-
ence of other such fields, but their identity is not totally
destroyed. Otherwise the universe would dissolve into a
hopeless flux, a madhouse of meaninglessness.
In biology the theory of evolution has raised the ques-
tion of whether there are one or many substances, and whether
they are created in time or are eternally existent. Psy-
chologists unite in rejecting the theory of a transcendent
soul or substance in, or rather beyond, consciousness. They
differ in their answers to the question of whether conscious-
ness is a unified and organic activity. The conclusion that
there may be something substantial about mind receives sup-
port from some of them, but it is also denied by others.
The significance of recent scientific developments can-
not and should not be further elaborated here. Sufficient
evidence has been presented to show that the concept of sub-
stance is clearly in need of revision. For this reason the
neo-realistic criticisms of it are timely and may be expect-
ed to have some validity. That the necessity for rejecting
substance in every sense can be shown by neo-realists
,
seems,
however, improbable. The variety of meanings which the con-
cept has expressed in the history of thought makes it reason-
t
able to suppose that some of them may be retained. More-
over, developments in science still permit the retention of
the doctrine in some of its historical meanings
,
Revisions which neo-realists have shown to be pertinent
to substance may now be observed.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND THE NEW LOGIC
Neo-realists make plain their attitude toward the con-
cept of substance in the method by which they investigate
the data of experience. The school "champions analysis as
an ultimate method of research. . . and eschews all
synthetic and intuitive methods as final. These "devotees
of analysis" regard substance as one of the "complexes"
that are capable of further reduction, and not as itself
a simple category.^ Because it is "incompatible with his
theory of analysis," substance must be rejected by the
neo-realist. A true ontology and epistemology "... can
only be the outcome of analytical method. . . f " and this
means for the realist that in these two realms the concept
of substance plays but a small part, if indeed it signifies
anything whatsoever.
Marvin, Art. Ill, 316.
Terry, Art. IV, 127. Cf. Holt, et al., NR, 55.
'Evans, NROR, 96.
Ibid., 97.

87
If the neo-realistic claim can be established that the
method of analysis is valid as the final procedure in re-
search, the concept of substance may be rejected. It is
therefore necessary to observe the nature and validity of
this method.
A. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS
Neo-realists offer as a preliminary definition the as-
sertion that analysis is ".
. • only the careful, systematic,
and exhaustive examination of any topic of discourse. ""^ It
is "simply the discrimination and specification of the de-
tail of experience." "Analytical thinking" is equated with
"exact thinking," and it results in "exact knowledge."
But if this were all the method involved, it would not dif-
fer from others. Rather would it be merely an elaboration
of the neo-realistic emphasis upon "the scrupulous use of
words" and "definition," 5 and as such it would be acceptable
to any investigator in philosophy. This insistence on rig-
^olt et al., im, 24. Cf. Perry, PCI, 373.
p
Perry, PPT, 236.
3Perry, Art. IV, 107.
4Holt, ibid., 24.
5
Ibid., 21-23.
c
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orous definitions may have brought the charge of "new
m1
scholasticism" upon the school, but if so it is indeed a
noble stigma to bear.
In actual use by the neo-realists, however, the meth-
od of analysis possesses further and more controversial
significance. It is the method of finding explanations
for things in ultimate and simple entities. Through anal-
ysis ".
. .
the problematic is discovered to be a complex
of simples,"2 and hence no longer problematic. No complex
is understood until it has been reduced to such simples as
are incapable of further reduction. These simples are
n
. . .
the terms that survive an analysis that has been car-
ried as far as it is possible to carry it. ..." For
neo-realism "there are no complex unities,"^ but only com-
plexes made up of ultimate simples. "A neo-realist recog-
nizes no ultimate immediacies nor non-relational nor in-
definable entities, except the simples in which analysis
terminates."5 The fundamental meaning of any object rests
Cohen, Art. I, 264.
2Holt, et al #
,
NR, 24.
3Ibid., 32.
Marvin, PBM, 79.
5Holt, ibid # , 32.
> » «
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t
T - »
89
in the simple entities which constitute it. 1
The method of analysis is an effort to understand the
2
universe through its parts and not through its wholes.
One of the theses supported by neo-realism is, according to
Perry, that . .we must work . . . from the part to the
whole," and not vice versa . The data to be analyzed, may,
to be sure, occur as wholes. Analysis means ". . .to dis-
cover that an entity is in some sense formed or composed
of parts," and hence it "involves the whole-part relation."4
The parts, their organizing relations, and whatever proper-
ties the whole may have which the parts do not, are speci-
fied by analysis, but the chief importance is found in the
Qparts, for they supply the character of the whole.
Stress is laid on the fact that analysis is a discovery
"^Perry asserts that ".
.
.a complex depends on
. . .
its! simple components both for its nature and its mean-
ng" (Art. IV, 127).
"The world" (i. e. the universe) for the neo-realist
is at least "an articulate structure that is revealed by
analysis" (Holt, et al., NR, 35), but it is itself not one
organic whole, as will be shown below.
3PCI, 374.
4Spaulding, Art. V, 158.
5Ibid., 161.
6Perry, PPT, 319. Spaulding holds that the whole is
at least no more significant than the parts for the latter
".
. .
are real in quite the same sense as are the wholes
which are analyzed" (Art. V, 155).
J4
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of parts in a whole and not their invention or falsification
so as to contradict the whole."1" In reply to the pragmatist,
who makes the first charge, it is asserted that though one
may select parts in a given whole for purely practical rea-
sons, such as prediction and control of nature, and may make
artificial divisions of wholes into parts, this is no con-
2demnation of the method hut merely a misuse of it. To the
contention of Bergson and Bradley that analysis results in
parts that contradict the whole, e. g. that the analysis of
motion leads to rests, the realist retorts that this too is
a misuse of the method, and that the attack presupposes the
validity of analysis. 4
i
The philosophic enterprise begins and ends in analysis,
for the neo-realist. n
. . .
The very objects of philosophy
n
are the fruit of analysis, 11 i, e. the naive assumptions of
common sense are first banished through analysis. 5 On the
^•Spaulding, Art. V, 155. A liberal use of the princi-
ple of independence, one of the cardinal doctrines of neo-
realism (cf. Perry, Art. IV), is made in defense of this
interpretation of analysis.
2
Spaulding, ibid., 158-159.
^Cf. Burnham and Wheelwrights assertion that "any type
of analysis, if pressed too far, will lead to paradox.* PA,
91.
4
Spaulding, ibid., 160-161.
5Holt, et al., NR, 21.
» 1
other hand, the fundamental truths attained by the philoso-
pher result from analysis It is little wonder, therefore,
that ". • • one of the major purposes of the new realism
[is] to justify and to extend the [i. e« this] method of
logic* • . •" Spaulding points out that no proposition,
and hence no method or criterion, can be shown to be "more
than tentative," but nevertheless he believes, as do his
colleagues, that the results of analysis are more trustwor-
thy and fruitful than those attained by any other method.
It is a method which has "full ontological validity,
"
5There is nothing which necessarily escapes analysis.
The fact that something is not yet analyzed does not mean
Q
that it is unanalyzable. An adequate account of life and
mind can even be given by "the ordinary methods of analysis
and research. ..." Whatever actually turns out to be
-'•Marvin maintains that "logical analysis" reveals not
only "the foundations of science" but "the foundations of
other independent systems of propositions" which are "at
least implicitly asserted in man's art, in his morals, and
in his religion." Art. II, 92.
2
Holt, et al., NR, 26.
3Ibid., 479,
4Ibid., 26.
5Ibid., 24.
6Marvin, PBM, 77-79.
7
Pitkin, Art. Ill, 377.
^. .l «orj9»c » «
*
*
if .
r
. . 4
» > • »
» • *
«
-
» t 1
92
unanalyzable into simpler entities does so only because it
fails to "exhibit . . . complexity of structure,"
1 In short,
analysis is believed to be the most reliable and generally
applicable method available for philosophical investigation.
These claims for the analytic method must now be ex-
amined. In the first place, it should be noted that the
universal efficacy of analysis is not demonstrated by the
neo-realist, though its wide applicability is maintained.
While the assertion that nothing necessarily escapes analy-
o
sis suggests that there are no cases where the method is
inapplicable, Pitkin confesses the inadequacy of analysis to
deal with the relation between stimulus and reaction in the
"lower senses."3 He goes on to say that "formal analysis is
only one of many methods of discerning reals," and that it
"... may be just as incompetent to deal with some problems
as deduction is useless in one's endeavor to decide which of
two paintings is the more beautiful."4 If the analytic meth-
od is "incompetent" to deal with some problems, it is reason-
s-Holt, et al., NR, 24.
2
Loc. cit #
3Art. Ill, 406n.
4Ibid., 407n.
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able to inquire whether substance is one of them. 1 The pos-
sibility that it is must remain open until the realists have
shown by their actual use of the method that it is capable
of reducing substance to constituent simples There is at
any rate no a priori necessity for the realist to eliminate
the concept of substance from metaphysics merely because he
employs the method of analysis.
Furthermore, if analysis is "only one of many methods
of discerning reals," the chief question to be answered is
not whether analysis is the right or wrong method but wheth-
er it gives a more adequate account of these "reals 11 than
other methods do. If one investigates the nature of a given
material object, e. g. a paper clip, the realist must estab-
lish the fact that analysis yields a more adequate explana-
tion of the complex than does a synoptic, an intuitive, or
some other method. Should the explanation given by analysis
turn out to be the most adequate, it would have to be con-
^Pitkin implies that activity is not further analyzable
in any significant sense when he says that "every discerni-
ble, or
. . .
every real must be defined in terms of and
identified with its activity" and that any definition "found-
ed upon anything less is abstract, partial, and
. . .
only
adapted to special
. . .
purposes." (Art. I, 226, 227.)
Montague ! s conception of a thing as an "active form" is a
similar notion. (CSD, 51-52, 54, 56, 58.) Since substance
and activity are sometimes identified (cf. supra, p. 9n2)
this may turn out to be an admission that the analytic method
is "incompetent" to deal with substance.
I
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ceded that the paper clip is not or does not contain a sub-
stance* But should some other method be able to demonstrate
greater adequacy in explaining the complex,^" it might be
possible to retain, at least in this particular case, the
concept of substance. Defense of the analytic method must
mean a defense of its ultimate adequacy as a means of expla-
nation.
Critics of neo-realism sometimes argue that if desire
is as influential as Perry and Holt assert, analysis would
scarcely be as objective as neo-realism assumes. Objects
might be analyzed differently, it is argued, as different
interests were present in the individual doing the analyz-
2ing # According to this reasoning a chemist analyzing the
brain might secure results, i. e. simples, differing from
those obtained by a psychologist. But the realist could well
reply that disagreement among investigators analyzing the
same object, say the brain, could exist only so long as anal-
ysis was incomplete. 0 Regardless of what the units might be
"'"Any other reliable method would of course involve anal-
ysis. Whatever superiority it might have over analysis would
consist in a supplement to the analytic method or in a dif-
ferent interpretation of its results.
Evans, NROR, 190. Cf. Schweitzer's discussion of the
intuitive factor in analysis. Art. I, especially pp. 173-175.
3
Cf
.
the realistic answer to a similar criticism made by
pragmatists. Supra, pp. 89-90.
. . > § \»
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to which the brain were at first reduced, the simples final-
ly reached by analysis must be the same* The simples at-
tained by any analysis, however performed, would be the same,
1
else they would not be completely simple.
A more serious criticism of the analytic method, and
one which realists have great difficulty in answering, con-
cerns the significance of these simples after they are at-
tained. If a simple is something which is "non-relational,"
"indefinable," and "ultimately immediate," it is an entity
2
which is exceedingly abstract. An absolute simple, assum-
ing that realists believe there are such, when taken alone,
would be so abstract as to be almost unintelligible. It
would be a mere that
. To be sure simples are never found
alone, but are always discovered in complexes. Yet these
simples are themselves taken to be the explanation of the
There is considerable ambiguity in the concept of sim-
plicity employed by neo-realists. Some passages indicate
that a "simple" has no determination other than the mere
fact of being (cf. Holt, et al., NR, 32, Holt, COC, 20-23,
63, Perry, Art. IV, 118, 119). Others clearly suggest that
simples are only relatively indeterminate and that they con-
sequently possess several definite characteristics (Holt,
COC, 154, 103, 66, 51, Spaulding, NR, 11, 43, 494, Montague,
Art # IV, 253). The difference between a simple and a com-
plex cannot therefore be unequivocally established. This
problem is further discussed in chapter VII, Cf. pp. 242-248.
Holt specifically asserts that "the simple and funda-
mental entities are abstract." (COC, 160.)
Perry, Art. IV, 127.
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complex in which they stand. This means that the concrete
is explained by the abstract. There is no reason why this
should not be done, provided, however, that more knowledge
is gained about the complex the more analysis proceeds to-
ward abstract ion.'*' But such additional knowledge would be
possible only if one knew more of importance about the sim-
2pies than one does about the complex* To reduce a complex
to a series of "thats" is scarcely to gain more knowledge of
importance about the complex* It is discovered only that
the complex is composed of "thats."
The realist would probably reply that this abstractness
is inevitable in simples. The concrete objects one knows in
everyday experience, it would be argued, are the complexes
formed by simples which become related and somehow generate
qualities. This is all one needs to know about the origin
and meaning of complexes. But the analytic method does not
explain how these simples assume some relations and termi-
nate others, nor how relations can join simples into complex
It is usual of course "to explain anything we do not
understand" by showing "how it fits into some order or system
of things which we do understand. ..." Piper, FMK, 285.
2
In most cases the analyst does know more about some of
the elements in a complex than he does about the complex. For
example, he may know more about the printed words used in the
argument of a paragraph in Hegel's Logic than he does about
the argument. But he knows next to nothing about the simples
to which those printed words may be reduced.
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groups. It merely states that such relationships occur. ^
This is a grave weakness in the method of analysis. If the
latter is to be judged by its adequacy to account for the
factors in a given philosophical inquiry, it must be con-
2
victed of failure at this point. A synoptic method, for
example, would require one to interpret all the facts, and
hence to make an attempt to explain how these simples change
their relations, or else to conclude that the ultimate enti-
ties of the universe are complexes. Thus the analyst appears
to overestimate the significance of simples as the units of
explanation.
The adequacy of the analytic method can be more compe-
tently judged, however, after its details have been further
considered. On the face of it, this method seems scarcely
capable of justifying itself as the most ultimate and relia-
ble way of carrying on philosophic inquiry.
xIf the ground of these changes rests in the simples
themselves they are not simple for they would then possess
definite capacities or attributes. If, on the other hand,
the reason for change is to be found in complexes, the lat-
ter are as ultimate as the simples. Analysts do not seem to
face this difficulty.
2By synopsis is meant the interpretation of an object
or complex so that its constituent parts are discriminated
and viewed in relation to each other, and so that the proper-
ties of the wholes which they make up are evaluated. It is
"the viewing together" of all parts and properties of any
given whole.
«* *
a
* - 1 s
B. TYPES OF ANALYSIS
There are chiefly two kinds of analysis that are stress-
ed by neo-realism, namely, formal, i. e. analysis in situ
,
and experimental."1" A brief consideration of these two types
of analysis will help to explain the method further.
Formal analysis, or analysis in situ , means the dis-
covery and distinction of parts in wholes without their ac-
tual separation from each other or from the whole in which
they are found. For example, if one analyzes the motion of
a ball tossed into the air, one does not stop the ball each
instant in order to get a series of photographs. Rather
must one find in the total complex which is constituted by
the ball from the time it starts to rise until it comes to
rest again, by theory, the points in space, instants in
2
time, qualities and relations that make up that complex.
One would, likewise, have to leave the parts in situ , or in
place, when analyzing the flow of an electric current, the
number continuum, or the continuity of time.
Analysis of this type, says Spaulding, is especially
useful in discovering functional relations. The retarded
Spaulding, Art. V, 155, 156.
Marvin, FBM, 76-77.
3
Spaulding, ibid., 156.
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velocity of a projectile shot from a gun, for example, is
a function of the time that elapses between the explosion
in the gun and the projectile* s contact with its target.
Such a relationship could not be determined experimentally.
This is the more important of the two types of analy-
sis, since so many objects cannot actually be taken apart
and literally reduced to the ultimate simples that consti-
tute them. Occurrences in history, geometrical objects,
elements of physics and chemistry, and astronomical phenom-
2
ena, illustrate this fact. Even those objects that can be
experimentally analyzed, e. g, water, a mud pie, cannot
actually be reduced to pure simples. The final stages of
the analytic process must always be carried on in situ . Only
some wholes formally analyzed are capable of experimental
analysis, but on the other hand all wholes analyzed experi-
mentally can be analyzed formally.
Realists of this school are careful to point out that
analysis does not "destroy its object." An object does
not become through analysis a mere collection of fragments.
It is, on the other hand, "... identical with these frag-
NR
, 208-210.
2Spaulding, NR, 208, cf. Art. V, 156.
3
Holt, et al., NR, 24. Cf. Marvin, PBM, 76, 77, 78.
i
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1
merits in that particular arrangement which has been [theo-
retically] destroyed. 1,1 Humpty Dumpty is himself only when
his pieces are together. Analysis does not allow one to
2
forget "the combining relations." The whole is ". . . the
parts and their properties and the relations relating the
ii3parts and the possibly specific properties of the whole."
Analysis in situ identifies these parts and relations and
asserts that when they are together they constitute a whole
of a particular type and name.
The second kind of analysis, i. e. the experimental,
is that type of examination which involves the actual manip-
ulation of the object under consideration. It often means
the separation of parts from each other and thus their re-
1Holt, et al., NR, 24.
o
Loc. cit.
3Spaulding, Art. V, 161, cf. NR, 446-447. Perry, it is
true, says that wholes are merely "... collections or sums
of the natures and values possessed by their parts" (PCI,
374, cf. PPT, 319). though the statement that the "terra-and-
relation character" is not "all there is" to reality would
seem to soften this assertion somewhat (PPT, 234), He also
says that there are "relations of organic unity" (PPT, 244),
but he denies that a part can in any important sense be de-
pendent upon a whole (Art. IV, 107-109). Holt points out
that there are unique properties of the whole, but that they
are generated by the parts, and hence do not condition the
parts (Art. I, 340), Pitkin concedes that there is at least
some kind of an "organic pluralism" (Art. Ill, 425). Appar-
ently it is characteristic of neo-realism to concede that
wholes have properties which parts have not, though there is
no unanimity in stating or explaining the fact.
€
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moval from the whole. Sometimes wholes are ". 0 . physical-
ly taken apart and their constituents are perceived or re-
vealed in quite the same way as are they themselves, as
wholes."1 This type of analysis concerns ". . . those enti-
ties which are dealt with in the chemical, the physical, the
o
biological, and perhaps also, the psychological laboratory."
A good illustration of the experimental method may he
found in the analysis of water. A molecule of water may be
reduced by electrolysis to two atoms of hydrogen and one of
3
oxygen. Two gases are now obtained instead 6f the liquid,
water. Experiments of mixing these two gases with others
shows that their properties for combining with other ele-
ments differ from each other and from those possessed by
water, the original compound. Thus the chemical properties
of the three "substances," water, oxygen, and hydrogen, are
different. Measurement and observation would establish such
physical properties as specific gravity, refractive power,
boiling point, electrical conductivity, and elasticity.
These would be common to all three "substances," though
^•Sjjaulding, Art. V, 156.
2Loc. cit.
Actual experiment would of course require sufficient
water to yield measurable results. Hence an enormous number
of molecules would be involved, but for purposes of clarity
one may speak of the analysis of only one.
•
_
— =^ •—
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their numerical values would not be identical. For example,
the boiling point of water would be 100° C, that of hydrogen
-250*C, oxygen -181*C. The boiling point , electrical con-
ductivity, absorptive power, and elasticity of the two gases
would be found to differ so widely in value from the value
these properties have as applied to water, that the latter
would be found to possess uniqueness in these respects, "^
Experimental analysis in this case actually decomposes the
whole, notes the unique properties of the whole, the parts
and their properties, and the combining relations.
There are four kinds of wholes with which analysis is
concerned. First, aggregates or collections may be con-
2 3
sidered wholes. Any number of objects in any order, e, g.
the objects before a student sitting at his desk, namely,
a blotter, pen, watch, books, calendar, constitute such a
whole. The chief connective or "organizing relation" is
and
. "... Anything, taken with at least one other "some-
thing," and these two with another something, and so on,
Cf. Spaulding's discussion concerning the analysis of
water. Art, V, 237-239. He also treats experimental analy-
sis on pp. 225-230.
2
,Ray (CNR, 29) expresses doubt about the accuracy of
calling such groups wholes, Cf, also Taylor, EOM, 96,
3
Spaulding, ibid., 157, NR, 193.
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form a whole. 1*1 There are no distinctive properties of the
whole. It is only the sum of its parts and their properties
o
numerically conjoined.
Secondly, classes which are composed of parts that are
not classes, may be treated as wholes. These classes may
consist of organic wholes, individuals, simples, or collec-
tions. Atoms of carbon, electrons, Americans, the even
integers, or rational fractions may be considered such
wholes. It is characteristic of these wholes to contain
parts that are similar in at least one and possibly in many
respects. For example, each atom of carbon has the same
weight and specific gravity, each even number is divisible
by two, and so on. Thus the parts possess in common one or
4
more relations other than that of numerical conjunction.
Spaulding presents detailed illustrations for wholes of this
type in his discussions of arithmetical analysis and the
analysis of space, time, motion, velocity, atoms and other
1Spaulding, Art. V, 163.
2
Ibid., 164.
5Spaulding, Art. V, 157, NR, 193.
4Spaulding, Art. V, 169.
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classes of individuals.
A third type of whole consists of classes which are
made up of subordinate classes. Chemical elements, numbers,
and integers are of this type for they are classes which may
be subdivided respectively into such further classes as
monovalent and bivalent elements, cardinal and ordinal num-
2bers, odd and even integers. Perceptual and conceptual
analysis reveal that there are kinds of entities, i. e. en-
tities which have in common their membership in certain
3
classes* The parts in this type of whole are thus related
by the fact of membership in a class, and they in turn con-
sist of parts related in the same way.
The fourth kind of whole which one may consider is a
unity or an organic whole. A specific individual chemical
compound, molecule, or atom, existing at some particular
place and time, or any individual organism would be included
in this type. 4 The molecules of salt in the tears of Mrs.
John Jones upon the death of her husband are organic wholes.
Spaulding, Art. V, 173-230. The "specific complexes, 1*
"functional," "contradictory, w "consistent," and "implica-
tive" wholes which Spaulding discusses as separate types of
wholes in NR, 194-195. are treated under this second type of
whole in the cooperative volume.
2Spaulding, Art. V, 157, NR, 193-194.
3
Spaulding, Art. V, 230-235.
4Ibid., 157.

105
She herself as a living organism is also an organic whole.
Parts of these wholes and their combining relations may "be
of many different kinds. There are properties of the whole
which the parts have not, and which are not merely the sums
of the properties possessed by the parts and their rela-
tions. 1
A great part of Spauldlng's article in the cooperative
volume is given over to applications of the analytic method
to specific wholes. The New Rationalism
,
Spaulding's most
important book representing the views of the school, also
abounds with concrete applications of this method. The de-
tails of such analyses may be passed over. It is sufficient
to note here that these illustrations are presented as cumu-
lative evidence for the method's general applicability and
validity.
Both the formal and experimental types of analysis are
believed by the realist to enable him to deal conclusively
with each whole as he investigates it. Analysis, it is
held, "exhausts the whole up to the point which it [i. e.
analysis] reaches,"2 and thougih there may still remain parts
and relations to be discovered, the parts and relations al-
"^Cf. the discussion above on p. 101 concerning the ex-
perimental analysis of water, an organic whole.
2Spaulding, Art. V, 161.
fI
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ready found have a distinct meaning of their own. It is
implied that no matter what further information may be
gained about a given whole, it will not change conclusions
about the parts and relations already discovered.
This may be true of a whole that is a mere aggregate,
but it is difficult to see how such a view can justly be
held concerning organic wholes. Classical physicists be-
lieved, for example, that their analysis was exhaustive up
to the point it had reached when they declared that a mole-
cule of matter was composed of atoms in certain relations.
Properties of mass, extension, motion, and impenetrability
were ascribed to these molecules. The theory of electrons
has, however, greatly modified this classical view of mat-
ter, particularly with regard to the "extension" and "im-
penetrability w of any given molecule. Analysis does not in
this case seem to have been "exhaustive" up to the point it
had reached. As further knowledge of the whole was attained
what had already been known was to some extent altered
thereby.
The analytic realist might reply that analysis was ex-
haustive and therefore reliable up to the point it had
^Cf. the criticisms of analysis presented by Smuts, HAE,
19-20.
2
Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 215.
i
\
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reached because it had reduced the facts it was able to dis-
cover to simples and had thus explained them."^ From this
point of view the discovery of electrons would merely mean
that new data in the whole were presented for explanation,
i. e. for reduction to simples. But since some of the prop-
erties of the molecule of matter under consideration, nota-
bly "extension* and "impenetrability," have had to be so re-
vised as scarcely to resemble the character they were earli-
er believed to have, the complete validity of the earlier
analysis must be denied. To have called impenetrability a
simple or to have reduced it to simples apparently would not
have been a reliable explanation of it, and thus of the mole-
cule to which it was ascribed.
It might be retorted that with any other method of re-
search beside the analytic, one would have had to revise
his findings when the electronic theories of matter began to
play havoc with the theory of impenetrability. This of
course is true, but the user of other methods, e. g. the
synoptic, could claim that such further "knowledge" of the
molecule of matter as the electronic hypothesis presents,
helps him to gain a more complete explanation of the mole-
1
The neo-realists of course never defended classical
physics. This illustration is used merely to show what hap-
pens when it is assumed that the analysis of a whole com-
pletes its function as it goes.
j1—
—
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cule, and that previous "knowledge" of it had not been sup-
posed to be exhaustive. It could be held by the synoptist
that even the present knowledge of the electronic character
of the atoms within the molecule is not "exhaustive, " He
would thus save himself from embarrassment if other drastic
discoveries should occur. The analyst, on the other hand,
would not be able to distinguish between good, bad, or in-
different explanations of the molecule if he claims that
present analyses are so far exhaustive of the whole.
A further difficulty with the realistic treatment of
wholes is the failure to give an adequate account of the
properties themselves which are unique with the wholes.**"
Spaulding concedes that in certain combinations parts form
wholes with properties which none of the parts have sepa-
rately, but he calls this generation of new properties "a
non-rational element in nature." Such an admission, how-
ever, means giving up the philosophic enterprise right where
it is most important that it be continued.
Vast areas of reality would still remain uninterpreted
•••Ray, CNR, 22.
2
Art. V, 161. Yet this is the very process which he
calls "creative synthesis," and makes the principle for ex-
plaining the new complexities which arise with the passing
of time. Ibid., 168, NR, 448. (This problem of creativity
is discussed below in chapter VII.)
I
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after the analytic method had done its best, for such organic
wholes are found in biological organisms, chemical compounds,
molecules, and atoms* 1 This would mean that the whole area
called by traditional thought the material world is honey-
combed with wholes some of whose properties are termed "non-
rational." For example, the fact that certain quantities of
the two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, combine to form the visi-
ble liquid, water, must be called non-rational and left un-
explained. Analysis merely specifies that this new whole
has unique properties but goes no farther. The plant and
animal kingdoms would also abound with non-rational data, if
analysis were to be the final method of investigation. That
a man can think, run, and paint, though neither the ovum
from which he grew nor any of the organs within his body
could do these things, would be recognized by the analyst,
but these properties of the whole would be labeled non-
rational.
It is not only the extent of these properties of the
whole which makes it difficult to accept the analytic meth-
od as final, but it is also their significance. The most
'Spauldlng, Art. V, 157, NR, 193-197. Whitehead points
out that modern "science ... is becoming the study of or-
ganisms" and that it is probable that "there are
. . .
pri-
mary organisms which are incapable of further analysis. 1'
(SMW, 150, 151.) Thus even "the atom is transforming itself
into an organism. ..." (Ibid., 149.)

110
significant property of Mr. Brown is his ability to think,
and not that his body is made up of so many elements and
that these are reducible to simples,^* For most ordinary
purposes it is far more significant that sodium chloride
has a savory taste and the property of preserving food and
improving the soil when used in proper quantities, than that
it is made up of a poisonous gas (chlorine) and an alkaline
metal (sodium). These unique properties of the whole are
"... the most complex and significant structures of our
it?
experience, & yet the analytic method merely labels them.
It does not explain them.
The analyst might reply that the question of "signifi-
cance w introduces "practical considerations which are more
confusing than clarifying*" It may be admitted that the
question of significance is a "practical" or valuational
consideration, but the realist is unable to give an adequate
interpretation of a whole without it. Merely to say that a
whole has certain parts, that these parts have certain prop-
erties and relations, and that the whole has properties
^"To be sure behaviorists do not concede that thought is
a unique property of the human organism. But this school
has now lost its standing in most quarters. It will be fur-
ther discussed below in chapter VI.
2
Brightman, ITP , 24.
3Perry, Art. IV, 104.
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which the parts have not Is not enough. Something must be
said about the importance of these factors in relation to
each other. As a matter of fact the analyst himself intro-
duces to some extent the factor of significance. He presup-
poses that simples are more significant than complexes by
explaining the latter in terms of the former. The critic of
analysis then differs from the analyst merely in the charac-
teristics of the whole which he considers the most signifi-
cant.
That the properties unique with the whole are more sig-
nificant in the explanation of that whole than the simples
to which it may be reduced, Is at least the testimony of
common sense. Certainly the importance of simples cannot be
upheld by common sense for they are never met in common ex-
perience. They are, on the other hand, far removed from the
convictions of common sense. Arguments from common sense
usually mean little in philosophy, but since neo-realism
claims to be on the side of common sense,"'" the argument in
this case may have some weight. At least it does not sup-
port the realist's case.
The inability of neo-realists to interpret the proper-
ties of organic wholes makes it questionable, therefore,
1
Holt, et al., NR, 10.
<
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whether these realists have shown that analysis must be the
final and ultimate instrument of thought. Further light
will be thrown upon this question by considering whether
neo-realism' s criticisms of traditional logic are valid.
C. CRITICISMS OP TRADITIONAL LOGIC
Neo-realistic method is at once a plan for investigat-
ing new data and a criticism of the older or traditional
methods of logic.
In the first place,"1' neo-realists contend that tradi-
tional logic in its Aristotelian form has overestimated the
importance of the substance-attribute formula as a princi-
ple of explanation. 2 In the so-called "new logic" these
concepts, "... even if they are not given up entirely,
play a minor part, and the concept of relation plays the
major role."3 Aristotelian logic suffers because it "rec-
ognizes only a limited number of relations between enti-
Neo-realists offer other criticisms of the traditional
logic than those discussed here (cf. especially Spaulding,
NR, 175-175), but those treated in this chapter are particu-
larly relevant to the general validity of the analytic meth-
od, and hence are of vital importance for the concept of
substance.
2
Spaulding, NR, xvi.
3Ibid., 173.
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ties. . . , 1,1 The subject-predicate formulations of the old
logic do not provide for such relational propositions as nA
is less than B." The logic of relations can explain situa-
tions, claim the realists, which had formerly been explained
2by substance and attribute. Whereas the older or Aristo-
telian logic was a logic of classes, "the logic of modern
exact science [which is the logic of neo-realism] is one of
series," says Spaulding. 3
The bearing of this phase of the new logic on the con-
cept of substance will be further considered in chapter V.
It may be observed here, however, that neo-realists rightly
indicate a weakness in the Aristotelian logic The latter
stresses primarily the nature of terms or subjects, whereas
the new logic emphasizes their relations to each other.
There is definite explanatory value in considering the sym-
metrical, asymmetrical, transitive, and intransitive rela-
tions of entities in series.
Yet Spaulding' s contention that the subject-predicate
4
relation cannot express some relations, e. g 0 "less than,"
1Spaulding, NR, xvi.
2Ibid., 175, cf. 36, 157-158, 192; Marvin, FBM, 178.
3Spaulding, ibid., 156, cf. 157, 174-175.
4Ibid., 173.
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or "implies," is unsupportable . If one says "a shilling is
less than a pound," he can be referring to the fact that a
shilling has the property, and thus lis the property, of be-
ing less than a pound. Or, "A implies B, w can also be ex-
pressed by the proposition "A is implier of B," i. e. A has
the property of being implier of B.
1
It may be admitted
that some "distortion" of the two original propositions was
necessary in order to employ the substance-attribute, or
subject-predicate, relation. Their meaning was, neverthe-
less, clearly expressed. Though the relation "less than"
refers both to "a shilling" and to "a pound" there is no
harm done by considering it an attribute of "a shilling,
"
While, therefore, it may be useful to employ other re-
lations than the subject-predicate, the latter need not be
abandoned. The bearing of the new logic on the concept of
substance is now clear. Since relational logicians err in
maintaining that the substance-attribute formula is unable
to express some meanings, they are also wrong in holding that
the concept of substance is inapplicable to some propositions.
One may only assert that other relations and thus other con-
^•Cf. Sheldon, SSPD, 54-56,
2Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 82.
Lenzen asserts that "the logic of relations admits the
possibility of the concept of substance." (Art. I, 152, 153).
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cepts are more natural and consequently more useful.
A second neo-realistic criticism of traditional thought
which has an important bearing on the concept of substance
is directed against the theory of organic logic. Realistic
objections to this organic method reduce to the contention
that it amounts to skepticism. It is argued that organic
logic makes impossible genuine knowledge of one proposition
until all propositions are known,"1" and this is an impossi-
bility for finite individuals. On the other hand, the actu-
al advance of science has shown, it is contended, that some
things may be positively known, and that knowledge proceeds
from part to part. Not only does organic logic make one's
knowledge of parts within wholes incomplete, it asserts fur-
ther that even what knowledge of these parts is acquired may
be entirely false. If an act is evil when judged from the
standpoint of the part but good when considered from that of
the infinite whole, judgments about good and evil cannot be
reliable, for finite beings cannot gain this universal point
of view.
Spaulding, NR, 422, Marvin, PBM, 93.
2
Perry, PCI, 374-375, Marvin, ibid., 93-94, Spaulding,
loc. cit.
3Spaulding, WAI, 162. Cf. Perry, ibid., 374, 376,
Spaulding, Art. V, 160-161, 171-172, Montague, Art. IV, 299.
•(%
116
These criticisms of organic logic are valid only
against an unnecessary, and probably erroneous, interpreta-
tion of absolutism. For even Hegel held that partial knowl-
edge of the whole is after all knowledge, though it may be
conditioned by further information* There are some cases
where further knowledge of wholes unquestionably alters that
already gained about them. This was shown above in the dis-
2
cussion concerning analysis of material molecules, Even
though the theory of electrons made necessary a revision of
some of the qualities ascribed to matter, other properties
have remained the same. For example, the atomic weigiht,
specific gravity, and fusing point of the elements making it
up, were unchanged. Similarly, the theory of relativity de-
veloped by Einstein has altered many conceptions about the
physical world, but it remains as true now as in the time of
Newton that the apple falls to the ground and not off into
space, and therefore that the knowledge represented by some
of the factors in Newton's laws is still reliable. Not all
"''For example, he says that "Dasein Tist] die Einheit
des Seins und des Nichts, in der die Unmittelbarkeit dieser
Bestimmungen und damit in ihrer Beziehung ihr Widerspruch
verschwunden ist, - eine Einheit in der sie nur noch Momente
sind. ..." (ENC, 89). Thus the simplest knowledge one
may have of an object (Sein) is "aufgehoben" in the synthe-
sis formed when new knowledge is gained. Yet it is still a
"Moment," i. e. a definite element, in that synthesis.
2Cf. p. 106.
•. • X jLj 0 ilu It X 9 V vJv^ JE3 1 IV* ' file *3W &X-1.X § U I c' l . ». w V. u *> XJ~ iiJ. i£t w .x.
»
"Oil VJ XVX JJ8XSI tO V*10©£1<j 9fl<J • ^£ XlQXXlOXcI • DOjF^fl-Sl-wfiXJ 9"».t»W <
•
e&iexaoM riooa iutt sie ul $£&dai3 ortxe - ^tinwrioetw
# *
117
knowledge about the physical world has been undermined by
Einstein.
While the organic theory of logic need not be discarded,
there are, on the other hand, cases where it does not neces-
sarily apply. Some single propositions, and some combina-
tions of them, e. g. , that two apples plus two apples make
four apples, or that if A<B, and B<C, then A<C, are true,
and probably will remain so, regardless of any further prop-
ositions that may be formulated. But the wide applicabili-
ty of organic logic must still be conceded.
The assertion that organic logic is valid and in many
cases applicable is thus another way of denying the realis-
tic claim examined above, that analysis is exhaustive of all
wholes up to the point which it reaches. But on the other
side, the fact that some propositions seem to be true ir-
respective of other propositions that may be formed suggests
that organic logic is not universally applicable. The pos-
sibility remains, therefore, that some, though perhaps not
all, wholes contain substances which analysis cannot dis-
solve.
The attack by neo-realists on methods used by other
schools is further illustrated in the rejection of internal
and the advocacy of external relations. If relations are
external the analytic method achieves added significance.

D. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS
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By the theory of internal relations is meant the be-
lief that the character of a term is partially constituted
by its relations, either through their permanent possession
or through the changes induced when relations are acquired
or terminated, or, that a term is united to its relations
by a third reality arising beyond these two entities or from
one of them. The Aristotelian doctrine of substance and
cause has been translated into what is now called the theory
of internal relations. 1 Consequently the rejection of in-
ternal relations by neo-realists is at the same time an ex-
plicit criticism and rejection of substance. Belief in
external relations means for the realist that there is no
substantial reality which joins and holds together terms and
their relations.
Internal relations are of two kinds according to Spaul-
ding. Terms are either "constitutive" of each other, or
else some mediating reality underlies them in such a way as
to maintain a unity or connection between them. A brief
•"Spaulding, NR, 37, cf. 38, 177.
2Marvin and Spaulding explicitly assert, Holt, Pitkin,
and Perry imply, and Montague does not reject, the theory of
external relations in the "Program and First Platform. " Cf
Holt, et al., NR, 472-480.
Spaulding, Art. V, 165, NR, loc. cit., Holt, et al.,
NR, 478n.
•
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consideration of these two types of relations is necessary.
According to the constitutive theory of internal rela-
tions, "each term makes a difference to the other and, there-
fore, constitutes it, at least in part.""'" Those who hold to
this view, declares Spaulding, conclude from the undeniable
fact of relatedness that the related terms are mutually de-
p
pendent. This view of internal relations is to be rejected,
say the realists, because it results in the infinite com-
plexity of terms. If each term is determined by all the oth-
er terms and relations it loses its identity. Consequently,
it becomes "most difficult if . . . not impossible to dis-
cover what a term is.
. .
»* On the other hand, the very
fact that terms are actually identified as such without all
other terms and relations being identified presupposes that
they are external to their relations. 4
Spaulding, Art. V, 165-166.
o
Ibid., 165. Montague holds that only subsistent terms
in relation constitute each other, but that this is not true
of existent entities, (The nature of existence and subsist-
ence is treated below in chapter VII.) Even in the case of
subsistent terms, he asserts, the fact of relationship only
adds something to the terms but in no wise negates or changes
the characters belonging to them before the relationship took
place. Cf. WK, 367-368, 381, 370.
5Spaulding, ibid., 166, cf. 167, MR, 183, Marvin, FBM,
86-88, Perry, PPT, 319.
4Spaulding, Art. V, 167.
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The 'Underlying-reality" theory of internal relations
is likewise unsatisfactory for the neo-realist. This aspect
of the theory requires that for every term and its relation
there must be an underlying reality to mediate between
them. 1 But there would then have to be a further relation
to unite this relation or mediator and the first relation
which has now become a term, and so on to infinity. The
theory of internal relations cannot escape this infinite re-
gress, it is asserted.
But there is no reason why the theory of internal rela-
tions should not express the fact that identical terms may
differ from each other when they enter into different rela-
tions. The theory of external relations emphasizes the in-
trinsic character of terms regardless of their relations,
and there actually is a measure of identity in terms even
though they change through relations. Hollands properly
suggests that the solution to this problem lies in combining
the views of Leibniz and Bradley. By this he means that no
terms are "... self-sufficient in such a way that they
Spaulding, Art. V, 166, NR, 38, 177.
2Spaulding, NR, 187-188, 180.
On this question compare Leibniz, Monadology
, 7, 9,
12, 13, and Discourse . 8, 14, with Bradley, Appearance and
Reality
.
25-34, 180-182.
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contain within themselves all their relational destiny. • . ."
as Leibniz had held, and that, on the other hand, they do
not , . merge in a "bare identity or wholeness which
leaves no room for their specific differences," as Bradley
had contended,
Bowne had argued for a position which amounted to a
reconciliation of these two points of view before Bradley's
work elaborating one of them appeared. For Bowne terms in
relation are identities in change. There is nothing stat-
2
ic. Terms are forms of activity which retain their identi-
ty even when they are related to other forms of activity.
Such identity and difference, unity in variety and multi-
plicity, is "revealed in experience" alone. 4 It is an ob-
servable fact that at least some terms and their relations
are internally related. This does not require that there
be some transcendent and mysterious reality that sustains
1Art. I, 465.
2MET, 19, 22, 23.
3Ibid., 43, 39.
4Ibid., 63, cf. 57, 61. A. E. Taylor comes essentially
to this same conclusion, though he holds that the union of
terms and relations occurs not in discursive thought but in
the intuitive insights resulting from discursive thought.
(EOM, 146-153). Cunningham argues that what is given in con-
scious experience is "not a mere congeries of discrete manys,"
nor a "non-relational manifold," but "a whole involving rela-
tions" (IA, 388-389).
i
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the relationship. It is a fact immanent in conscious expe-
rience itself that terms and relations are internally con-
nected.
Neo-realism must demonstrate that there is no such
reconciliation between identity and diversity in conscious
experience before its arguments against internal relations
may be considered valid. This is a problem to be considered
in chapter VI. As the argument now stands, there may be
some internal relations. The infinite regress is denied by
the empirical fact that identity occurs in spite of change
within consciousness.
Further evidence that the infinite regress feared by
the neo-realist does not actually occur, rests in the fact
that the advocate of internal relations can state his view.
There must, therefore, be terms which have a recognizable
fixity of meaning, tiven the believer in external relations
usually understands what the internalist means by his theory.
This is possible because in actual practice terms have a
relatively determinate meaning regardless of their context.
The internalist as well as the externalist may presuppose
this state of affairs. 1 Thus the theory of internal rela-
tions does not involve such disastrous consequences as neo-
1Sheldon, SSPD, 230.
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realists believe.
The defense of analysis proceeds through a plea for
external relations, i. e. a plea for the view that a term
can pass in and out of relations without being modified in
any way by such relationship. The following essentials in
this argument may be indicated. External relations, asserts
the neo-realist, are presupposed in their denial, for the
identity of terms is necessary for all intelligible dis-
course."'" In the second place, experience shows that the
same term may enter into many different relations without
prejudice to its character, or to the relations in which it
2
already stands. The fact that one can know an entity in
some of its relations without knowing all of them argues
further for the externality of relations.
In answer to this first argument, it may be observed
4
once more that the identity of terms is not destroyed even
by the theory of internal relations. There are undoubtedly
1Spaulding, in Holt, et al., NR, 478-479 (2, 3, 4), cf.
Spaulding, NR, 178, Art. V, 166-167.
2
Holt, ibid., 472 (5), Marvin, in Holt, ibid., 473 (4,
5), Perry, in Holt, ibid., 476 (4), Pitkin, in Holt, ibid.,
477 (1, 2), 478 (6), cf. Perry, PCI, 373.
Perry, in Holt, ibid., 476 (5), Spaulding, in Holt,
ibid., 480 (8), cf. Pitkin, Art. Ill, 462.
4
Cf. supra, pp. 120-122.
i , .
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many cases in which the second argument advanced here by
the neo-realists holds good. The term "earth" has the re-
lation "less than" when compared to the sun, and "greater
than" when compared with the moon, but the fact that the
term enters into or stands in the one relation does not af-
fect its other relation. On the other hand, there are some
cases in which this second argument is not valid. Oxygen
related to hydrogen is a term certainly changed by the re-
lationship.
The third argument for external relations adduced above
contains some validity, but it likewise does not show the
universality of external relations. This is the same prob-
lem that was considered in connection with the knowledge of
parts within wholes.^" One can gain some reliable informa-
tion about the quality red when it is found in a given rose,
without considering all the relations into which it might
enter. But the intrinsic character of the quality could
still be retained even if it did assume some internal rela-
tion.
There is an ambiguity in the realistic treatment of ex-
ternal relations which makes some difficulty. A tendency is
noticeable to deal with simples or abstract entities while
1
Cf. p. 116.
1 ^ n ..,,-'us V *a« „AU ^ 1 «Q gum
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defending the doctrine and then on other occasions to treat
complex exist ents in the same way, 1 Thus Spaulding asserts
the first implication of the doctrine of external relations
to be the proposition that "both a term and a relation are
(unchangeable) elements or entities." Here he is clearly-
discussing subsistent simples, for existents are not "un-
changeable," nor are they the "elements" of which complexes
are made, except in a very broad sense. Existents are them-
selves complexes. On the other hand, it is common for real-
ists to discuss external relations when the context indicates
that existents or complexes are involved. A conspicuous ex-
ample is the knowing relation. The case for external re-
lations is much easier to maintain in the realm of subsist-
ence. But these realists seem bent on asserting its general
validity. For this reason serious obstacles to its accept-
ance are encountered.
The result of this investigation is that there is evi-
dence for some relations that are internal and some that are
external. Neo-realists are chiefly concerned to deny the
universality of internal relations, 4 and in this phase of
1
Sorley, MVIG, 216.
2
Holt, et al., NR, 479.
3Perry, PPT, 319-320, Spaulding, NR, 41, 431.
4Spaulding, Art. V, 167, Holt, et al., NR, 33.
»*
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their thought one may readily share. But the argument ad-
vanced "by some of them3, for the universality of external
relations cannot, in the light of this evidence, be allowed
o
to stand. There are clearly some relations that are inter-
nal.
If this be the case, analysts find some wholes which
they cannot exhaustively interpret. Even if the parts, the
relations between them, and the properties of the whole
which the parts do not have, are specified, there is no ex-
planation for the influence which the whole may exert upon
these parts. The effort of neo-realists to escape the theo-
ry of substance which internal relations imply is, there-
1Holt (Art. I, 372, cf. GOC, passim), Pitkin (Art. Ill,
422-424), Perry (Art. IV, 118, et passim; PPT, 319) seem to
argue that all relations are external. Spaulding leaves the
question open, though the weaknesses he finds in the theory
of internal relations would prevent him from allowing that
any relations were of this character.
2Cf. Macintosh, POK, 302.
If terms are to some degree constituted by their rela-
tions or are uniquely bound to them, the concept of substance
plays an important role. For if terms are constituted by re-
lations in the sense that they possess their relations and
thus are these relations, substance expresses the notion that
a term has the potentiality of manifesting many relations.
Substance is also necessary if the fact that terms are consti-
tuted by relations means that they are altered by their acqui-
sition or termination of relations. The identity of a term
through change rests in a substance that unites its successive
states. Finally, if terms and relations are uniquely bound
together by some third reality, the latter must be substance.
Whitehead says that „ . the concept of internal rela-
tions requires the concept of substance as the activity syn-
thesizing the relationships.
.
(SMW, 174).
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fore, not successful. Analysis has indeed shown that one
absolute and all-comprehending substance is untenable, for
some relations are external. But if there are lesser sub-
stances they are to be found in the wholes which involve
internal relations.
Further information about the significance of analysis
for the concept of substance may be gained by considering
the results of this method. But before proceeding to these
results it is important to notice the realistic emphasis on
mathematics,
E. LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS
The logic which realists adopt is of comparatively re-
cent origin. Contemporaneous with the dominance of Aristo-
telian logic there has been an independent movement of
thought during the last four hundred years in which the con-
cepts of relation, event, happening, have played the dominant
role."'" It is this strand of thought which has recently been
pformulated as the logic of series or the science of order.
Neo-realists accept this type of logic preferring to substi-
tute, as already indicated, "relational 11 for subj ect-predi-
^-Spaulding, NR, xvii.
2 lbid., 10-11.
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cate propositions. 1 The chief interest of the realist lies
in the relational proposition and not in the nature and
character of terms.
2
This new logic is identified with mathematics, for the
propositions of logic are held to be formulae the terms of
which are variables. Since logic requires mathematical
method it deals with something more persistent than mere
thought. Consequently it must be considered the science of
being and not the science of correct thought. Neo-realists
meet the mathematical logician on his own ground and attempt
to understand and interpret the universe from his point of
view. 4 It may even be said that "the neo -realistic ontology
5
is founded on symbolic logic. ..."
Though realists make extensive use of mathematical or
symbolic logic there is no reason for supposing that they
are thereby committed to a particular kind of metaphysics.
Spaulding, to be sure, does make this assumption. In his
1Spaulding, NR, 173, Marvin, Art. II, 51n, FBM, 228-
229. Cf. Parkhurst, RLR, 6.
2Holt, COC, 3, Marvin, Art. II, 54-56, Spaulding, NR,
205.
Holt, loc. cit., Spaulding, NR, 15, Marvin, ibid., 52-
53, PBM, 221-223.
4Holt, et al., NR, 25-26.
6Ray, CNR, 1, 3.
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last book, A World of Chance , he attempts to show that sym-
bolic logic has a positive and definite significance for
1
metaphysics. Marvin and Holt seem also to imply the meta-
2
physical reference of logic. Specialists in symbolic log-
ic, such as Russell and Sheffer, however, deny that it has
any metaphysical significance of a positive character*
Russell goes so far as to say that from symbolic logic noth-
ing can be inferred concerning the external world, not even
4
the fact that there is a world.
If mathematical logic had any decisive significance for
metaphysics there would be more agreement about metaphysical
views among those who employ it. There is in fact, however,
a wide divergence between the metaphysical positions em-
braced by mathematical logicians. Perry denies objective
Cf. especially pp. 22-23, xiii.
2
Marvin, Art. II, 53, Holt, COC, 1.
Metz (PSG, II, 248) says that symbolic logic is M . . .
eine sehr specielle Disciplin. • . , die mit der allgemein
philosophischen Bewegung nur in loser Verbindung steht und
deren philosophischen Bedeutung und Relevanz auch heute noch
sehr umstritten ist. Es ist keinesfalls so. . . , dass hier
die Sache der Philosophie selbst zur Verhandlung oder gar ihr
Schicksal zur Entscheidung kommt. . . . Vielmehr handelt es
sich in der mathematischen Logik lediglich urn die Konsti-
tuierung eines neuen, bedeutsamen und ma'chtig auslangenden
Zweiges am Stamme der logischen Wissenshaft. ..."
4Cf. KEW, 41.
J*
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1 2
and ontological character to value, Spaulding affirms it.
Russell is a thorough-going pluralist, while Whitehead 1 s
4 5philosophy of organism is monistic. So far at least it
has not been shown that one definite view of the universe
can he prescribed by symbolic logic.
It is necessary to observe, on the other hand, that a
mathematical interpretation of reality may accompany any
metaphysical view that is rigorously defined. The category
of quantity or number is involved so soon as one begins to
consider the "nature" of reality. The quality of being that
I is found has a numerical value. If there is being, it is a
kind of being, and this kind is numerically distinct from
other kinds. Furthermore, any assertions that are made about
reality are numerically discernible from each other. Thus,
a mathematical character attaches to one's thought of reali-
ty whenever it becomes articulate. But this is quite dif-
ferent from asserting that mathematics is finally determina-
-
-"-PPT, 551-344.
i!
p
NR, vi, 496-507.
5Cf. AM, 242, 394-402.
4Cf. PR, 10, 220, 80, 529-530, 531, 53.
Stace considers symbolic logic "a mere intellectual
plaything," the use of which has, up to the present, result-
ed in "nothing of real importance" (Art. I, 760).
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tlve of one's view of reality. It means only that the ele-
ments of reality are mathematically related.
Perhaps the truth lies, as Whitehead suggested in a
paper read before the Eastern Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association in December, 1936, in a harmony between
the mathematical interpretation of first principles and the
"functional genetic" interpretation advocated by Dewey. Ac-
cording to Whitehead's conception mathematics would be con-
cerned with "the forms of succession" and not "the succession
of forms." Reality might then be conceived as qualitied
being in activity according to mathematical form. His con-
clusion that the ultimate interpretation of reality may rest
with aesthetics indicates that absolute, rigorous, and hence
mathematical, exactness cannot characterize one's final in-
terpretation and that a harmony of all factors must be the
ideal. 1
One may conclude that relational or symbolic logic does
not require a metaphysics in which the concept of substance
2is absent. The fact, as shown above, that types of logic
-.«-"
1xArt. I, 184-186.
Mead observes that in spite of symbolic logic "we
still go on thinking in terms of what has been called the
•logic of things'.
. . .
That is logic built up on the in-
herence of certain qualities in certain substances. ...
If you continue to work in a world of things, I do not think
that symbolic logic will be of any particular value. . ."
(MTNC, 341-342).
1m
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which employ this concept can also perform the functions
ascribed to symbolic logic, leaves the question still open
as to whether the concept may be retained.
F. THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
Neo-realists contend that analysis dissolves or shows
to be external "... those frame relations which might tie
the universe together" and yields "an ultimate plurality of
reals.""1" These results must be taken into account.
If analysis is the ultimate or even the chief method
for philosophic inquiry a metaphysical pluralism is proba-
2ble, think the neo-realists. This follows from the exter-
nality of relations and the fact that cognition is not uni-
versal. The second of these arguments is really a result
obtained by an application of the first.
These ultimate reals in which analysis terminates are
4
for neo-realism the neutral entities mentioned above. Ob-
jects are events and events are complexes of qualities oc-
cupying certain points in time and space. Each quality and
locking, TOP, 351.
2Holt, et al., NR, 33, Perry, PPT, 272.
5Holt, loc. cit., cf. 472 (2, 3), 476 (6).
4 They are further discussed in chapter VII.
5
Cf. Montague, Art. IV, 253-254, 263-264.
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relation is analyzable into ultimate simples, which are
thought to take the place formerly occupied by substance.
1
There is no substance which holds these ultimate simples to-
gether, else they would not be simple* They somehow get
themselves arranged in complexes without the help of any
further agency. The abstractness of such entities and their
consequent inadequacy as final explanatory elements has al-
ready been noted, A metaphysical pluralism of some kind is
indicated, however, by the fact that some relations are ex-
ternal
.
It is further argued that the analytic method saves one
from certain common fallacies, and especially from those
which are committed by the idealist. The "fallacy of pseudo-
simplicity, " according to which the familiar is confused
with the simple, its sequel, the notion of "indefinite po-
tentiality , and the 'error of verbal suggestion, M which
results from an uncritical acceptance of the vague connota-
tions which words often possess, 4 may be avoided by a care-
1
This follows from realism's explanation of the ana-
lytic method itself (cf. supra, 87-92) and the argument that
relations are external.
2Holt, et al., NR, 12-14, Perry, PPT, 271.
3Perry, loc. cit.
4Holt, ibid., 18-19.
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ful analysis of every concept thought employs, says the real-
j
ist. Analysis also helps to guard against the "speculative
dogma," by which it is meant that one all-sufficient propo-
sition explaining everything must not be assumed by the phi-
losopher, 1 and against the "fallacy of exclusive particulari-
ty," i. e. the assumption that a particular term in a given
system belongs to that system alone.
So far as these fallacies are actually committed by the
serious philosopher, analysis does afford protection against
ii
them 0 But this does not necessarily indicate the preemi-
nence of analysis as the method for all philosophic inquiry.
Any philosophic method would welcome the services of analy-
sis to this extent.
Conclusions regarding the status of substance when the
analytic method and the new logic are applied may now be
drawn*
G. ANALYSIS AND SUBSTANCE
The following conclusions concerning the validity and
applicability of analysis seem to be evident.
First, analysis is an important means of interpreting
1Hblt, et al,, NR, 16-18,
2Ibid,, 14-15.
t
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experience, and may be relied upon to guard thought against
vague, ambiguous, concepts and hasty assumptions. Secondly,
though widely applicable, the analytic method cannot be made
the ultimate method in philosophy because it leads to un-
warranted abstractness. Thirdly, analysis is unsatisfactory
as a final method because it is unable to account for the
properties which wholes possess but which their parts do
not. Fourthly, neo-realism does not succeed in showing
through analysis that organic logic leads to skepticism, or
that the substance-attribute formula must necessarily be
given up, though it does show that other types of logic than
the Aristotelian and the organic are valid, e. g. the logic
of relations. In the sixth place, analysis has made clear
that some relations are external, but the fact that other
relations are internal limits the general validity of analy-
sis as a method. Finally, the existence of some external
relations indicates that analysis has shown reality to be
pluralistic and not monistic.
These results have an important bearing on the concept
of substance. In the first place, the impossibility of mak-
ing analysis the final and ultimate method in philosophy
leaves open the question of whether there are substances. 1
^Spaulding concedes, in spite of his emphasis on analy-
sis, that "some of the entities of the universe may be sub-
stances.
. .
, " though he does not specify which entities he
means, Ke is clearly more interested in the entities which
are not "substances." NR, 389.
\
—
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Secondly, since the properties which wholes have "but which
their parts do not, receive no adequate interpretation from
neo-realists, the hypothesis that a whole is a substantial
reality which conditions and is conditioned by its parts,
remains reasonable. Thirdly, the existence of some rela-
tions that are internal is evidence that some kind of sub-
stance may synthesize relations. In the fourth place, the
empirical fact that terms and relations are combined in con-
scious experience without losing their identity, suggests
i
that substance may be of the nature of consciousness. Final-
ly, the fact that some relations are external denies that
there is one absolute substance, but allows that there may
be a plurality of substances.
It is now apparent that the neo-realistic plan to re-
move the concept of substance from metaphysics has grave
i
i
weaknesses. Whether the neo-realists are more successful in
their attack on this concept when they actually apply the
analytic method to fundamental metaphysical problems, is the
question remaining to be answered. The first of these prob-
lems may next be considered.

CHAPTER V
MATTER
In this chapter the problem is to establish whether
neo-realists demonstrate the necessity for a complete re-
jection of material substance or for only a modification in
it. With their careful adherence to "the unimpeachable
truth[s] ... of science,"2 realists adopt the conclusion
of physics that the material thing is no substratum in which
qualities inhere, but a complex of qualities in relation.
The radical character of this proposal is appreciated by
them for it is asserted that the history of philosophy has
been largely dominated by the Aristotelian belief that the
It is consistent with realistic practice to investi-
gate the possibility of substance in matter before consider-
ing whether it is present in mind, for mind is "homogeneous
with the environment, belonging to one cosmos with it."
(Holt et al., NR, 35, 475.) Cognition is "on the same plane"
as happenings in the physical world (ibid., 33), the differ-
ence between knower and known being the same as that between
bodies, colors, or any other grouping of things (ibid., 34).
There is accordingly no a priori reason for treating mind
first. On the other hand, the nature of mind is more easily
understood after its environment is considered.
2Perry, PPT, 272. Cf. Holt et al., NR, 36-42.
5Spaulding, NR, 42.
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physical thing is identifiable with a substratum. 1
The neo-realistic attack on material substance begins
with the assertion that the physical bodies to which common
sense holds, are reducible to simpler elements. Belief that
this reduction is valid constitutes an implicit argument
against the cruder form of material substance. It is there-
fore necessary to observe the character of this analysis.
A. ELEMENTS OF MATTER
Matter may be broadly defined, says the realist, as that
aspect of being which is made up of complexes "occupying both
space and time.*2 It is that province which contains spatial
and temporal properties on the one hand, and "space-time-
filling properties" on the other. Yet it is the fact of
space-time occupancy which invests an object with material or
physical character, not the "that" which occupies. Physical
bodies are thus "the distinct individuals of the genus "mat-
ter.""3
Though common sense and philosophical tradition may have
held that these "distinct individuals" were lumps of simple
substance they are "capable of being analyzed into more prim-
Spaulding, NR, xvi, xvii.
Perry, PPT, 52. Cf. Marvin, PBM, 232.
Perry, loc. cit.
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itive terms.""1* Natural sciences, such as physics and chem-
2istry, have done much in recent years to reduce matter to
such simples as leave "no residue ... of little material
"brickbats." It is taken for granted that the cells and col-
loidal particles making up living organisms as well as the
particles which constitute inorganic objects such as blocks
4
of wood are composed of molecules. Atoms must he assumed,
the scientist shows, in order to explain the chemical behav-
5ior of these molecules. Experiments indicate that probably
Q
all the elements are composed of electrons. The electron
itself is "a field of force," and as such it is "a three-
dimensional manifold of elements which are intensity points
forming an ordered series."
The fundamental unit of matter is thus a manifold of
elements or qualities in relation. Wherever these units are
so related as to form a larger whole, there are properties to
1
Perry, PPT, 310. Cf. Marvin, FBM, 232, Spaulding, Art.
V, 239.
2
Marvin, Art. II, 86.
Holt, Art. I, 368-369.
4
Spaulding, Art. V, 243, 229, 239.
5Ibid., 225-227, 238, 239. Cf. Montague, Art. IV, 265.
6Spaulding, ibid., 238. Cf. Marvin, Art, II, 86, Holt,
COC, 118.
7
Spaulding, ibid., 239.
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be found which are not properties of the parts but of the
whole. ^ An atom of hydrogen would have refractive, rotatory,
and absorptive powers but these would be lacking to the indi-
vidual electrons constituting it, A molecule of sulphuric
acid would in turn have properties which neither an atom of
hydrogen, sulphur, nor oxygen would have. Physical complexes
are cases of "creative synthesis," for they are more than the
p
sums of their parts.
It is probable that the cruder forms of material sub-
stance are justly ruled out by neo-realists , Matter is not
one block of extended substance from which particular physi-
cal objects are hewn. The relativity of measurement to the
frame of reference employed by the measurer, and the fact
that both the objects measured and the instrument of measure-
ment change during the process of measuring, indicate that
there is no inert, fixed, or solid, material substance in
physical things. If there is such a reality there is no way
of determining it. Nor can matter be considered an aggre-
gate of indestructible atoms, some of which become related in
such fashion as to form the seemingly substantial character
1
Spaulding, Art. V, 239.
2IMd t , 240, cf. 239.
This conclusion follows from the discussion in chapter
III. Cf, supra, pp. 66-68.
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of a given material object. The reduction of atoms to fields
of electrical force, and the discovery within them of empty
space, make it plain that they cannot be solid units of pas-
sive material stuff. * Recent developments in physics are
rather generally recognized to have made necessary the re-
jection of material substance in these senses.
The further question of what constitutes the atom leads
into more controversial territory. Its electrical character
pis widely accepted, but the significance of this view for
material substance is much in dispute. The neo-realistic
argument that the fundamental units of matter are manifolds
of qualities in relation is advanced with the further asser-
tion that there is no substratum in which these qualities
and relations inhere. Thus the concept of material substance
is rejected altogether and that of a complex of qualities and
relations is substituted for it.
Whether the criticisms are valid which realists level at
substance as an aspect of the fundamental units of matter,
must now be inquired. Though it is largely true, as Hasan
points out, that neo-realists presuppose the absence of sub-
stance, it must be observed that some explicit arguments
1Cf. supra, pp. 70-74.
2
Cf. supra, pp. 70, 72, 73.
3Cf. ROR, 166.
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against the doctrine are also presented.
B. CRITICISMS OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE
Neo-realists understand by substance the alleged pres-
ence in unitary complexes of "an entity . . over and above
their qualities, properties and relations." Consequently
that which is rejected is "the notion that the unity of the
thing substand
s
,
underlies, transcends, or is otherwise con-
cealed beyond or within its manifestations. ""^ Apparently
realists deny that there is a ground of qualities and rela-
tions anywhere outside these qualities and relations them-
selves
.
Sources for the bad habit of thinking in terms of sub-
stance are not hard to find, thinks the realist. The first
one lies in the common willingness to impute to things the
structure which belongs to knowledge of things. Names, e. g.
"Caesar," "gold," "I," "you," are to the knower "symbols for
systems of expectations." Substance arises from the "primi-
tive and inveterate habit" of ascribing to these objects a
"forward reference" or "determination by the future" such as
that which alone belongs to an organism endowed with a nerv-
Perry, GTV, 403. Cf. Marvin, FBM, 174.
2Perry, ibid., 404, cf. PPT, 66.
3Perry, GTV, 403, cf. PPT, 67. Holt, COC, 62, 64, 135.
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ous system.*
1
' A second source for the notion of substance is
"the psychology of self-knowledge." The sense of alertness,
tension, effort, or expectation which is characteristic of
the self is ascribed to external objects. When the self an-
ticipates B of A it imputes to A an anticipatory relation to
B, a sense of activity and power that is regarded as A f s po-
tentiality or secret inwardness. Substance, it is believed,
results from taking self-activity as the model for thought
4
about external objects.
Undoubtedly this explanation for the psychological ori-
gin of the concept of substance has much truth in it. How-
ever, the origin of a doctrine never determines its meaning
and validity. The fact that the idea of self had its origin
in such notions as breath or wind, does not in itself prove
that there is now no self. So the idea of substance need not
be rejected, nor retained, because its birth is alleged to be
humble. The problem is to determine its validity whatever
its origin.
Perry, GTY, 405.
2Loc. cit.
3Loc. cit.
4Some thinkers outside the school of neo-realism also
call the concept of substance in question because of its "sub-
jective" origin. Cf. Cassirer, SP, 210, Loewenberg, Art. II,
12, Parkhurst, RLR, 42.
1
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*
.
-I
. . . ,
i
i
c
144
It may be noted, however, that in rejecting the model of
self-activity as the guide for thought about external ob-
jects, neo-realists become obligated to justify some other
manner of conceiving them. If the habit which the mind most
readily adopts is indefensible the case for some other one
must be clearly demonstrated.
The first direct criticism of material substance by neo-
realists is that it illustrates the fallacy of pseudo-sim-
plicity.'1' To believe in a material substance is to mistake
familiarity for simplicity, that is, the seeming simplicity
of an unanalyzed complex is confused with the real simplicity
attained through analysis. Whereas substance "endows the ob-
ject with an undivided unity" analysis reduces this unity "to
many terms in relation,"2 Science has been outgrowing the
doctrine presumably because it was vague and incompletely
analyzed. Since it is a case of inadequate analysis sub-
stance tends to beget "a naive and premature intellectual
satisfaction" and thus to become "an easy way of shirking in-
4
tellectual responsibility.
"
In reply to this criticism, one may readily admit that
-••For the nature of this fallacy cf. Holt et al., NR, 12-
14.
Perry, PPT, 66, cf. Art. IV, 127.
Marvin, Art. II, 90.
4perry, GTV, 406.
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any unit of what was traditionally, or is now, called mate-
rial substance is capable of further analysis. No unit of
matter could be understood until all of its parts and prop-
erties were identified, and their relations indicated. For
example, an atom of sodium can be understood when its volume,
specific gravity, mass, attractive power and other properties
are noted, and when its electronic constituents and their
properties, as well as the relations between these parts and
properties are specified. Such an analysis will terminate,
says the realist, in a congeries of points in space, instants
in time, relations between these points and instants, and
qualities occupying space and time.''' Explanation of any ob-
ject involves its analysis, as neo-realists maintain.
But the question still remains, assuming that this is so
far a true analysis of any given unit of matter, whether sub-
stance in every sense is thereby eliminated. As noted in
the last chapter, explanation of wholes through their parts
p
leaves out of account the unique properties of those wholes.
Neo-realists either ignore these properties or else label
them "non-rational. " Whatever unit of matter one may choose
for an illustration, whether electron, atom, or molecule, re-
gardless of size, it must be considered a whole, of which
1This view will be further explained below (cf. pp.
167-181)
.
2
Gf. supra, pp. 108-111.
-t
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there are unique properties. This follows from the fact that
units of matter are fields of force which vary when in con-
tact with other fields of force, but which also maintain a
measure of identity or integrity. 1 The terms and relations
to which neo-realists reduce these units of matter do not
themselves possess the attributes of force. Until the neo-
realist explains these properties of the whole he has no
right to assert that there is no material substance. It may
consist in these factors that are more than the qualities
and relations which as parts make up the given unit of mat-
ter.
A second criticism which neo-realists make of material
o
substance is that it is an "indefinite potentiality. 11 Since
the precise nature of a substance is undefined "it is deemed
3
capable of anything and everything. n Science constantly
finds it to possess "unexpected properties." Thus it may as
reasonably be endowed with "intelligible force" as with
"physical force," and no one can foresee what further powers
4it may in the future reveal. Such diverse and contradictory
views as materialism and occasionalism, Spinozistic monism
10f, supra, pp. 72-74, 77.
^erry, PPT, 69.
3
Perry, GTV, 406.
4Perry, PPT, 69. Cf. Marvin, PBM, 178.

and Leibnizian pluralism have resulted from this indefinite
character of substance."*"
So far as this argument is a criticism of substance be-
cause the latter is vague and "indefinite, 11 it may be granted
validity. There is no sense in postulating substance if
2
there exists no clue as to what it is that is postulated.
A thing, and hence substance, cannot even be without being in
some determinant way, and as soon as the determinate charac-
ter of the thing is mentioned, qualities and not substance
are under consideration. Thus it seems impossible to divorce
the "that" from the "what" of a thing. The thing is in some
sense its qualities and there is no use in thinking of a
vague and indefinite something beyond or beneath them.
Yet if this is a criticism of substance as the seat of
potentiality some rather serious complications arise. If
there is no potentiality beyond the qualities and relations
of a given physical object, say an electron, which accounts
for the fact that these qualities and relations move as a
unit in a certain orbit, or become joined to other qualities
and relations so as to produce an atom, then this potential-
ity must rest in the qualities and relations themselves.
1Marvin, Art* II, 90.
2
Cf. Leighton, MAC, 187.
5Taylor, EOM, 132.
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They must themselves originate their own motion, and be able
to assume and to terminate relations alone. This assigns
a new and heavy burden to qualities and relations. Whether
they are able to bear it will be considered under the head-
ing of identity. 1
The third criticism of material substance may really be
considered an aspect of the second. It holds that the rela-
tion between a substance, if there were such, and its prop-
erties would be unclear. "No direct relation of necessary
connection" is to be found. There is only an "arbitrary 11
2
relation between them. Since substance is assumed to be
distinct from its attributes the manner in which it is relat-
ed to them becomes problematic. For example, how are "yel-
lowness," "malleability, " and such properties related to the
substance "gold"?4
This is indeed a true difficulty in the concept of a
substratum beyond attributes. If substance is distinct from
its attributes, there would seem to be a need for some rela-
tion to join the qualities to their substance. But to as-
sume such a relation is to raise the problem of what status
1
Cf. infra, pp. 167-181.
2
Perry, PPT, 67.
3
Ibid., 69.
4Ibid,, 67.
<
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this relation enjoys, and how it is related to the substance
and to the qualities. On the other hand, if substance is not
distinct from its attributes, there remains no reason why it
should be assumed at all. It jLs the qualities in that case.
If the concept of substance is retained it must be considered
immanent in the attributes, but not exhaustively defined by
them.
The defender of substance may admit the difficulty of
explaining this relationship but go on to assert that other
and more serious problems arise when substance is rejected
altogether. Without some theory of substance two seemingly
insurmountable difficulties present themselves. In the first
place, there would appear to be no way to account for the
element of permanence in change. Secondly, the principle of
identity or individuality would not be satisfactorily ex-
plained. Substance can perform these functions. * It would
be simpler to accept the mysterious fact that qualities are
related through substance than to fail in the explanation of
these other two fundamental notions. Whether neo-realists
give an acceptable account of the latter remains to be ob-
served.
As a fourth argument against the doctrine of substance,
"'"The necessity for retaining these two historical mean-
ings of the concept of substance is elaborated below. Cf
.
pp. 167-186.
•
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neo-realists point out that there is no empirical evidence
for it, "No residual substance to he called 'Matter 1 " can
he discovered when a given material object is analyzed Ex-
perience does not reveal a "thing-in-itself ,
"
2 for when an
object, e, g. a table, is robbed of its qualities, such as
color, hardness, weight, and other discernible properties,
it becomes nothing at all. To suppose a system of entities
beyond what are perceived is gratuitous. The phenomenal and
noumenal are identical.^ Realists have "a strong aversion"
for "inaccessible universes" and "substances," but sympathize
rather with the "trend
. , . toward identifying reality with
the elements, processes, and systems of experience,"
It is of course true that material substance as such is
never experienced. But this fact can at best be only a weak
argument against it. Because the center of the earth has
never been perceived one need not and does not conclude that
there is no center. A "center" is assumed in order to ac-
count for the earth's behavior. It would be reasonable to
assume a substance to account for the behavior of a material
Holt, COC, 131.
2
Ibid., 128.
3Marvin, PBM, 174. Cf. Perry, Art. IV, 103.
4Pitkin, Art. Ill, 433-434. Things are "what they are
known as," to use James' phrase (PRA, 50).
^erry, Art. IV, 103.
*
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particle, even though it had never been experienced. The
fundamental problem is to determine whether the behavior of
a material particle can be accounted for if it is assumed to
be only a complex of qualities and relations. If the con-
cept of material substance is to be rejected it must be more
because it serves no necessary function than because it lies
beyond experience.
While all knowledge must be conditioned by sense experi-
ence it is far more than the mere recording of such experi-
ence. There are also factors of interpretation, inference,
and prediction in it. The missing premises of a logical ar-
gument are not perceived but inferred. Eclipses are pre-
dicted and earthquakes are explained through reference to
causes that are never perceived."*" One may be said to "know"
a substance in the sense that it is required by reason to
explain what is given in sense experience. Yet, care must be
taken to use these supplementary factors of reason sparingly,
and in this respect the present criticism constitutes a just
warning. Reason must not be allowed to fabricate all sorts
of "unknowns." It must be limited to those conclusions which
the facts of experience absolutely require.
Still another reason for rejecting material substance
according to the realist, lies in the fact that the status of
Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 247.
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space is rendered ambiguous by it. Space cannot be itself
a substance. If space were one great container, the things
within it, the earth, stones, animals and what not, would
have to be its attributes, and this they obviously are not.
And if space be conceived in terms of points, what would the
attributes of points be?"*" On the other hand, space cannot be
an attribute of so-called material substance, for it is the
"other" attributes of substance which are in space. Thus,
an object ! s mass, motion, impenetrability and other qualities
o
or attributes are in space.
Certainly the doctrine of material substance does inter-
fere with the status of space if the latter must be real.
Hence the validity of this argument rests upon the validity
of the case for space as real. Realists, however, assume the
reality of space without proof, and consequently this criti-
cism of substance may be passed over.
A final reason for rejecting the doctrine of substance
is that its function has been absorbed by the theory of re-
lations. Neo-realists employ "the notion of relation in
Marvin, PBM, 174-175.
2
Cf. Perry, PPT, 51-55.
3
It may be noted that if space were phenomenal, i # e.
if it were a form according to which the mind construes
physical objects, a rule according to which qualities are
ordered, the problem of the relation between substance and
space would not arise.
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place of the notion of substance,"''* for the latter is "a
vestige of primitive thought. . . . 11 Whereas things were
more evident to men in their intellectual childhood, with the
advancement of scientific learning relations between things
have assumed the greater importance. In fact the progress
of modern science has been "due mainly to a substitution of
H4the category of relation for the category of substance."
If substantive terms are admitted at all "they stand for re-
„5lational systems of manifest properties. ..." For exam-
ple, a color is to be explained as "a function of many things"
6
and not as an essence or an aspect of one.
At this point Montague disagrees with other members of
the school and asserts in effect that substance still per-
forms the function of helping to distinguish qualities from
relations. While qualities are "obviously relational" they
are thought of "as the private attribute or predicate ...
'inhering 1 as an adjective or accident in the body as its
"^erry, PPT, 308.
2Marvin, PBM, 175.
3
Ibid., 175, Art. II, 90, 91.
4Perry, GTV, 406.
Loc. cit.
6Cf. Pitkin, Art, III, 463.
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substantive or substance.""'" Such a quality as "shape" is "a
dyadic relation," which means that it is the surface of con-
tact which a body directly sustains with its environment.
"Relations are only recognized as such when they are at least
triadic. • • " "Distance" is thus a third or mediating en-
tity between two bodies.
One may doubt, along with Montague, whether the category
of relation can "replace wholly the older notion of sub-
stance." Of course if no relations whatever were recog-
nized, save that of substance and attribute, a Leibnizian
monadology would result. 4 But it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that this ".
.
etrange phobie des substances
fait suspendre en l'air toutes les relations en leur enlevant
les termes sur lesquels ils s'appuient." Unless there is
some sense in which relations and qualities "belong" together
it is impossible to explain how the nature or identity of a
thing is to be thought.
At any given moment only part of a thing's, e. g. a pen-
1CSD, 84.
2Ibid # , 85.
3Sheldon, SSPD, 206.
4Whitehead, CON, 150.
Bremer, HA, 302.
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cil»s, relations are evident. 3. As the pencil lies on the
desk one may give a relational definition of it by saying
that it is that which is "to the right of" the blotter,
"above" the desk, "excluding" other physical bodies, "exert-
ing so many ounces pressure" on the desk. But some relations
of the pencil which truly constitute it a pencil are not
present at the moment under discussion. The relation of
"marking a line on a page" or that of "creating" a message to
another person beside the writer are not present, and these
are what justifies one in calling this complex a pencil. To
call a thing its relations would thus result in a truncated
definition of it, for only a few of those relations could be
enumerated at a given moment. Apparently some provision must
be made for joining the relations (and qualities) which a
thing manifests at a given moment with those it manifests at
another.
The realist might retort that no theory can define a
thing by all its attributes, for nothing ever manifests all
its attributes at once. This is true, but a theory of sub-
stance would supply the element of potentiality which would
make the origin of future attributes plausible. It would
make the connection between the attributes present at one
moment and those at another more understandable.
1
Cf. Taylor, EOM, 136.
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If, on the other hand, relations are to take over this
function of substance, they must he able to identify them-
selves with each other from moment to moment, thus presenting
Mthinghood " in any given object. But such a character is no-
where ascribed to relations by the neo-realist. They are
merely said to be given in certain conjunctions at different
moments. The continuance of association characteristic of
some and the discontinuance characteristic of others is not
explained* It seems questionable, therefore, whether the
concept of relation has, or ever can, supplant that of sub-
stance. Certainty about this issue can, however, be attained
only after the realistic theory of identity has been exam-
ined. 1
These criticisms of material substance have, it appears,
successfully shown that substance as an inert and inconceiv-
able support of qualities and relations, but which is still
2distinct from them, must be rejected. The thing does seem
to be its qualities and relations. But in adopting this con-
clusion neo-realists are forced to show that the functions
of substance, viz., potentiality, identity, permanence, ac-
tivity, can be absorbed by qualities and relations. If it
1
Cf. infra pp. 181-186.
2
Lelghton points out that it may be doubted whether any
philosopher ever actually held such a view as this, MAC, 189.
•
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can be shown by realism that qualities and relations are
adequate to the task of assuming these functions, all forms
of substance will need to be given up. But if realists fail
in this, justification for a kind of substance which is
somehow immanent in its qualities and relations, but is
still something more than they, will be afforded.
Before inquiring what disposition the realist is able
to make of the traditional functions of substance, it is
necessary briefly to examine the exact nature of qualities
and relations. What functions they can perform will be more
evident after their character and status is observed.
C. THE STATUS OP QUALITIES
Whatever the precise character of a quality or of its
distinction from a relation may be, it does not derive from
the mind that knows it. w . . . Sensible qualities ...
possess an inherent and inalienable character of their
own. 111 Accordingly, "the thing transcends the thought ...
and possesses the qualities and characters which ... knowl-
edge reveals. n^
Neo-realists have a peculiar interest in maintaining
Holt et al., NR, 35, cf. Holt, Art. I, 313.
>
Perry, PPT, 312.
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the objectivity of both primary and secondary qualities, 1
for it makes more reasonable their intrinsic character. If
they possess an "inalienable" character of their own they
would seem more capable of assuming the functions of sub-
stance. The need for a material substance, or bearer of
qualities, tends therewith to be obviated.
The objectivity of primary qualities is generally ac-
cepted by realists. Their "reality," i. e. objectivity, is
2
"vindicated indirectly as well as perceptually. " The phys-
icist goes, not to the epistemologist but to nature itself
for the true character of things. 3 The "fundamental physi-
cal properties" such as "latitude, longitude, shape, date,
»4
motion" belong to the physical manifold itself. They are
5partly spatial and partly temporal, consisting of points and
instants, themselves indefinable, standing in certain rela-
It may be noted that the objectivity of qualities is
assumed and not argued by realists, beyond an appeal to com-
mon sense. Cf. Macintosh, POK, 248, Hasan, ROR, 191.
2
Montague, Art. IV, 299.
Jarvin, Art. II, 88. Marvin adds that the physicist
has not yet been able to say exactly what the primary quali-
ties are (ibid., 89).
4
Perry, PPT, 52-53. Cf. Spaulding, Art. V, 196-197,
Holt, Art. I, 369.
For the realistic view of space see Spaulding, NR, 451-
452, Art. V, 182-188; for that of time, see Perry, PPT, 235,
Spaulding, NR, 213, Art. V, 190-193, 223-224.
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tions. Each body at every instant occupies, or rather is
,
several points in space related in particular ways.
Secondary qualities as "space-time-filling" are like-
wise objective. Such properties as color, temperature,
sound, taste, derive their "physical character" from their
1
relation to the fundamental or primary qualities. In fact
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is
"accidental and not logical," for both "enjoy the same on-
tological status."3 Secondary qualities are "on the objects"
just as they appear to be. 4 It is "obvious" that the tree
is green and the cloud gray, and to say that the forest is
not green when there is no one there to perceive it is "ri-
diculous." Even Montague concedes that these qualities are
"as objective as they seem," though in his earlier writings
7their objectivity was for him plainly an insoluble problem.
Undoubtedly there is, as realism claims, an important
objective element in both kinds of qualities. Even Berkeley
•''Perry, PPT, 52-53, 277, 324, 310, Art. IV, 128.
2Holt, COC, 138-139, Art. I, 313, 314.
3Holt, COC, 134.
4Ibid., 148, cf. Art. I, 354. Cf. also Marvin, PBM, 193,
^olt, COC, 139.
6CSD, 85, cf. WK, 272.
7
Art. IV, 299.
1l£j * i 1 1 ' \ *
•
•
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admitted that their source lay in a stimulus external to the
finite knower. There is at least an objective "power," as
Locke said, which produces in the moment of perception pri-
mary and secondary qualities. 1 "These thrills in our organ-
isms we call colors, sounds, and so on, express the natures
of their objective determinants" whatever one's theory about
qualities may be. At all events, a quality is a prediction
that if one behaves in a certain way toward an object certain
results will eventuate. Thus the weight of an apple is what
would be registered if it were put on the scales, its shape
would be the roundness experienced by the fingers when touch-
ing it and by the eyes when seeing it. Qualities do have
this objective reference. One may know that true qualities
are discovered when repeated prediction yields the same re-
sult
.
4
But there are serious obstacles in the way of consider-
ing qualities as qualities independent of and objective to
the knowing mind. In the first place, the problem of error
becomes an insurmountable difficulty. Realists have wrestled
persistently with this problem but have not yet solved it
1
Cf. Leighton, MAC, 188n.
2
Pitkin, Art. I, 210-211.
5Lewis, MWO, 140.
4Cf. Cassirer, SP, 274, Lewis, ibid., 125, 126, 133.
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satisfactorily. The assignment of error to the realm of sub-
sistence raises more problems than it solves, for the rela-
tion of subsistence to existence is by no means clear. On
the other hand, if error is considered a wrong response, the
problem is merely restated or else it receives a subjective
reference which is inconsistent with realistic premises."''
Secondly, the supposedly autonomous and intrinsic character
of qualities would seem to indicate that one quality could
P
go on existing without the other. How the volume of an ob-
ject could exist without its weight is not evident. The in-
terdependence of many qualities is a patent fact.
If, therefore, the doctrine of substance is given up,
the entities which assume its function must be "powers" that
accomplish certain reactions in those who perceive them.
Such a view of qualities would really make it easier to be-
lieve that the functions of substance could be adopted by
qualities* But realists reduce "powers" to simpler terms and
relations, thereby discarding the advantage such a conception
might offer. Whether simple terms and relations can ade-
quately replace the concept of substance becomes a further
For further discussion of this difficulty see pp. 285-
28V •
2
Hasan, ROR, 191.
Sperry, PPT, 71-72, 263, Art. IV, 104.
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question to be answered.
The possibility of distinguishing between qualities and
relations may now be considered.
D. QUALITY, MEASUREMENT, AND RELATION
There is a strong inclination on the part of some neo-
realists to believe that the properties or qualities of an
object can best be expressed in measurements or quantities.
The result is that qualities tend to merge with relations.
Relations are said to be more fundamental than qualities, so
that in the development and refinement of thought the cate-
gories of substance, quality, and relation represent three
successive stages."*"
Science, says Holt, has the "best empirical evidence 11
for reducing "all qualitative differences to different ar-
«2
rangements of elements which are alike in quality." There-
fore quality proves to be no "ultimate category of natural
science, • • " Secondary qualities, such as colors, are
APerry, PPT, 308n, 310.
2Holt, Art. I, 339, 340. For a thorough consideration
of this problem see Hartshorne, PPS.
Ibid., 329. Holt does not seem quite so certain of
this conclusion at another point (cf. COC, 161-162).

i.
163
definable in non-qualitative terms. 1 "Roughness" is a suc-
cession, i. e. a quantity, of taps perceived through the
o
sense of touch. Heat, light, odor, and whatever other qual-
ities are radiated, depend for their intensity upon their
nearness to the center of radiation, and hence they may he
defined as quantities of energy.
Primary qualities are likewise quantitative formulae or
ratios. Mass is really "the fixed ratio of acceleration
which a body possesses in relation to each other body or to
some standard body."4 Motion may be defined as "a definite
relation to space and time of something which occupies them
ii 5jointly. Velocity, the rate of motion, is the ratio be-
tween the quantity of space traversed and the quantity of
time consumed. 6 Energy may be called "a constant relation-
ship or proportion of variable terms . . . [whichJ are func-
1Holt, COC, 107. Montague agrees with Holt that dif-
ferences in intensity of vibrations account for differences
in the intensity of colors, but denies that such differences
account for differences between qualities. Cf. Holt et al.,
NR, 480.
2Holt, Art. I, 343.
5Pitkin, Art. Ill, 446, cf. 463-464.
4Perry, PPT, 58, 61, 62. Cf. Holt, COC, 157.
5Perry, ibid., 61, Marvin, PBM, 232, Spaulding, Art. V,
195-196.
Perry, ibid., 56, Spaulding, ibid., 205-209.
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tions of space and time or of properties that occupy
them. . . » *- Supposition that there is anything more to
these qualities than mathematical relationships is either
"an antecedent play of the imagination or a speculative aft-
^thought.*
According to this view the physical world is a system
of relational constants, a set of quantities in proportion.
"Most every physical term one can mention" is "definable "by
an equation."3 Properties of physical objects "turn out to
be mathematical relationships." In fact, physical science
is "tending to become altogether a science of exact measure-
5
ment and mathematical explanation. Physical things may be
regarded as "relational complexes."
The critic of realism may agree that there is no harm,
and perhaps much profit, in formulating a relational or
quantitative definition of qualities. Solubility of a lump
of sugar may be considered its reaction, i. e. its relation,
Perry, PPT, 60.
2
Ibid., 61.
Marvin, PBM, 258.
^Loc. cit.
Marvin, ibid., 239. Cf. Perry, GTV, 406.
6Pitkin, Art. Ill, 463.
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to water; its weight the relation of attraction to the earth;
its whiteness the relation to a normal eye or to other col-
ors. But the fact that such definitions are possible need
1
not mean that qualities are thereby read out of court. It
merely emphasizes that they have a relational or quantita-
tive reference, and never act in their own right, but always
as correlates of relations. They are terms which it is some-
times practical to use in a sense other than that of mere re-
lation. Qualities may be known by the relations they assume
but this does not mean there is no justification for holding
to qualities as separate entities. To say that all qualities
are really relations is "to blur an indispensable distinction
in meaning, 11
Pitkin rightly points out that quantity, and hence re-
4
lation, is logically posterior to quality, for quantity
5
means nothing if not some kind of quantity. There is a cer-
^Montague agrees on this point (Art. I, 121).
2Neo-realists as a group do, of course, recognize that
relations imply or presuppose terms. But the conclusion that
all qualities are ultimately reducible to non-qualitative or
neutral terms and relations raises the question of how the
undoubted qualitative novelties in evolution arise. Again,
the problem of individuality would, on this theory, become
difficult to solve.
Drake, Art. I, 18. Cf. Eaton, ST, 130.
4
Art. Ill, 449.
6Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 206.
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tain absurdity in reducing all qualities to relations and
thus declaring, as Holt does, that being is in the last anal-
ysis, of one kind. If being is of only one kind it would be
impossible to understand what this one quality or kind was,
for a quality enjoys the character that it has by distinction
from something else, and there would in this case be nothing
else
.
Haste must be made to recognize, however, that another,
and perhaps more important, strand of thought in neo-realism
retains ultimate qualitative distinctions. Montague, as
already noted, holds that qualities are "dyadic" relations
whereas relations are "triadic" and consequently not identi-
fiable with qualities.* Spaulding urges that realism can
accept "no one quality • . • to which all other entities are
reducible" but must hold to "an irreducible plurality of
• • • kinds." Marvin comes essentially to the same conclu-
sion when he asserts that in spite of much continuity in
reality each existent is a case of some element of spontane-
ity and discontinuity.
Prom this investigation it appears that the functions
of substance are, according to some realists, to be taken
CSD, 85-84.
2NR, 455.
5FEM, 148-149.
<s? Svi.O X v il J lei 1J w .1. X-O J^vX1W v J # » # ^ v X X-Q v Vil v *jmm
— *J.T ' £lw O v v x Um X JiT98 39 fivfllO0 ilX v TuEyJSC 4 3 J i*L L .X • • +
i
•
167
over "by relations. According to others they are to be as-
sumed by both relations and qualities . This latter alterna-
tive seems to be the more plausible. The problem henceforth
becomes that of determining whether the material thing is no
more than a complex of qualities in relation, that is, wheth-
er the functions once ascribed to a material substratum may
now be performed by qualities and relations.
Chief among the problems that must be solved by any
thinker who renounces substance is, as noted above, that of
identity. He must show how one material "thing" is to be
distinguished from another if its qualities and relations do
not "belong" to a substance, and how the thing at one moment
is identical with itself at another though some changes have
taken place. These issues may be discussed respectively as
the problems of individuality and of permanence.
E. INDIVIDUALITY AND IDENTITY
If there is no substratum in which qualities inhere,
identity must rest with the qualities and relations them-
selves. Perry makes this clear when he objects to calling
a thing "the sum of its attributes" since an "it" or "core"
is thereby presupposed. It is less misleading to call the
thing a complex of qualities and relations."'" The common ar-
Art. XII.
>•
t
i
•
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gument that properties or qualities must be properties or
qualities of something and hence of a substance, 1 is thus set
aside as invalid. Things are "made up" or "defined in terms
2
of" attributes or qualities.
The problem of identity receives some light from the
fact that although qualities do not belong to substances,
they do belong in some cases to each other, to events, and to
relations.
3
There may be "disembodied qualities,"4 but for
the most part they "belong to something . " For example, the
properties of temporality and irreversibility may have in
common the further quality or property of being serial. An
event may possess the property of being fast or slow. Rela-
tions have such properties as symmetry or asymmetry, transi-
tivity or intransitivity.
Since qualities are always found in combinations or
clusters, some types of which are more frequent than others,
neo-realists are right in pointing out this dependency. For
example, red is always discovered as the red of a rose, a
Verda, NRLS, 109-110.
2
Perry, Art. IV, 109.
Spaulding, WOC, xvi-xvii.
4Spaulding, NR, 389.
5
Spaulding, WOC, xvi.
•
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book, or some other group of qualities.^" If the cohesion of
these qualities were of such an intimate character that it
yielded an element of individuality that was more than the
sum of the qualities there would he ground for ascribing sub-
2
stance to the complex. But such a degree of dependence is
just what realists are concerned to deny.
The material object is according to neo-realism only a
complex of qualities and their organization. It is composed
of independent parts none of which is ponderable, ponderabil-
ity being a quality which exists in the organization of
4
parts. Just as a word is its letters and an organization
which means more than the letters, so a physical thing is the
qualities and their configuration. The pattern or configu-
ration is "some sort of a unifying relation," but it is not
organically related to its elements. Unity or individuality,
it seems, rests in the "configuration" of qualities.
Another way the individuality of a thing may be con-
ceived according to the realist, lies in "the systematic
1Hasan, ROR, 310, Loewenberg, Art. II, 17.
2
Loewenberg, ibid., 12.
3
Cf. Perry, Art. IV, 109.
4
Holt, Art. I, 369, 340.
Perry, Art. XII, 300.
6Perry, GTV, 403.
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character of its manifestations.""'" A thing is a system of
qualities, a region of space "marked by some distinguishing
character that remains unchanged through time. Qualities
may be perceived as members of a system that "stands quite
distinct from other systems and forms what we may call a
thing.
"
3
Roots of individuality are present in the account so far
presented. It would be useful in attempting to distinguish
one thing from another to know that some qualities belong to-
gether and that a pattern, configuration, or system is dis-
cernible in groups of qualities. But such a conception of
individuality leaves fundamental issues still unclarified.
It remains to show why the object gives the impression of be-
ing a unified whole instead of a loose aggregate, and why ob-
jects function as wholes and not as collections. How quali-
ties come to form themselves in patterns is also a question.
Some of the realists, notably Pitkin and Montague, real-
ize the need for such explanation and go on to assert that
the thing is a pattern or system of qualities that act as a
•"•Perry, GTV, 403.
2Perry, PPT, 52. Cf. Montague, Art. IV, 255, Spaulding,
KB, 11.
3
Marvin, PBM, 50.
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unit. "Things are
. . • what they do. . • .
"
1
They are
"centers of influence," and must be "defined in terms of
and identified with £theirj activity," Each physical thing
has ". . . a form inhering in the motion that carries it,"4
There is an "active form" or Gestalt in the physical object
which pervades its particles and serves as an "organizing
agency.
There is much to be said for this view that the thing is
g
some uniformity of behavior. If certain qualities and rela-
tions act together so as to give one the notion of "foot-
rule" the system of activity i_s the rule. This seems more
plausible than to say that a certain mass, an extension of
twelve inches, a hard surface, a width of one inch, are a
foot-rule. If the thing is a coordination of activities the
qualitative groups perceived as things would have some reason
for thus appearing. The grounds of experience may be "cen-
*-pitkin, Art. I, 211, 210. Of. Spaulding, NR, 271.
2
Pitkin, ibid., 225, cf. 226, also Art. Ill, 445.
3Pitkin, Art. I, 226-227.
Montague, Art. I, 131, cf. Art. IV, 286, 265.
5
Montague, CSD, 51-52, 54, 56, 58. (This is clearly an
avowal of substance.)
g
Cf. Lewis, MWO, 137-139. Even Parkhurst, who opposes
substance, asserts that any being "guiltless of action is
"inexplicable" (RLR, 40).
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ters of activity."1 Bowne argued extensively for the view
that the thing is the "character of its activity," and that
it 3
"the inactive is the non-existent." This Leibnizian con-
clusion seems difficult to escape.
One branch of neo-realism indicates an attempt to escape
it however, through the denial that force or activity is any-
thing more than a system of terms in relation. Force or ac-
tivity itself is not ultimate any more than substance, and
if analyzed it turns out to be specific elements in specific
4
configurations. Such dynamical considerations as activity
are "more confusing than clarifying," and consequently real-
I
ists oppose, along with scientists, "any explanation which
makes use of the notion of force. . • . 1,6 Motion, the funda-
mental concept in any theory of activity, is merely a series
of relations between complex terms which are themselves rela-
tions between points in space and instants in time.
Activity does, to be sure, consist of relations between
Leighton, MAC, 189, cf. 188n.
2MET, 39, cf. 16, 19, 23, 26, 30, 31, 43.
3
Ibid., 24.
4Perry, PPT, 71-72, 263.
5Perry, Art. IV, 104.
QMarvin, Art. II, 90.
7Spaulding, Art. V, 196, NR, 500.
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points in space and instants in time. But is this all that
it is? If so, then the terms and relations involved must
themselves assume and terminate their correlations."** To say
that there is "power" in these entities which enables them
to assume and terminate their relations would be to endow
them with characteristics which realists intend to deny. The
latter hold that these terms and relations are of a logical
2
and finally of a mathematical character and hence devoid of
"power •
"
Apparently there is a need for explanation here which
neo-realists do not fulfill. Sheldon declares that this def-
inition of motion is "an escape rather than a solution" of
the problem and that it reveals the difficulties which arise
when the element of "transeuncy" is omitted.
There would seem to be fewer difficulties to hurdle if
motion, and hence activity, were considered a complex that
is more than the elements which make it up. It is something
which is itself ultimate, as well as its constituents. There
seems no other alternative than to conclude that it is some-
Bradley finds the weakness in the theory of external
relations to be the fact that no explanation is afforded of
how the terms leave one set of relations and adopt another
(AR, 575).
2
This belief is further discussed below (cf. pp. 269-
272)
.
3SSPD, 243.
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thing more than the mere assumption and termination of rela-
tions. It is a whole which does the assuming and dissolving
of these relations. If activity is then an ultimate reality
there is justification for saying that the thing j^s activity.
Individuality would appear to rest in this principle. A
thing may he called what acts as a unit. It is "a persisting
unity of diverse qualities,""*" an "immanent law of appear-
ances.
Neo-realists retort to the critic who presses for a
theory of identity that no material complex owns its compo-
nents. Rather does it share them with other complexes. The
"specificity" of any given pattern is not disturbed by the
fact that its components also make up other patterns, just as
the words "lilt" and "till" are composed of the same let-
ters. "Physical entities may retain their specific natures
despite their community of qualities." If qualities are
conceived as belonging exclusively to a given complex, their
presence in others is strange . Thus if the characters of
gold belonged exclusively to gold, then yellowness, lustre,
softness, and smoothness could not very well be ascribed to
"^eighton, MAC, 182.
Kremer, NA, 302.
3Perry, Art. XII, 301.
4Ibid., 302.
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any other object, e. g. a brass button. ^ Interaction between
2
objects would be impossible if each owned its phenomena.
Attributes do not depend upon their complexes and hence bear
no unique relation to them.
Needless to say, a system of windowless monads would be
the result if each complex owned its qualities exclusively.
There must be a universal character to qualities, the differ-
ent instances of which help to make up particular complexes.
Some significance may be attached to the fact that the ele-
ments constituting a complex so act as to convey the impres-
sion of oneness or individuality. Cannot this group action
be an expression of the nature of the group itself? It is
just as reasonable to say that this coordination of elements
is no ''fiction" created by the perceiving mind as it is to
believe the individual elements or qualities are independent
4
of the mind. Certainly these particular instances of qual-
ities and relations must belong together in a unique way,
else they could not yield the element of individuality. The
neo-realistic assertion that no qualities are owned is really
a confession that there is no clear-cut principle of individ-
Perry, Art. XII, 301.
2
Marvin, PBM, 183.
3Perry, Art. IV, 109.
4
Cf. Taylor, EOM, 135.
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uality. 1
In the last analysis, one thing cannot be clearly dis-
tinguished from another, says the realist, for each thing is
a function of every other. With this conclusion realists
concede that identity cannot in any definite sense be attain-
ed. It is seldom possible to say where an object terminates
2
and relations to other entities begin. Distinction between
a stimulus and response cannot be precisely drawn. The sun
extends far beyond its fringe of molecules and it is only by
a series of practical abstractions that its identity has been
narrowed to a central fire. 4 Things are defined in terms of
5
the influence they exert, and since this is hard to deter-
mine the precise character of the thing is indeterminable.
Q
Definition of things by relations makes the limits of these
relations hard to discern. The term object has a wide deno-
tation, but it is na denotation which physical science it-
self imposes, 11 The physical world is a realm in which enti-
"^A normative definition of individuality is given below
(cf. pp. 178-180).
2Holt, Art. I, 372.
Pitkin, Art. Ill, 382, 383-384.
4Pitkin, Art. I, 225, 203, Art, III, 446.
Aitkin, Art, I, 227, Art. Ill, 447.
6Marvin, PBM, 175, 25-27, Perry, PPT, 64.
7
Holt, ibid,, 369.
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ties and relations stand in complexes that interweave, none
of which is genuinely distinguishable from another.
Individuality, the critic of realism must confess, is_
somewhat indefinite. It is to some extent a pragmatic mat-
ter. Things are functional wholes. They are what they may
be taken to be for a given purpose. Chairs and tables,
bridges and lead pencils are such in a particular context
and for the purpose they serve. 3" Between the legs of the
table and the floor on which they rest there is constant in-
terplay of motions, an exchange of energy. Consequently one
cannot say "exactly" where one ceases and the other begins.
But for all practical purposes every man is able to distin-
guish the two. Each is_ the function it performs, the one an
object to write upon, the other a means of supporting that
object. It is just as true to say a chair is a piece of
furniture designed to be sat on as it is to declare it is
really a bundle of electrons. For the common man the former
p
definition is adequate, for the physicist, the latter.
Realists must perforce decry identity even on these
grounds for it is here supplied to the object by mind, and
mind, as the realists argue, has no such prerogative. What-
'parkhurst, RLR, 43.
2
Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 85, 82, 154.
3Cf. infra, pp. 223-224.
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ever identity there is must be found in the objective world.
Yet realists, as noted above, are unable to show such an
element in the objective world. The "broad denotation" as-
cribed to objects by them is their frank confession that
identity in any respectable sense is simply not to be found.
They may, therefore, justly challenge their critics to point
out this elusive principle.
In the history of thought from the time of Socrates and
Plato to the present, individuality has proved to be a dif-
ficult problem. Etymologically the term, which comes from
the Greek word 'dxa/xo^ means the indivisible or "uncuttable."
From the great variety of definitions that have been pro-
posed, certain necessary elements stand out. First, an in-
dividual is "a being which cannot be divided into parts to
which the name of this being will apply. ""*" It is an indi-
visible whole. Secondly, it is a unity which remains rela-
2
tively constant through change. Third, it is something
that is independent and self-contained. Fourth, it is a
4
unique being of which there is but one instance. Fifth,
ARoyce, Art. II, 534.
2Eisler, HWP, 504, Stout, Art. I, 504.
3Royce, loc. cit. Cf. Bosanquet, PIV, 68.
4Eisler, loc. cit., WPB, I, 732-733, Stout, loc. cit.,
Royce, loc. cit. Cf. SOED, I, 993.
#
179
"an individual is something which reacts. ..." Individu-
ality may thus be ascribed to that self-contained, unique,
and active whole which maintains a relative constancy
through change. The principle of individuality is the per-
sistence of definite and self-contained units or modes of
activity through change.
Individuality rests, therefore, in activity according
to definite law, though each Individual is in a sense a law
unto itself. The thing is that complex of entities which
acts in a systematic way or performs an intelligible func-
tion. There is no need to assume a mysterious and unknown
substratum which binds qualities and relations together, but
there is need for observing that a principle of activity im-
manent in the qualities and relations is the thing. Real-
ists would object that such internal connection between
qualities and relations destroys their character. Provision
was made for this rejoinder in the previous chapter by show-
ing that qualities and relations retain their identity
though related in conscious experience at least. Individu-
ality may, consequently, be of the nature of experience.
There is no reason to fear that this view leads to
Leibnizian atomism or monadism, though it does have much in
common with it. Units of experience are not windowless mon-
1
Peirce, Art. I, 557, 538.
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ads. They receive stimuli from without and their influence
extends to areas far beyond their immediate environment.
Their significant feature is that they act as wholes. A
thing may be considered the function or purpose it performs.
It is a "unity ... of teleological structure.""
1
" In the
inanimate world where purposes are not so apparent as in the
organic, it is still plausible to believe that some measure
of purpose is present. Even here things are modes of ac-
tivity according to patterns which persist through change.
Where one complex joins with others to compose a larger one,
it is conceivable that a larger and broader purpose or field
of activity thus arises, having been built upon lesser ones.
That the principle of individuality requires a theory
of substance is now clear. The thing is more than a mere
i
loose collection of qualities and relations. The latter are
unified through a mode of activity that manifests a unique
pattern. Substance is necessary to account for the factors
of wholeness and uniqueness. Qualities and relations alone
do not and cannot supply these elements or accomplish these
functions
.
Realists have not been able to supply a satisfactory
means for identifying an object in its relations to others.
1
Taylor, EOM, 125, 126. Aristotle's view of final
cause has some relevance here.
2 O Of"1O0
They have offered clues to the principle of individuality,
but have not developed them. Whether they have had more
success in dealing with the relation of a thing to itself
after undergoing change may now he inquired.
P. PERMANENCE AND CHANGE
Just as substance is a fruitless assumption in the at-
tempt to distinguish one thing from another, so is it otiose
as a factor in explaining permanence and change, say the
neo-realists. 1 Substance can give no reason for change.
Rather does it "leave us precisely where we started, with
„2
change ultimate and unexplained." If realists can demon-
strate their claim that change can be explained without ref-
erence to substance, one more blow will be dealt to that con-
cept .
Change is of two kinds, namely, change of place and
change of state. In the first case, change relates to the
arrangement, or rather rearrangement, of spatial-temporal
Montague, however, believes that substance provides an
element of permanence in things. He says, "the great
achievement of modern science consists in the correlation of
. . .
qualities and qualitative changes with the continuous
and homogeneous relations and changes of relations between
. . . perduring qualities or substances" (Art
.
IV, 266). This
substance is to be explained as potentiality of change, caus-
al implication, or consciousness of other events (ibid.,
279).
2
Marvin, FBM, 185, 184. Cf. Spaulding, Art. V, 231-256.
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properties. 1 The fundamental concept in change, whether it
be of the first or second type, is motion. As already inti-
mated, motion is "a series of complex terms, each of which
consists of a one-one correlating relation between a specif-
ic term of the space and a specific term of the time se-
2
ries." These correlating relations and their terms are
"themselves related asymmetrically and transitively. 9 When
a billiard ball changes its position on the table, it is to
be thought of as a complex of qualities and relations which
now assume new spatial and temporal relations. The series
of correlating relations between the points in space and in-
stants in time which constituted the billiard ball in its
position of rest and those which constitute it when its rest
ceases, is its motion. 4
Motion, and therefore change of place, the critic of
realism must concede, is_ at least an affair of relations.
But the real problem is to define the nature of these rela-
tions. Here, once more, arises the problem of how terms and
relations acquire and terminate their association. If mo-
Perry, PPT, 53.
2Spaulding, Art. V, 196, NR, 500, Marvin, FBM, 232-233.
3Ibid., 203.
4Cf. Marvin, ibid., 117.
*
<-
c
c
183
tion is only the series of relations which in turn become
terms for other relations, such a capacity must be ascribed
to the terms and relations themselves. This realists refuse
to do. The only conclusion must be that motion is more than
the mere fact of logical relation. It is an active whole or
unit of activity which persists after relations terminate
and before they are acquired.
Change, and likewise motion, thus appears to be change
of something. The realistic difficulty with the problem of
change consists in the inclination to regard change as a
mere succession. A series of relations which are "corre-
lated" but have no other common and permeating element is a
succession. "A mere succession of entirely disconnected
contents held together by no common permanent nature per-
sisting in spite of the transition, would not be change at
all.""*' To call succession change seems to be a confusion of
terms which robs both of their natural meaning.
Change of state, like change of place, is for realism a
succession. In this case it is a progressive succession of
2 3qualities or space-time-filling properties instead of a
Baylor, EOM, 161. Cf. Sheldon, SSPD, 243.
2Holt, COC, 212-216, cf. 218.
3
Perry, PPT, 53.
c4
184
succession of spatial relations. Change in this as in the
former sense is a series of correlating relations and con-
sequently "exactly the same interpretation of . . • these
"non-motion" changes must be made as is made of change of
nlposition. r
But the same difficulties attending an interpretation
of change of place are present in this view of change as a
succession of qualities. Unless there is some permanent
element present in change the very meaning of the term is
vacated. The same problem of identity crops up here. To
say a thing is a series of states makes it impossible to
distinguish the states of one thing from those of another.
But to say there is a permanent element which binds these
states together makes the identity of a thing discernible
2
even though it undergoes change.
Neo-realists have made the assertion that there is no
material substance, but that the functions of substance can
be taken over by qualities and relations. This attempt to
provide for the functions of substance has largely failed,
however, through its inability to supply a satisfactory
theory of identity. The relational method has many advan-
tages for the physical scientist but it makes impossible any
Spaulding, Art. V, 214, 216, 217.
Cf. Lewis, MWO, 396.
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clear conception of "things." With its use difficulty is
experienced in distinguishing one thing from another, and
in discerning the thing that changes.
The only recourse seems to he to adopt some theory of
substance. As already suggested, the view which contains
fewest difficulties is one that considers substance to be a
purposive whole which is active in and through its proper-
ties or qualities. Such a unit of activity is relatively
self-contained and is capable of maintaining a measure of
constancy through change. The conclusion follows that phys-
ical objects are substances. A brass button is a unit of
activity that is unique. Through changes of time, place,
and even of state it retains a discernible identity. It em-
bodies the purpose to be known as the brass button that it
is and no other.
Whether all substances are persons is a further ques-
tion which cannot be settled here. It seems improbable that
such a deduction is either justifiable or necessary. Per-
sons are, it may be observed, units of activity which are
relatively self-contained and which are capable of remaining
constant through change. They also embody purposes. But
here the parallel between persons and physical objects stops.
Persons are able to choose between purposes, and to refuse
to carry out some of them* Persons are capable of discur-
•
1 »
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sive thought and the realization of value. Physical objects
have not these capacities. Yet the physical thing must he a
unit of experience else its individuality remains unintelli-
gible. Experience at the level of physical things is of an
elemental character.^" One may conclude that though all per-
sons are substances not all substances are persons. All sub-
stances are, however, units of experience.
The conclusion of neo-realists that matter is neutral in
character is an argument that matter is non-substantial.
G. MATTER AND SUBSISTENCE
The neo-realistic metaphysics implies that there is no
p
material substance because there is no matter, at least in
the traditional sense. Scientific analysis of physical ob-
jects reveals, it is argued, no residue such as that which
was once called "matter."3 Rather does it show that physi-
"^Units of experience at the level of physical things
may be said to enjoy "prehensions" but not the "apprehen-
sions" which are granted to persons (cf. Whitehead, SMW, 101,
213-214). The latter are also capable of prehensions, though
apprehensions are their distinctive faculty.
2Realists point out that even if there were material sub-
stance, it would be only a part of being (Perry, PPT, 108,
Marvin, FBM, 107). Physical nature is but "an instance" of a
broader realm (Spaulding, WOC, vii). Naturalism errs in fail-
ing to observe this fact (Perry, loc. cit., cf. 65). Inter-
preters often wrongly contend that neo-realism is indistin-
guishable from materialism (cf. Verda, NRLS, 192).
3
Holt, COG, 122, 123, 169.
1
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1
cal objects are really neutral in character. They are but
"aggregates" of "neutral entities."2 The qualitative dis-
tinctness of matter is thus dissolved for these primitive
elements are interchangeable with those which make up mind.
Neutral entities are "subsistents " and not "existents, "^
5They are logical and mathematical in nature.
Whether or not matter remains an intelligible concept
is largely a question of usage. If by matter the neo-real-
ists mean the classical opinion that it was a core in which
qualities inhere, they are, of course, justified in assert-
ing that it has been "reduced" to other units. But since
this is an arbitrary definition, in view of the fact that
many different theories of matter have been put forth since
the beginning of reflective thought, it is misleading to
hold that matter no longer exists. The aspect of reality
which these theories have been devised to explain still re-
mains. So different is this phase of reality from that usu-
ally termed mind that there are definite methodological ad-
roit, COG, 122, 118, 127.
2Ibid., 131, 127, 128, Art. I, 368, .372, 373, 370-371.
^erry, PPT, 310, 324, Holt, Art. I, 373, COC, 128.
4
Holt, Art. I, 373.
5
Holt, COC, 123, 124, Art. I, 369, Perry, PPT, 108, 83.
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1
vantages in retaining its peculiarity. Even idealism ad-
mits the existence of matter, though denying its ultimate
reality or validity.
In a sense this criticism is a recurrence of the argu-
ment that material substance is a case of pseudo-simplicity.
2
As already noted, material substance in the classical sense
is capable of further analysis. But the source of individu-
ality and continuity of things without some theory of sub-
stance, constitutes a difficulty which realists do not solve.
Hence, the argument, implicit in the neo-realistic system,
that there is no material substance because there is no mat-
ter has slight significance.
On the other hand, these same neutral entities to which
realists reduce matter in some respects illustrate the theory
of substance that they reject. If matter, and hence any
given physical object, is an aggregate of neutral entities,
its origin lies in the neutral realm. The potentialities of
particular physical objects lie beyond or "beneath" them in
more primitive elements. Substance, as the cause and ground
of particular things, has performed this function of poten-
^"The fact that matter seems to be of the nature of ex-
perience does tend to remove the "bifurcation" in nature be-
tween mind and matter. Yet these two realities still perform
different functions.
2Cf. supra, pp. 144-146.
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tiality in the history of thought. There is some virtue,
therefore, in calling neutral entities the substances of
matter. Neo-realists would doubtless repudiate any such in-
terpretation as this, but in doing so they would leave the
problem of potentiality unsolved.
H. CONCLUSIONS
Results of the realistic criticism of material substance
may now be formulated. In the first place, the so-called
"subjective" origin of the concept of material substance is
no reason for rejecting it. Second, neo-realists show suc-
cessfully that matter is neither made up of one substantial
block, nor of indestructible or substantial atoms. Third,
neo-realists justly conclude that substance as an inert and
inconceivable support of qualities and relations which is
still distinct from them, may be rejected. Fourth, the neo-
realistic demand that material substance yield to analysis
must be met, but explanation of matter through its simplest
elements remains incomplete. The factor of wholeness in
units of matter may be their substance. Fifth, material sub-
stance has been shown to be no "indefinite" potentiality,
though the concept may be retained to account for the poten-
tiality of motion or activity according to a pattern, which
physical units manifest. Sixth, the argument that material
t
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substance must be given up because it lies beyond experience
has little validity, since assumptions and postulates are
constantly made about realities that are not directly experi-
enced. Seventh, the attempt made by neo-realists to show
that qualities and relations can assume the functions of ma-
terial substance fails through its inability to provide for
identity or individuality, and for permanence in change.
Eighth, the principle of individuality, which may be regard-
ed as the persistence of definite and self-contained units
or modes of activity through change, requires a theory of
substance. Ninth, a material substance may be defined as
that unique unit or whole of experience which is active in
and through properties and relations according to a law,
plan, or purpose. Tenth, the neutral entities advocated by
neo-realists perform a function of the material substance
which realists reject.
4
II
CHAPTER VI
MIND'
It is the purpose of this chapter to assess the neo-
realistic criticisms of spiritual or mental substance and
to evaluate the substitutes proposed for it.
By denying the fact of spiritual substance neo-realists
assert that there is no permanent and self-existing soul,
subject, or substratum, which supports or joins together the
2
empirical processes of consciousness. Mind can be no sub-
stance which privately owns its attributes. It must be con-
sidered an "objective" complex in which a nervously endowed
organism reacts to stimulation, or selects portions of its
environment for attention. Nor is consciousness a "sub-
stantial being" whose nature is simple and self-evident.
In this chapter the terms mind, spirit, and conscious-
ness will be used synonymously, unless otherwise noted, since
neo-realists adopt this practise.
2
Holt, et al., NR, 38, Perry, Art. IV, 126, 145. (Neo-
realists do not offer a specific definition of the substance
that is rejected, but this definition seems to be presupposed.)
3Perry, Art. IV, 134, Montague, WK, 357, Holt COC, 183-
184, 171, Art. I, 354-355, 373, Marvin. PBM, 261, 263, Pit-
kin, Art, III, 454-455, 459-460, Spaulding, NR, 42, 481-482.
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Rather is it a "baffling problem" for "rigorous analysis."
1
While considerable diversity exists among the neo-real-
2
istic views of consciousness, there remains general agree-
ment that consciousness or mind is no substantial "subject,"
but rather an object, or relational complex, resting on the
same plane as objects in the so-called physical world, Mon-
tague, however, concludes that though consciousness may be
present in objective complexes, it is none the less to be
considered substantial. Agreement among the other five re-
alists in opposing spiritual substance still makes possible
significant general conclusions.
The choice by neo-realists of a method for studying con-
xPerry, Art. XIII, 197, Spaulding, in Holt, et al., NR
480 (9).
2
Pitkin considers consciousness a relation, of a non-
spatio-temporal dimension, which accomplishes reactions in
the nervous system (Art. Ill, 457); Montague equates it with
potentiality or causal implication (Art. IV, 281, 276-278);
Holt defines it as the aggregate of obiects to which the ner-
vous system responds (Art. I, 554, 373; but later adds that
it includes the response (Art. II, 393-394); Perry regards
it as a complex relation between an interested organism and
selected parts of its environment (Art. IV, 147, 134), thus
agreeing in most essentials with Holt (cf. PPT, 305n, where
Perry refers to Holt's The Concept of Consciousness and "Re-
sponse and Cognition" as ''the most able statement of the
. . , [neo-realistic] theory" of mind); Marvin largely
agrees with Holt and Perry (FBM, 261, 263); Spaulding finds
consciousness to be a relation but inclines to believe it is
a new dimension (NR, 42-43, 481-482).
Montague's conception of spiritual substance will be
presented below. Cf. pp. 217-222.
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sciousness implies a criticism of substance. Introspection,
which has usually been held to reveal unique, distinctive,
and private characteristics of mind, is rejected. Denial of
validity to the introspective method means denial that spir-
itual substance is discoverable in experience. Considera-
tion of this method thus becomes pertinent.
A. THE METHOD OF INTROSPECTION
"Spirit" says Perry, ". . . is not a , . , substance,
which can be discovered only by the unique method of in-
1
trospection, or, indeed, by any other method. Though the
introspective method is more harmonious with the doctrine of
spiritual substance than others, it can be no defense of the
notion. As a method of studying mind it has grave weaknesses.
While introspection may be valuable in collecting and
identifying "cases of mental content," it does not serve to
define their nature. In the first place, it is unable to
accomplish such definition because of its abstractness. Not
only are a multitude of elements which condition conscious-
3
ness not given in introspection, but many facts which have
PCI, 377.
Perry, PPT, 277, 275-276.
Pitkin, Art. Ill, 436.
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actually been in consciousness cannot be recalled."*" Second-
ly, introspection is an inadequate method because its con-
scious use bears no organic relation to other states of con-
sciousness, and hence cannot retain them for analysis and
2 3
description. "introspection is retrospection." Thirdly,
4
introspection yields only things in relation and these are
better studied by other methods. "No generic character" can
be discovered about the contents of consciousness by intro-
spection. ^
Because of these weaknesses it is necessary "to abandon
the method of self-knowledge altogether, and substitute that
of general observation. ..." Since consciousness belongs
to the same open field of experience wherein other objects
7
lie it is "observed precisely as physical phenomena are ob-
«8
served. This thesis of behaviorism, that experience can
xHolt, COC, 199, 194-195, 206-207.
2
Ibid., 214-215, 192-193, 201, Perry, Art. IV, 147, 145,
PPT, 275, cf. Marvin, PBM, 257-258.
5Holt, ibid., 299, 197-198. Cf. Perry, PPT, 276-277.
4
Marvin and Holt derive this view from Woodbridge (Mac-
intosh, POK, 281)
.
5Perry, PPT, 277.
6
Ibid., 283.
7
Perry, PCI, 377-378, PPT, 274, 273, Holt, Art. I, 353,
Marvin, Art. II, 60, PBM, 257.
8
Perry, Art, IV, 147, Holt, COC, 308, Marvin, FBM, 258.

195
be apprehended by the methods of physical science, is rather
generally accepted by neo-realists."'"
The defender of introspection would reply to the neo-
realist that the first criticism urged above would be rele-
vant to any method that might be adopted, Abstractness
results inevitably from the fact that only a part of con-
sciousness can be considered at any given moment. No method
would make it possible to study the factors conditioning
consciousness all at once. This difficulty must be blamed
on the nature of the universe and not made sufficient reason
for rejecting introspection. It is of course true that in-
trospection may not reveal all that has passed or is pass-
ing through the mind. But here again the difficulty is com-
mon to other methods. Even Perry concedes that the observer
may not know all that is in his own mind or in that of
•'"Marvin, PBM, 258, 260, Holt, GOC, 308. Montague, char-
acteristically, dissents at this point. He avows that in-
trospection reveals not only such objects as seem momentarily
to belong to experience, e. g. stones, chairs, animals, but
also certain subjective elements, e. g. feelings, desires,
volitions, which are indissoluble from experience itself.
Introspection also yields a relational form or structure ap-
plicable to the psychical phase of the experience (Art. I,
108-109). Spaulding's definition of mind in a more recent
work (WAI, 151) as "experience or awareness," and his asser-
tion that nwe ... directly experience experience , or . . .
are aware of awareness, as a reality that is as qualitatively
different from matter and other kinds of reality ... as
color is
. , . from sound," would also seem to indicate be-
lief in the validity of introspection.
i
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another. 1
In response to the second criticism of introspection,
it may he pointed out that the empirical fact of self-iden-
tity seems to deny such discreteness in consciousness. How
could one realize himself to be the same person today who
sat at his desk at the same hour yesterday, unless the data
of experience were intimately related and organized? Neo-
2
realists, as will be observed more in detail below, hold
that self-identity is to be accounted for largely on physio-
logical grounds. But this would mean, in the last analysis,
that units of matter associate themselves together in such
fashion as to recognize their own unity and identity— a
materialistic conclusion which even neo-realists seem to re-
ject. Consciousness must, furthermore, be some kind of
duree reelle to account for the fact that meanings and rela-
tions are present in it. If it were a mere discrete series
of experiences it is difficult to see how these experiences
could gain interpretation and reference to each other.
To the argument that introspection yields nothing more
than cases of mental content which are really things in re-
lation, and that these are observable and interpretable by
PPT, 289-292, 283.
Cf. pp. 226-234.
1-
j
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other methods, it may be replied that facts are against it."*"
One may feel that one's dancing at a party is inferior to
that of others without this feeling being apparent to any
one else present, or one may wish he had remained at home
without actually going home, or he may think of greetings to
give the hostess which are never uttered. Certainly these
are mental facts which introspection can report but which
other methods would never discover. To be sure each con-
scious state has reference to "the open field of experience
,
w
i. e. it stands in relations to entities and states beyond
itself, many of which may be clearly apparent to others. But
some items of consciousness are not open to study by such a
method, for example, as the behavioristic. Behavior indi-
cates many states of consciousness but not all.
These facts indicate that the introspective method need
not be given up. Therefore, the argument that spiritual sub-
stance in any form must be denied because of its alliance
with a faulty method, may be declared invalid. Since there
remain good grounds for using the introspective method the
possibility of spiritual substance also remains.
While neo-realists largely presuppose that mind can be
2
no subject or unity of apperception, and hence no substance
Cf. Sheldon, SSPD, 187.
Hasan, ROR, 166. Cf. Holt, COC, 142.
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of any sort, they still advance some more or less direct
criticisms of this view. To these the argument now moves.
i
B. CRITICISMS OP SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE
Selfhood in any unique sense whatsoever is, according
to Perry, a mere matter of habit. Self-consciousness is
wa clear case of the mistaking of habit for insight," for it
is composed, as analysis reveals, mainly of familiar images
and phrases containing one's name or a personal pronoun,
e. g. "I will," "I think," or "I act."
2 Since all habits
are arbitrary this one is not trustworthy.
i
It is of course true that consciousness is habitually
thought of as belonging to a self. But this is no real ar-
gument either for or against spiritual substance. As ob-
served in the discussion concerning habit and material sub-
stance, the source of a notion determines neither its meaning
nor validity. Whether the habit is based on facts must be
"*"In rejecting spiritual substance neo-realism follows
significant tendencies noticeable in philosophy and psycholo-
gy early in the present century. James had protested against
the conception of consciousness as a substance and had held
it to be a form of connection among objects (cf. "Does Con-
sciousness Exist?" Jour. Phil., 1(1904), 477-491). Animal
and physiological psychology had been arguing for the non-
spiritual character of consciousness (cf. Ray, CNR, xiii)
.
2
PPT, 282, cf. 288.
^Ibid., 281.
t
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the problem to which attention is given.
That the habit of conceiving mind in terms of spiritual
substance^ has no justification in fact may be derived,
first of all, according to realists, from the mind's liabili-
ty to further analysis. Spiritual substance is a case of
2
"pseudo-simplicity" or incomplete analysis. Mind or self,
just as body, is a complex "capable of being analyzed into
more primitive terms" and therefore is not itself "really
simple," or readily understandable. Consciousness, not
itself simple, is an "aggregate" of simple entities and is
5to be defined in terms of them and not vice versa. Though
consciousness may be familiar, it is by no means simple
„
So far as this criticism of spiritual substance means
that consciousness has no quality, state, or attribute which
lies beyond the pale of analysis, its validity may be readily
Neo-realists are very sure that mind is not "a univer-
sal substance, out of which every single entity that is, is
composed" (Holt, COC, 102, 97, cf. Spaulding, NR, 435, WAI,
150-151, Perry, Art. XII, 301, Art. XIII, 197). The problem
here is to determine, however, not whether there are one or
many substances, but whether the concept of spiritual sub-
stance itself is a valid notion.
Perry, PPT, 280-281, Art. XIII, 197, Holt, et al., NR,
12-14.
3Perry, ibid., 310, 237, Art. IV, 127, 143.
4Perry, Art. XIII, 197.
5Holt, COC, 82, 79.
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conceded, "What cannot be described or explained or under-
stood, plays no part in the world of reason. . . • 1,1 A
transcendent and unknowable soul defying analysis is a use-
2less notion. Not only does it introduce a mystery to ex-
plain the empirical processes of consciousness, but its re-
3
lations to those processes remain ambiguous.
If, however, this argument means that consciousness is
better understood through its simple elements than through
the more familiar whole which these elements constitute, the
weight of the argument may be seriously questioned. In the
first place, these simpler elements are never found as such
apart from a whole of conscious experience. This the real-
4ists themselves point out. The quality red can be ab-
stracted perhaps in thought from other qualities but it is
always experienced with something that ls_ red, i, e, along
with other qualities and relations. To explain conscious-
ness by its simpler elements is to explain the given state
by something that is never given. Such a procedure would
repeat the very weakness neo-realists seek to avoid, for
•'•Sheldon, SSPD, 188.
2Cf. Spaulding, NR, 243.
3Cf. Barrett, PHI, 133.
4Perry, Art. IV, 127.
11
1
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this is just what is done in appealing to a transcendent
soul to explain a given state of consciousness.
Furthermore, the reduction of consciousness to its parts
and the assertion that it is completely explained by its
parts is either itself a case of incomplete analysis, and
i
thus a repetition of the error realists are trying to avoid,
or an admission that some of the factors discovered are inex-
plicable. Perry, Holt, Pitkin, and Marvin observe that there
are properties of wholes distinct from those of parts, but
they declare that these are derived from the parts and hence
are reducible to them. 1 But it is difficult to see how some
of the properties of such a whole of conscious experience as
the one word "i" indicates, could be reduced to its parts.
It is not a mere succession of conscious states because it
can compare such states and recognize them as past or pres-
ent. Thus the properties of conjunction and comparison of
conscious states do not belong tc these states themselves.
Apparently there is some factor present which the neo-realis-
2tic analysis fails to reveal. Spaulding, however, would re-
gard these properties as a case of "creative synthesis," but
would declare them "non-rational, 11 for properties that are
Of. discussion of this problem in chapter IV, especial-
ly pp. 89nl, 100n3, 108-111.
p
Cf. also Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 346.
*
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unique with wholes constitute a non-rational element in
nature.-1-
In spite of the argument that spiritual substance is a
case of pseudo-simplicity, therefore, the possibility that
substance is present as the wholeness or identity-reference
of a given conscious state still remains. Eeo-realists do
rightly point out, however, that belief in a transcendent
soul will not stand analysis.
A second realistic argument against spiritual substance
i
is that the latter exemplifies the fallacy of "exclusive
particularity," for it requires one to assume that sensa-
2tions belong to a mind. The advocate of spiritual sub-
stance, says the realist, erroneously concludes from the
fact that perceptions and ideas occur in John Smith's mind,
that they therefore belong exclusively to it. While his
ideas cannot be attributed to any one else, they can never-
theless be shared. 4 Belief that a subject cannot also be an
object, i. e. that perceptual elements have no communal
g
character, is a case of this fallacy. To say that qualities
•Art. V, 247, 241, 240, cf. WAI, 31-32.
2Perry, PPT, 286, Holt, et al., NR, 14-15.
5Spaulding, NR, 500, 501.
4Perry, ibid., 287, 297.
5Ibid., 298, cf. 127-128.

belong to their subjects exclusively would be so to denude
material objects, as well as other minds, that they would
thereby become meaningless."*"
The critic of neo-realism must of course agree that if
qualities known by a mind belonged exclusively to that mind
solipsism would be the result. And since solipsism is a
self-contradictory notion, due to the fact that any effort
to argue for it or even to state the view presupposes its
falsity, no tenable theory of perception can be reduced to
it. There is, moreoever, as common experience testifies,
2
knowledge of an independent and external world.
That a valid interpretation of the status which quali-
ties or sensations occupy in knowledge, requires the aban-
donment of substance is not so clear. If one were obliged
to hold to epistemological monism, then, as realism argues,
the qualities which "enter" one mind might be considered to
be the same ones which "enter" another. But the fact of
error makes epistemological monism exceedingly dubious, and
xPerry, Art. XII, 501-302, Spaulding, NR, 240.
pEven Berkeley, whom the neo-realists take to be the
classical exponent of subjectivism (Perry, PPT, 124-154),
held that objects have an existence independent of and ob-
jective to finite knowers. He says, "... sensible things
. . .
have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find
them by experience to be independent of It* ( Dialogues ,
III, Everyman Edition, p. 266, cf. Principles , 28, 29.
)
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while research in this problem still continues it cannot yet
be said that error is satisfactorily explained by epistemo-
logical monists."1" Since epistemology must, therefore, be
dualistic the "qualities" or sensations present in a given
3
mind may be considered native to that mind, though they re-
port, indicate, point to, interpret, imply, or refer to a
reality beyond themselves. The objective reference of sen-
sations is their communal character. From this point of
view the "sharing" of ideas means that two different minds
possess a relatively similar though separate report of the
same objective fact.
In short, the argument that spiritual substance is a
case of the fallacy of exclusive particularity would be a
Lovejoy, RAD, 77. If error is consigned to the realm
of subsistence more problems arise than were present in the
older view that errors reside in consciousness, for the re-
lation of subsistence to existence has not been made clear
by neo-realists. Spaulding f s assertion that "one is freed
from the hypothesis that consciousness is a substance" by
"the non-existence" of error (NR, 442, 441), cannot, there-
fore, be considered persuasive. Gf. infra, pp. 285-287.
2There are, to be sure, grave weaknesses in the theory
of epistemological dualism, but its merits outweigh the de-
fects
.
3While the quality or sensation arises in the mind the
originating stimulus may not be internal to the mind. Per-
ceptual knowledge of an object is "neither the coincidence
of mind and object
. . .
nor any duplication of the object
in the mind. " Rather is it an activity of mind in which the
limitation and interpretation of what is given and the pre-
diction of future givenness occur. (Lewis, MWO, 134, 135.
Cf. Hartshorne, PPS, 8, 245-250.)
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serious blow to the concept, if the fallacy were actually
committed. Since, however, no one actually contends that
sensations lack an objective character and since a mind may
in a sense "possess" its sensations without the disastrous
effects which realists fear, the argument loses its force.
The particularity of sensations is exclusive largely in the
sense that they are numerically distinct in different minds.
The right to believe in spiritual substance as the "owner-
ship" of sensations which have a universal and objective
reference, still remains. This ownership need not be con-
sidered a mysterious core in which sensations inhere, for
such a conception would raise the same difficulties as the
concept of a transcendent soul. One is, however, free to
believe that the sensations or data of experience in a given
mind belong together and function as a unit.
The third argument by neo-realists against spiritual
substance is based on the second. Substance, it is held,
stands unjustifiably for not only an ownership of perceptual
data, but also for a privacy and uniqueness of ownership
which conscious experience does not possess. Realists deny
that these data are owned and that this ownership, if it ex-
isted, escapes inspection by other minds. ". . . The unique-
ness of sensations and affections in the individual is an
appendage of the soul-substance theory" and consequently is
1
i
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"the veriest hocus-pocus."1 Consciousness is no stuff or
2
substance that escapes public inspection. In fact, there
is no "purely subjective existence." Contents of mind ex-
4
hibit no generic character, they are open to all. They
5
may be present in different minds in the same way. Belief
in the privacy and uniqueness of mind is a habit based on a
Q
misinterpretation of facts. Whatever uniqueness there may
be in the experience of a given individual is negligible so
7far as his intellectual life goes, though bodily states do
Qpossess a private character.
It seems clear that neo-realists correctly point out
the relative privacy of affective and even of volitional
factors in experience. One is uniquely sensible of his own
Holt, COC, 110, cf. 310. Holt's later statements that
"affections" exist within the organism (cf. Art. II, 402-
403, 394, 396) , seem to soften this contention that they are
not private and unique.
2Marvin, PBM, 260-261.
3Perry, Art. IV, 143. Cf. Schlick's belief in the
"neutral" or "impersonal character of experience" (Art. I,
369, 367).
4Perry, PPT, 227, 293-294, 295, Art. IV, 147.
5Perry, PPT, 287, 288.
6Ibid., 288-289, Holt, COC, 185-191, Art. I, 353.
7
Perry, ibid., 287, 288, PCI, 379, Holt, COC, 109.
8Perry, PPT, 293-294, 295, Holt, Art. II, 402-403.
••
•
•
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feelings, desires, and intentions because these have a nerv-
ous connection with his own brain alone. Others may deduce
what some of these affective states are, but they can never
observe them directly. If a slothful or sullen workman is
reproved for his shoddy work some conclusions about his
feelings and intentions may be drawn from his actions there-
after, but there will also remain many features about them
that are forever hidden from others.
But to argue, as some neo-realists seem to do,"1" that
these facts indicate only that one body is unique and dis-
tinct from another and not that minds are private, divides
experience into such compartments as do not actually exist
in conscious life. Feelings, desires, and volitions, con-
tinually mingle with the more cognitive activities in expe-
2
rience, sometimes to the mind's advantage, sometimes to its
hindrance. That fatigue, anger, desire for comfort, willing-
ness to eat excessive amounts of food, becloud the intellec-
tual activity of the mind are too patent facts to ignore.
On the other hand, rational powers may so dominate one's
life that these excesses are avoided. Will power may even
enable one to think clearly for a short period in spite of
Of. Perry, PPT, 293.
Hartshorne argues that an "affective tone" is present
in "the entire content of consciousness" (PPS, 7, 174, 175).
II
•
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them. Conscious experience actually involves these diverse
factors in complexes of varying patterns. Thus, whatever
privacy there may be to feelings and volitions constitutes
1
an argument for the privacy of mind.
There exists considerable doubt, also, whether even the
cognitive functions of mind are completely open to public
inspection. John's friend may of course become Henry's
pfriend, as Perry asserts. Yet John's conception of what a
friend is, may vary considerably from Eenry's and the latter
may never find it out. Even if John's conception coincided
•2.
with Henry's they would not be numerically identical. 0
1
Perry agrees to this but calls it a "trivial proposition,
"
since John's idea of Henry's idea of friendship is bound to
be reasonably accurate. Some privacy is thus admitted. The
real question concerns its importance and extensiveness.
The fact that one mind's idea of a given object is not
numerically identical with another mind's idea of that ob-
ject, can scarcely be so "trivial" as Perry assumes. Though
John's concept of friendship were accurately known by Henry,
the place of that concept in the rest of John's conscious
1Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 331-532.
2PPT, 287.
5Cf. Verda, NRLS, 124.
Loc. cit.
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life might completely escape Henry. The latter might not
be able, for example, ever to discover that John regards
friendship as a means of political or social advancement.
Even if he suspected it, he might never be able to prove it.
Moreover, the failure of minds to understand each other even
when they try most desperately, would seem to occur more
frequently than Perry admits. The diversity of philosophi-
cal opinion in the United States at the present indicates
that the distinctness and privacy of minds is scarcely
"trivial/1
There is, one may conclude, much in a mind which is
unique with that mind, and which escapes inspection by an-
other mind. It may be that spiritual substance coincides
with this factor of privacy and uniqueness.
Neo-realists argue, in the fourth place, that spiritual
substance must be denied because consciousness is no whole
that is more than the elements making it up, or that binds
its elements, i. e. particular data of experience, together."1"
Consciousness is not "a distinct substance," i. e. it is not
a class term which applies "distributively" to each of its
•^The first argument against spiritual substance was that
it exemplified incomplete analysis. Here it is contended
that spiritual substance is an unnecessary assumption since
the elements of consciousness are not internally bound to-
gether. The two arguments are phases of the same issue,
namely, that of whether consciousness is an organic whole.
1
II
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members. Rather is it to be taken "collectively. " Con-
sciousness is its elements just as a regiment is all its
soldiers, but nothing more nor less.
1
It is a "collective
entity" whose contents fluctuate. Elements come and. go in
consciousness but there is no "logical structure" or "in-
2ternal relationship" binding them together. This concep-
tion of consciousness finds "the most remarkable parallel"
j in Hume's view that consciousness is only a heap or collec-
tion of different perceptions. Since every perception is
distinguishable from another each "may be considered as sep-
arately existent."'"' Parts of consciousness are "dependent
I
on the whole of consciousness," but this is really a depend-
ence of whole on part, just as an aggregate depends upon its
members *
It is not just clear how far neo-realists wish to push
the discreteness of consciousness. Pitkin is willing to as-
sert that "predispositions," "purposes," and "associations,"
"interpret the instr earning characters" of experience. Perry
Holt, COC, 89-90. Cf. Perry, Art. IV, 143.
2
Holt, ibid., 210, 170.
5Perry, PPT, 306, cf. Art. IV, 149.
4Perry, Art. IV, 137, 144.
5Art. I, 228.
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allows that the fragments of nature which find their way
into mind "acquire thereby a peculiar interrelation and
compose a peculiar pattern."1 What status this "pattern"
or 'peculiar interrelation" enjoys is not altogether ap-
.
2
parent.
Though consciousness may involve a measure of discrete-
ness, and although its contents can be distinguished with
relative clarity, to call it merely an aggregate of sepa-
rate elements does not do justice to the facts of experi-
ence. In the first place, as already noted, the ingredi-
ents of consciousness never occur separately. They always
occur in complex wholes. Secondly, the mere identification
of an element in a given state of consciousness involves it
in such relations to other elements as actually give it
4
meaning. Apart from these relations the element is a mere
j
"that." Finally, there is a factor of self-reference in
each conscious state. When John Jones is aware of a red
pencil the awareness includes a reference to other data
which are John Jones. He may not reflect at the moment that
1PPT, 277.
2But cf. Perry, Art. IV, 138-140, PPT, 277-279.
5Lewis, MWO, 127-129, 146, Cassirer, SP, 248, Bright-
man, Art. V, 265.
4Lewis, ibid., 132-153, 118.
|
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he is a self that is now experiencing the red pencil, but
unless there is this self-reference, awareness would "be
meaningless. Awareness at a given instant transcends that
instant of time and gains relation to other experience
which persists through time. In short, consciousness is
present as a Gestalt"1" and not as an aggregate of discrete
2
elements
.
Evidence for the organic character of consciousness
i
may he said, therefore, to refute the neo-realistic argu-
ments that consciousness is an aggregate of discrete ele-
ments. Spiritual substance may be present as the organic
wholeness of consciousness.
The fifth and final argument which neo-realists ad-
vance against spiritual substance rests in the assertion
that perception is "present at ive " and not judgmental. The
knowing situation is one in which neither the knower nor
4the knowing relation can be an active substance, otherwise
knowing would be self-contradictory and self-defeating.
The content of consciousness is the actual presence to the
^•Cf. Koehler, GS, 187-194.
2Evans, NROR, 138, Verda, NRLS, 116.
3Holt, COC, 142, 143, Pitkin, Art. I, 222, Marvin,
PBM, 261, 263.
4Spaulding, NR, 28, 42, 212-213, 292.
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physiological organism of objects which that organism se-
lects. Knowledge is a relation between homogeneous elements
in nature. 1 The mind is not active in the knowing relation,
that is, it does not supplement or modify the given data.
It merely selects by attention what shall be in the manifold
of consciousness.
This criticism raises epistemological problems which
lie beyond the province of the present investigation. How-
ever, certain objections to the criticism may be discerned.
First of all, if perception is pure receptivity the knower
is left without a means of distinguishing truth and error.
Both may be present in a given state of consciousness with
the same presumption of objectivity. It is an empirical
fact, however, which neo-realists appear to neglect, that
along with the propositions which the mind entertains at any
given moment, there is also belief or judgment that they are
2true or false, or partly true and partly false. Secondly,
the view that perception is pure receptivity overlooks what
Lewis calls the factor of "prediction." As Berkeley put it,
one presentation is the sign for another that may be expect-
ed. Perception is the discovery in what is presented of
^erry, PPT, 324, PCI, 377.
! 2Rogers, Art. I, 145-146.
j
i
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something which is significant of what is not now so pre-
1
sented. Apparently an element of construction, interpre-
tation, or judgment attends perception which neo-realists
o
do not take into account." If there is judgment in percep-
3tion, consciousness is active.
There is no reason why the active and judgmental char-
acter of consciousness in knowing should lead to the skepti-
cal or solipsistic subjectivism that neo-realists fear. It
by no means follows that the mind creates its objects simply
because it deals with the stimuli from those objects cre-
atively. The objects of consciousness may be just as inde-
pendent and "real" as the neo-realist desires, even though
the mind is actively interested in them. Grounds for be-
lieving in substance as the active and interpretative ele-
ment in consciousness still remain.
As a result of the direct attack by neo-realists on the
concept of spiritual substance the following principles are
clear. First, neo-realists show that substance as a tran-
scendent and unknowable soul is truly "an embarrassing super-
—
^"Lewis, MWO, 44. Hocking observes that "experiencing
is getting answers to questions which the mind is putting to
the world. . ." (TOP, 362).
2
Kremer, NA, 301.
3
Cf. Evans, NROR, 136.
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tilfluity. Secondly, they also rightly show that any theory
of spiritual substance must allow for analysis of the con-
cept into its constituent parts, but they fail to demonstrate
that consciousness may be better explained through its sim-
ple parts than its substantial wholeness. Thirdly, spirit-
ual substance as the exclusive possessor of perceptual data
that have no objective character leads to solipsism as real-
ists assert, but substance as a unity of data which still
manifest an objective reference remains a tenable hypothesis.
Fourth, the neo-realistic argument that substance as a pri-
vate and unique factor in experience either does not exist
or is of negligible importance, cannot be justified, though
it does emphasize that consciousness is no completely monad-
ic substance. Fifth, the argument that substance is denied
by the discreteness of conscious experience calls attention
to an important factor in consciousness but disregards its
relational and organic features. Sixth, the denial of sub-
stance because experience is non-active, i. e« because it is
presentative and not judgmental, involves a disregard for
the empirical fact that interpretation attends perception.
One may conclude, therefore, that the neo-realistic
critique of spiritual substance calls attention to extreme
Leighton, MAC, 187.
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forms of that doctrine which must be rejected. let, the
alternative still remains that spiritual substance may be
the element in consciousness which accounts for its organic,
unified, private, active, and self-identifying characteris-
tics. There is no embargo on believing that spiritual sub-
stance is the concrete fact of selfhood immanent in the flux
of conscious experience. Spiritual substance is not a "that
which" above or beyond consciousness which performs the
functions of self just noted. Rather is it the de facto
unity of these functions themselves. ^
It remains to inquire whether neo-realists are able to
present a reasonable view of consciousness without the re-
jected concept of substance. This amounts to asking whether
they propose an adequate substitute for the notion of sub-
stance. But before proceeding to that problem it is neces-
sary to observe that Montague, whose views have so far in
this chapter been largely ignored, does hold to a doctrine
of spiritual substance. His theory merits separate consider-
i
ation.
^"Laird comes essentially to this same conclusion. "Sub-
stance," he says, "is ... a descriptive term indicating a
unity which exists de facto. It does not make the connected-
ness of properties; it only describes their connectedness.
It is not even an accessory after the fact. Minds are sub-
stances simply because desiring, willing, and knowing do not
float about loosely. They always unite in a personality,
and this united fact is the spiritual substance. ..." ( ASR,
172-173.
)
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C. MONTAGUE'S CONCEPT OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE
Montague's first published essay was "A Plea for Soul
Substance,""^" and ever since that time he has held that "the
mind
. . „ is a real soul. . . ." By this he means that
mind has "curious properties
. . .
which are so different
from the properties of bodies" that they cannot characterize
a merely mechanical aggregate. Among these properties may
be found "prospective self-transcendence" which is also 'pur-
A. 5
posive or teleological
,
"retrospective," "spatial,"6 and
"logical" self-transcendence. Mind is "the place of
forms," i. e. Platonic ideas or essences, and is capable of
8 „ „9pursuing ideals. It is "an indivisible unity" and pos-
^This was the title of the essay. See Psych. Rev.,
(1899), 457-476.
2
Art. XIII, 157.
3CSD, 32.
4Ibid., 35, 58, Art. I, 115, 126-128, Art. IV, 282,
285, Art. VII, 49.
6CSD, 36, 58, Art. IV, 282, WK, 361.
6 CSD, 37, 40, Art. IV, 282.
7
CSD, 39.
8Art. I, 114.
9Ibid., 112.
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sesses a certain amount of privacy."1" As "an organism" with-
in the physiological organism it is active in "imposing pat-
terns of self transcending meaning upon the sensory con-
tents," though it is to some extent an effect of external
objects.
These attributes belong to the mind or soul because the
cortex of the brain possesses, as no other structure does,
the "capacity for retaining as specific forms of potential
energy minute portions of the specific kinetic energies of
the neutral currents which stream through it."4 Traces of
this potential energy are built up into complex systems
which give to the brain possessing them such rational and
self-determining powers as distinguish men from inanimate
bodies. The latter have stores of energy but they are sim-
ple and of insufficient range to prevent their behavior from
being controlled by contiguous bodies. Consciousness is
"•"OSD, 40.
2Ibid., 58.
5WK, 358-360, 382, Art. IV, 276-278, 281.
4WK, 362, cf. Art. IV, 285, Art. I, 129.
^Yet mind is in some sense adjectival to the body (cf.
GSD, 23-31). It is both cause and effect (Art. IV, 276-278,
280).
6
WK, 362, Art. IV, 283.
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thus a "correlate of causality or energy. 1,1
Resemblances between consciousness and the potential
energy of physical events make possible their identifica-
tion. For example, both refer backward and forward in time,
2
and outward in space, and both are private or hidden. No
recognized term expresses the three-fold reference of events
to their causes, effects, and interacting contemporaries,
"implication" and "potentiality" approximate it most near-
ly. Therefore it is justifiable to conclude that "the po-
tentiality of the physical is the actuality of the psychical
and the potentiality of the psychical is the actuality of
4the physical." The type of consciousness one has at a
given moment is the result of energy currents of a particular
strength.
^
Critics have vigorously maintained on the one hand that
X
WK, 361.
2
Art. I, 129, 120-121, 126-128, Art. IV, 281-282, WK,
350, 361.
5
Art. IV, 282, 283.
4
Ibid., 281. Obviously this view has universal and
metaphysical significance which lies beyond the present prob-
lem of substance in finite consciousness. For example, Mon-
tague asserts that "all matter is instinct with something of
the cognitive function" (Art. IV, 283), and decides to call
his system "hylopsychism" (Art. IV, 278-281), "animistic ma-
terialism" or "cosmological spiritualism" (Art. XVIII, 158).
5
Art. IV, 293, 294.
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Montague only contributes to confusion by trying to identify
such "generically different" factors as consciousness and
causal implication, 1 and on the other hand that though there
exists similarity between these two notions, the manner of
2
their conjunction is not explained. Whatever may be the
truth in this controversy it is clear that Montague is call-
ing attention to a genuine attribute of consciousness. The
mind does involve self-transcendent reference to the past
and future and to distant objects in space.
Apparently Montague is arguing expressly for a concept
of spiritual substance. While he does not use the term sub-
stance in his more recent writings, he points out that the
theory of cause-effect potentiality conserves the truth in
the concept of substance. Certainly potentiality was one
of the functions that substance traditionally performed.
Probably Montague would agree that spiritual substance has
at least those characteristics that remain after the critique
by his colleagues has been evaluated, namely, organization,
unity, privacy, activity, and self-identity. To this group
1Hasan, ROR, 316-517, 318, Rogers, Art, I, 151-152, 156,
Macintosh, POK, 288-289.
2Sheldon, SSPD, 192-193.
3
Art. IV, 279.

he would add the factor of potentiality.
This additional characteristic of substance doubtless
contributes something to an understanding of mind. At any
given moment the mind has capacities for referring to ob-
jects that are not immediately present to it in space and
time. Thus it has at any instant the potentiality for pass-
ing into other states. However, there is grave danger that
this factor of potentiality may become an "indefinite" po-
tentiality and consequently fall heir to all the vagueness
and ambiguity of the transcendent soul. Certainly the po-
tentialities of a mind at any given moment are for the most
part a dark mystery. To explain a mind by reference to its
potentialities is to appeal to the unknown. But merely to
say that any given conscious process involves references be-
yond itself does not seem so mysterious. The fact of self-
transcendent reference is actually immanent in the conscious
process. To the element of identity, found above to charac-
terize substance, may be added that of transcendent refer-
ence. Spiritual substance is not only an identity, but it
is a self-transcending identity.
It is now evident, not only that "the six" neo-realists
fail to show the necessity for abandoning all forms of spir-
itual substance, but that one of their number argues explic-
itly for one of those forms. The substitutes presented for
spiritual substance may now be observed.
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D. CONSCIOUSNESS AS RELATION
Neo-realists substitute for the conception of mind as
substance "the relational view of consciousness.""'" While
difference of opinion exists as to how this relation may be
construed, neo-realists agree that consciousness at least
involves "a complex relation between a sentient and inter-
ested organism and some parts of its environment, . . ,
"
This view marks an effort to define mind as a mode of con-
nection within the one objective world, and hence as a real-
ity that is homogeneous with this world.
According to one strand of neo-realistic thought con-
sciousness is more of a new dimension than a relation in the
space-time world. Spaulding argues for consciousness as a
4 ii
relation but then concludes that it is a qualitatively
distinct dimension in the universe." He holds that the new
Spaulding, NR, 42 (Spaulding is also critical of the
relational view, cf
.
NR, 482), Marvin, FBM, 262-263.
2
Perry, Art. IV, 147, 134, PPT, 321, 315, 316, 308,
Spaulding, NR, 42-43, 88, 89, Marvin, FBM, 261, 263, Pitkin,
Art. ill, 449, 453, 441, 455, Art. I, 228, Montague, Art. IV,
475, WK, 358, Holt, Art. I, 354, COC, 219, 254, Art. II, 393-
395.
Holt, FW, 93, Perry, PCI, 377, 378, PPT, 304, 323,
Holt, et al., NR, 33, 35, Montague, Art. VI, 199.
4
NR, 42-43.
5Ibid., 478, 471, 484, 485, 481-482, 470.
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dimensional aspect of consciousness is its unitary whole-
ness, i. e. the qualitative character peculiar to it as a
whole, but not applicable to its parts. 1 There is a rela-
tion between this new dimension and the "elements' 1 of con-
sciousness, just as there is a relation between the proper-
2ties of wholes and their parts. But consciousness as a new
dimension cannot itself be identified with a relation. It
may be construed as a relational complex, but not as a part
of that complex. Rather is it a whole within which there
are relations. Pitkin also believes that consciousness is
"of a dimension different from any spatio-temporal one." It
is "of the (4+a)th order,"4 "Cognitive relations" are "in
that different dimension," and are logically "transverse" to
those in the spatio-temporal order. ° Other neo-realists do
not seem to share this view.
Consciousness defined as a relation involves two end-
terms, namely, the organism and a portion of its environment.
The "subject in consciousness is the living and responding
1
Spaulding, NR, 481, 472, 476.
2 Ibid., 481.
3Ibid., 482.
4Art. Ill, 456, 453-454, 458.
6Ibid # , 456.
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organism,""1" whose nervous system selects portions of the
p
environment for inclusion in the conscious cross-section.
There is a "combining action" in consciousness performed by
physical, physiological, biological, and ethical principles
in the organism. These determine the arrangement of ele-
ments in consciousness. Portions of the environment are
"illumined" by the action of the organism, 4 just as a search'
light playing over a landscape lights up now this object and
5
now that. On the other hand, the content of consciousness
is the section of the environment to which the nervous sys-
tem responds.^ Consciousness is literally an excerpt of
things selected by a cerebrally equipped organism for its
special purposes. This "manifold of consciousness ... is
something in and for itself."8
1Perry, Art. IV, 126, 154, 140, Holt, Art. II, 394, FW,
174-175, Spaulding, NR, 89.
2Perry, ibid 0
, 134, 138, PPT, 298, 299, Pitkin, Art.
Ill, 454, 444, 445, 442, Art. I, 215.
Perry, Art. IV, 139, 138, 140.
4
Perry, PPT, 300.
5Holt, Art. I, 353-354, COG, 168-172, 182, 208, Marvin,
PBM, 263.
6Perry, PPT
,
299, 279, 277, Art. IV, 134, Holt, Art. I,
354, COC, 210, 219, 254.
7Perry, PCI, 378, 377, Marvin, FBM, 261, 263, Pitkin,
Art. I, 222.
8Holt, COC, 208.
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Such a relational definition raises the question of
whether consciousness as a unique and non-physical reality-
is thereby dissolved or merely restated so that its biologi-
cal basis and objective reference are emphasized. There is
a formal presumption in favor of the latter conclusion, for
a relational definition, as noted in the last chapter,"^" may
usually be translated into a definition by genus and species,
and hence it is merely an alternative to the older method.
Because consciousness can be defined in terms of relations
and functions does not necessarily mean that its uniqueness
thereby vanishes, any more than the sweetness of sugar van-
2ishes when it is defined as C. pH 0 . The possibility re-
mains open, therefore, that consciousness may be unique, and
therefore "substantial," even when defined relationally.
Whether there is anything unique and irreducible about
consciousness for the realists constitutes a question that
can be settled only through a further consideration of the
attributes which they find consciousness to possess. To this
problem attention may now be turned.
1 Gf. pp. 154-155, 113-114.
The view that consciousness is a "new dimension" recog-
nizes this qualitative uniqueness. Spaulding appears, how-
ever, to deny that a relational definition of consciousness
is a true alternative to the dimensional theory.
5Sheldon, SSPD, 98, 181, 185. Gf. Lewis, MWO, 5.
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E. INDIVIDUALITY AND BEHAVIOR
It is clear that some neo-realists
,
especially Perry,
Holt, and Marvin, int end to deny uniqueness to consciousness.
This is shown by the strong flavor of behaviorism that per-
vades their writings. If consciousness is only the behavior
of the physiological organism it may truly be said to lose
its supposed uniqueness. It would then be assimilated to
the physical world,"'"
Perry calls attention to the fact that neo-realists are
"in accord" with behaviorism and that they consequently go
back to "the old Aristotelian view that we mean by mind only
the peculiar way in which a living organism endowed with a
central nervous system behaves . Consciousness differs
from bodies "very much as one bodily system differs from an-
other." Man must be considered "a part of nature." Holt
considers mind "the subtler workings of integrated objective
Whatever consciousness as a "new dimension" may be, it
seems at least to be something that is irreducible to the
world of space and time. When consciousness is defined in
terms of such mathematical abstractions certain of its fac-
tors are no doubt emphasized. But its character as actually
experienced seems more fully described as a reality that is
also in time with some reference to relations of space.
2
PCI, 578.
5
Ibid., 377, PPT, 301, 303, Art. IV, 147.
4Perry, Art. X, 136.
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mechanisms,"1 and predicts that "behaviorism will be able to
give a complete account of cognition. . . ." Meanwhile he
calls himself a confirmed behaviorist. Spaulding finds the
relational view of consciousness "compatible" with behavior-
ism and refers favorably to its literature, Marvin leaves
the question open as to whether the "soul" exists as anything
more than a one-to-one correspondence between states in the
4
nervous system and behavior. Pitkin, however, regards con-
sciousness as "the crucial advance toward" the behavior of
5the organism, and not necessarily behavior itself.
Now, if consciousness is nothing more than the behavior
of the physiological organism, as this phase of neo-realism
clearly implies, there is no escaping materialism. Since
mind is body and body is matter, then matter is the only
existent reality. This means that molecules of matter some-
how become so related in groups that they understand and ad-
1PW, 93.
2
Art. II, 395.
3
NR, 89, 89n4.
4FBM, 266.
5Art. Ill, 457.
QBoth mind and body are really composed of neutral enti-
ties, according to neo-realist s . But since these entities do
not exist but only subsist, mind and body are identifiable in
the existent world.
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just themselves to other groups or complexes. Consciousness
would be, if behaviorism is true, clearly outlawed, as a
unique reality."*"
But difficulties in this view at once arise. In addi-
tion to the fact that the term "consciousness" is used by
behaviorists in a radically different sense from ordinary
p
practice, though this is tacitly assumed not to be the case,
there remains the problem of time- transcendence which be-
haviorists cannot solve. If mind is something physiological,
and hence material, there is difficulty in conceiving how it
assimilates its past states and formulates its plans for the
Holt recognizes that this must be the result of be-
haviorism but finds materialism to be the only tenable meta-
physics. In a letter, addressed to the present writer, from
Tenant's Harbor, Maine, under date of Dec. 17, 1956, Holt
says: "I have learned that 'realism,' as I understood it and
accepted it, necessarily leads to straight materialism, I
am now a materialist."
2Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 353, 329. Cf. Verda,
NRLS, 107.
The argument that memory can be accounted for by the
continuance in the nervous system of "stored stimuli" or
connections in the form of nervous arcs (Holt, COC, 246-247,
243-244, 235, 254, 258, 259, 227, Perry, PPT, 296, Marvin,
PBM, 152), lies open to two criticisms. First, physiology
shows that the elements of a physical organism change com-
pletely in a relatively short time. Accuracy in memory could
only be accounted for by postulating something that did not
change. Such an element of organization would be non-physi-
cal. (Cf. Verda, NRLS, 129.) Secondly, the factor of recog-
nition would be omitted. Memory is not only the repetition
in consciousness of past states, but it includes also recog-
nition that these past states have been present in the same
mind. (Brightman, ITP
,
195). "Recognition" is a time-tran-
scending fact that is more than a physiological occurrence
in a given moment.
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future. ^ Sheldon pertinently inquires, therefore, how that
function which is able to recall the past in memory and lay
hold on the future in prediction can be identified with a
2
material process which is confined to the present. If the
older theory of soul-substance erred by considering some-
thing merely static and supra-temporal, this theory of neo-
realism errs by interpreting it to be something solely dy-
namic and completely temporal. Mind is a process in time
capable of combining its temporal states and surveying the
past and future at a given moment. Apparently the factor of
"*"The attempt to account for prediction on a physiologi-
cal basis (Holt, COC, 243-244, 252-255, Pitkin, Art. Ill,
457, Perry, Art. IX, 169), fails to observe the time-tran-
scending element and its recognition by the mind in any re-
ference to the future. A mind that predicts and plans for
the future joins at a given moment knowledge of occurrences
which did not take place in that moment, and projects some
expected occurrence beyond that moment. A particular end
aimed at in the future is in some sense here and now, and
the mind realizes itself to be entertaining this plan for
future action now.
2SSPD, 218, 217, 212, 213.
Spaulding's theory that the content of memory consists
of non-temporal subsistents recognizes this supra-temporal
factor but really argues for the substance he is trying to
deny (MR, 442, 389, 485).
•
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identity,^" once assigned to substance, plays a role here
2
which neo-realists fail adequately to explain.
That, however, some neo-realists are themselves con-
vinced of the embarrassments to which behaviorism leads, may
be derived from two sources. In the first place, some of
''"There is a strong tendency in neo-realism to consider
identity in consciousness explicable on purely physiological
grounds. In his earlier writings Holt denied all "intrinsic
unity" to mind (COG, 299, 297-298) and argued that volitions
and even feelings and emotions were "impersonal" and in no
wise sacred to the "subjective" realm (COC, 291, 287-288,
282-284, 294, 109-112, 300-301). He later amended these
statements to show that mind, will, feeling, and emotion are
not independent In nature but dependent on or even identi-
fiable with the physiological organism (Art. II, 394, 396,
403, 402, 407-408). Perry finds personal identity largely in
the experience of bodily activity (PPT, 285, 284, 304, 295)
and declares that biological "interests" are "the defining
forms" of life (PPT, 301, 343, 342, 344, 300). Pitkin is
compelled to assert that the "directed activity" of the or-
ganism constitutes individuality (Art. Ill, 442, 437, 457).
There are passages in Spaulding's writings which indicate
that individuality rests with the activity of the organism
(Art. V, 247, NR, 450), yet "creative synthesis" in mind is
something unique and non-physical (Art. V, 247, 240, WAI, 25,
27, 31-32).
But such a physiological view of identity or individu-
ality leads to serious difficulties. All physiological or-
ganisms and hence all nervous systems of human beings are
the same in character or they are different. If they are the
same the origin of differing interests, purposes, and selec-
tive principles receives no adequate explanation. The unique
individuality of particular minds would then be a mystery.
On the other hand, if physiological organisms differ in con-
stitution the peculiar individuality of persons is conceiv-
able but their ability to communicate common truths would be
rendered problematic.
2Behaviorism does, to be sure, have some value as a
statement of consciousness. It emphasizes, for example, the
physiological processes that undeniably attend consciousness,
and points to the fact that behavior does furnish leading
clews to what consciousness is.
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them criticize behaviorism severely. Montague rejects it
explicitly on the ground of its materialistic implications. 1
Spaulding observes that behaviorism errs in denying the
whole that results from the organized elements of conscious-
2
ness. Marvin regards the relational view of mind as a de-
nial of materialism and behaviorism. Perry remains loyal
to behaviorism but evidently repudiates its materialistic
4implications since he criticizes materialism, and urges that
a physiological account of mind must be "supplemented by a
moral account . "
A second reason for believing that neo-realism wavers
in its espousal of metaphysical behaviorism and hence in the
argument that consciousness can be assimilated to the physi-
cal world, is that attributes are ascribed to mind which in-
dicate its uniqueness. The following characteristics illus-
trate this point.
Reason, it is argued, determines behavior. It has
1
Art. IV, 271-272.
2
NR, 477-478.
PBM, 263. He also argues that the naturalist must make
room for such "supernatural facts as man's achievement of
logical, moral, and aesthetic value. Ibid., 158.
4PPT, 82-84, 108-109.
5Ibid,, 300, 330-331.
0
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"genuine efficacy" in testing, applying, and guiding inter-
ests and beliefs,"1" and thus it enables the individual to
pdeal with the novel in adjusting himself to his environment.
The mind is even qualitatively discontinuous with the
physico-chemical system with which it is correlated, enjoys
4
relative freedom from the limitations of that system, and
5
causally exerts control over it, though still abiding by
some of its laws. An organization is found in consciousness
Q
which remains constant despite its changing constituents,
and therefore consciousness possesses a non-spatial and non-
7temporal character. These attributes cannot characterize a
purely physical complex.
One may conclude, therefore, that consciousness consti-
tutes a unique and irreducible reality, and that some neo-
1Perry, Art. X, 168, 157, 137, 166, 143.
2Spaulding, WAI, 63, 80-81, 105-106, Pitkin, Art. Ill,
457.
5
Marvin, PBM, 265, Spaulding, NR, 477, 478, 449, WAI, 27,
25, 31-32,
4
Perry, PPT, 343, cf. 253, 254, Spaulding, NR, 392, 393-
394, 395, 396, 427, 448, WAI, 46, 50, 58, 29-30.
5Spaulding, WAI, 105-106, 102, Marvin, loc. cit., Perry,
ibid., 341.
6Spaulding, ibid., 25, NR, 449.
7Spaulding, NR, 449.
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realists, especially Spaulding (also Montague), and in a
less marked degree Perry1 and Marvin, recognize their fail-
ure to assimilate it to the physical world. By defining
consciousness as a relation between the organism and its en-
vironment these realists ascribe to it attributes which show
it still to be a reality in its own right. Not only do they
fail to destroy the uniqueness of this reality, but they
2
seem at times to argue expressly for it. The probability
noted above that a relational definition of consciousness
would turn out to be a restatement of the uniqueness of mind
in different language seems, therefore, to receive some con-
firmation.
The realistic conception of consciousness must in some
sense, therefore, be a restatement of a kind of substance.
So far as these realists actually believe that mind is a
qualitatively unique reality that transcends the physico-
chemical world and freely exercises its capacity to aid the
organism in adjustment to its environment, thereby persist-
ing as a unified organization while its elements change,
Perry vigorously attacks naturalism, believing that
the entities of logic and mathematics, which are presupposed
physical science, and the non-physical phenomena of de-
sire and will refute it (PPT, 108-109).
The declaration that neo-realism reduces to "a specu-
lative reconstruction of the world of physical science
(Rogers, Art. I, 145), thus appears to be an exaggeration.
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they are arguing for a kind of spiritual substance. Yet
such a conception of mind represents only a trend in neo-
realistic thought and remains at best a far cry from what
most neo-realists intend. In the light of the above criti-
cisms passed on the behavioristic and materialistic features
of the neo-realistic view of consciousness, this trend to-
ward substance appears, nevertheless, to be the direction in
which a tenable view of consciousness must move. The at-
tempt by neo-realists to conceive consciousness without a
theory of substance may be said, therefore, largely to fail.
A final criticism of spiritual substance is implied in
the realistic argument that consciousness is reducible to a
qualitatively neutral reality. Some attention must be given
to this view.
P. MIND AND SUBSISTENCE
The "primitive terms" or simples to which consciousness
may be analyzed are interchangeable with the elements that
make up matter.^" Consequently, mind loses its qualitative
significance and becomes a "neutral aggregate. 11 It is "no
new substance" but a complex of the simpler neutral enti-
xPerry, PPT, 310, 277.
2Holt, COC, 131, Art. I, 355.
3Holt, COC, 308.
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ties."*" The contents of mind are neutral and thus are "of
such stuff as logical and mathematical manifolds are made
. . .
." This means that spiritual substance does not ex-
ist for these neutral elements as neutral only subsist. HA
mind or consciousness is a class or group of entities within
the subsisting universe. ..."
Here once more appears the difficulty of how the neu-
tral elements of consciousness are to be conceived since
they are never given in experience as neutral. The reduction
of mind to such entities is an appeal to obscurity. This
view is as baffling as the transcendent soul so far as its
ability to explain the given processes of consciousness goes.
Indeed, the neutral entities do in some measure perform the
function of substance, for they are the potentialities out of
which mind arises. But to derive mind from principles, con-
cepts, and entities which are never given in experience is
an appeal from the given and known to the not-given and un-
known.
But aside from this difficulty, there remains the prob-
"•Holt, COC, 114.
2
Ibid # , 167, 182-183, Art. I, 373, Marvin, FBM, 263,
Spaulding, WAI, 152-153 0 Pitkin confesses ignorance of what
the "mind stuff" is, out of which the empirical phases of
things are made. Art. I, 203.
5Holt, Art. I, 373, cf. COC, 220-221, 254, Marvin, FBM,
263.
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lem of accounting for the organization of these entities in-
to such a complex as consciousness. If they themselves pos-
sess the ability to accomplish this arrangement, they would
seem to be of a dynamic character foreign to their defini-
tion as simples. If they do not have this ability some oth-
er and even more mysterious agent must be invoked to bring
about their conjunction, or else it must be dubbed a result
of chance. Either of these alternatives shirks the responsi-
bility of explanation. If the neo-realist replies, as he
doubtless would, that he has no such obligation to explain
how these entities become organized, one may point out that
he has no right to construct a realm of subsistence unless
he explains how its constituents are related to existents.
There would seem to be fewer difficulties involved in
the conclusion that spiritual substance is itself ultimate
and qualitatively irreducible. The entities which neo-real-
ism considers neutral are given in the complex of experience
as elements in an immanent but organic whole. They may be
understood as parts in this whole. The argument that com-
plexes can better be understood through their wholes and
parts than through their parts alone has already been exam-
ined and defended.
Spiritual substance still remains a tenable concept.

11
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G. CONCLUSIONS
Examination of the neo-realistic criticisms of spiritual
substance makes the following conclusions apparent. First,
the argument that spiritual substance cannot be observed in
experience since introspection is an unfruitful method for
studying consciousness, has not been demonstrated. Second,
neo-realists clearly show that belief in a transcendent,
non-empirical, and unknowable soul- substance cannot be jus-
tified. Third, any theory of spiritual substance must allow
that substance may be analyzed into constituent parts, as
neo-realists assert, but the latter do not establish the
fact that explanation through these simple parts alone is as
complete as through further reference to the substantial
whole to which they belong. Fourth, if spiritual substance
be considered the exclusive possessor of perceptual data
that have no objective character, solipsism results, as neo-
realists contend, yet substance as the unity of data which
still possess an objective reference, remains a tenable hy-
pothesis. Fifth, the realistic argument that spiritual sub-
stance does not exist because unique and private factors in
consciousness are non-existent or of negligible importance,
is denied by experience, though the argument rightly empha-
ft
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sizes the fact that substance cannot be completely monadic.
1
Sixth, discreteness remains an undeniable characteristic of
consciousness but the organic and relational factors in it
still make substance a reasonable view. Seventh, the neo-
realistic denial of spiritual substance because experience
is non-active, i, e. because it is presentative and not
judgmental, betrays a disregard for the empirical fact that
interpretation attends perception. Eighth, one of "the six"
neo-realists
,
namely Montague, explicitly argues for spirit-
ual substance as a form of potentiality, and though this
view stands in danger of explaining consciousness by refer-
ence to obscurity it emphasizes the self-transcendent char-
acter of substance. Ninth, definition of consciousness as
a relation amounts to a restatement of the concept of spir-
itual substance with special emphasis on its physiological
basis and objective reference. Tenth, the behavior istic and
materialistic trend of neo-realism encounters difficulties
from which spiritual substance, defined as an organic, uni-
fied, private, active, self-identifying, and self-transcend-
ing reality, would provide an escape. Eleventh, some neo-
realists, especially Spaulding, less notably Marvin, Pitkin,
and Perry, indicate some interest in such a supplement to
There is, as Hartshorne argues, a "fundamentally so-
cial character to experience" (PPS, 6, 8).
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their views but do not offer a systematic development of it.
Twelfth, the neo-realistic effort to reduce spiritual sub-
stance to neutral substance raises more problems than it
solves, since the nature of neutrality is not explained nor
the principle of organization clarified.

CHAPTER VII
BEING AND EXISTENCE
The problem remaining to be solved is whether the neo-
realistic criticisms of substance as an ontological princi-
ple are valid. This issue includes the query as to whether
realists adequately provide for the functions which the con-
cept of substance once performed in ontology."'" The present
chapter will be devoted to these subjects.
That neo-realists deny to substance a place in ontology
o
is quite clear. There is for them no one "substance.
. .
,
stuff. . . , unknown, or unknowable underlying entity, to
which all other entities are reducible. ..." Nor does a
plurality of substances comprise ultimate reality, "The
simple entities, of which in the last analysis all things
are composed, have no substance, "^ except in the meaningless
By ontology here is meant the theory of ultimate reali-
ty, as distinguished from cosmology and psychology, though
the latter deal with areas within the ultimate reality.
2Knudson asserts that in the "substantistic . . . sense
of the term" neo-realists even "repudiate all ontology"
(POP, 407)
.
3
Spaulding, NR, 435.
4Holt, COC, 135, Art. I, 372.
0
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sense of having "neutral w substance."
1
" On the other hand,
"they are a class,"2 Since any kind of substance is a case
of incomplete analysis, an accurate interpretation of being
cannot be in terms of it
.
Precisely how this rejected concept of substance may be
defined, is not altogether clear. Usually the term is taken
by realists to mean a supposedly irreducible complex, of ma-
terial or spiritual quality, which bears the relation to par-
ticular entities of a substratum to its attributes, or of an
4
organic whole to its parts. One is left to suppose that ul-
timate being5 is entirely innocent of any such complex, wheth-
er it is construed as an all embracing one in which concrete
particulars inhere, or as a plurality of units from which par-
ticular entities arise. The failure of neo-realists explicit-
ly to define the concept that is rejected gives rise to con-
siderable difficulty in assessing their criticisms.
If substance must yield to analysis and reduction the
ultimate elements of being cannot be substances. The realis-
m-Holt, COC, 136.
2
Ibid., 135.
3Perry, Art. IV, 127.
4
This definition may be inferred from the denials of sub-
stance just cited, and from the criticisms of it which appear
below.
The term "being" and its relations to 'reality, " "exist-
ence." and "subsistence" will be explained on pp. 269-270,
278—280
•
'"
o
o
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tic argument that being is a plurality of simples implies the
absence of substance, since the latter must be considered a
complex. Consequently, the ensuing discussion of simples is
also a treatment of an implicit criticism of substance,
A. THE PLURALITY OF SIMPLES
For neo-realists the fundamental elements of the uni-
verse are "simple ones,"^* These "simples in which analysis
terminates" are "ultimate immediacies," "non-relational" or
2
"indefinable entities." No ground exists for affirming
"that there is one simplest entity or one first principle
. . .
. " Rather are there many entitles of which simplicity
may be asserted. With the advancement of knowledge many "sup-
posed differences" between entities will turn out to be pure-
ly matters of form or complexity. "... Ultimately perhaps
all so-called substantial differences will ... be thus re-
solved." Simples are drops of mere being, not a kind of be-
ing, for "that which all things are is not a . . . property
Holt, COC, 154, 135. What elements are considered sim-
ple is explained below (pp. 270-272). For the purpose of the
present discussion it is unnecessary specifically to identify
them.
2
Holt, et al.
,
NR, 32.
3
Holt, COC, 154.
4Ibid., 64.
I'
243
by which some things are distinguished from . . , others."
These "primitive terms" of which the "universe is com-
posed are to "be distinguished from complexes, for the latter
are "defined in terms of the simple. ..." But on the oth-
er hand, "the simple cannot be defined in terms of the com-
plex. Simple entities are not only "mutually independent"
but are also "independent of the complexes of which they are
members." They cannot be "wholes" or "values of variables"
for this would belie their simplicity and make of them com-
plexes. Nor can they imply or be implied by complexes since
implication is a relation confined to propositions or combi-
Q
nations of propositions, i. e, to complexes. Though these
elements may not be given in experience apart from complexes,
they are nevertheless discernible within their context. 7
It is quite clear that if there are such entities as
absolute simples which can in no sense be construed as com-
-'"Holt, GOC, 20, 21-23.
2
Ibid., 63.
Loc. cit.
4Perry, Art. IV, 118.
5Ibid., 119.
6Ibid., 118-119.
7
Ibid,, 127. Pitkin says that some "genuine simples are
given in experience" (Art. Ill, 406n)
,
though he probably
means not that they occur alone but in a broader context.
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plexes, substance must be abandoned as an ultimate concept
in ontology. However substance may be defined, whether as
the substratum in which attributes inhere, or as the unity
and synthesis of relations, or as the self-dependent and per-
manent factor in change, or as the element of wholeness which
conditions parts, it must be considered a complex. The va-
lidity of this implied criticism depends, therefore, on one f s
answer to the question of whether the universe is reducible
to utter simples.
Now any realm of discourse rests finally upon a limited
number of indefinables ». A few basic concepts must be taken
to have relative fixity and clarity of meaning without defi-
nition in terms of anything else. Otherwise arguments would
be circular or else become embroiled in an infinite regress.
In this sense neo-realists are justified in concluding that
the fundamental elements of the universe are "indefinable"
and "immediate." These ultimate simples may be considered
the indefinables in terms of which the universe is to be ex-
plained.
If, however, the indefinability of simples means, as the
2passages quoted above imply, that these simples are charac-
terless save for the fact that they are elements of pure be-
Burnham and Wheelwright, PA, 19, 18, 82.
2
Pp. 242-243.
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ing, serious difficulties arise. On the one hand, if the
world of concrete fact is reduced to utter simples or drops
of pure being, it is explained in terms that are meaningless
abstractions. Bare being, as Hegel said, is nothing."*" How
these ultimate entities could even be distinguished from each
other or from the complexes in which they are found remains
unclear, if they are genuinely simple. Absolute simplicity
can only mean indeterminacy. Furthermore, on the assumption
of complete simplicity there is no explanation for evolu-
2
tion. The view that complexity and value develop out of ab-
stract and characterless simples leaves too many problems
unsolved. These effects could scarcely have arisen from such
simple causes.
On the other hand, if simplicity means only "relative"
simplicity, the elements in which analysis terminates are
complexes and not simples. So soon as one concedes that
these ultimates have definite and distinguishable natures
they become complexes
,
though they may be the simplest com-
plexes which thought can discern. "indefinability, " when ap-
plied to these ultimate entities, can, therefore, only mean
ENC, 87, 86. Holt recognizes this (COC, 21), but he
does not appear to realize that utter simplicity signifies
bare being.
2
The neo-realistic conception of evolution is discussed
below, pp. 294-299.
1
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that the elements of the universe have a relatively simple,
yet definite and unambiguous character. One must conclude
that these primal entities, whatever else they may be, are
in a measure complex. Such being the case, the implied argu-
ment that substance cannot be an ultimate concept in ontolo-
gy because the only usable concepts are simples, loses its
force.
That neo-realists themselves, even including Holt and
Perry, did not long retain or perhaps ever consistently main-
tain the notion of complete simples, follows from two sources.
In the first place, simples are in some passages said to pos-
sess definite properties. They enjoy "distinct self-identi-
ty" regardless of context, * manifest "a certain serial order"
which is "intrinsic to them,
"
2 and bring with them when re-
lated "a character which they possess quite independently and
by themselves." Secondly, simples can be identified and
distinguished from each other. It is possible to discrimi-
nate only "the relatively simple," but among these may be
found the concepts of identity, difference, number, and the
4 H
negative. In studying the universe one must start "with a
Holt, COC, 104.
2Ibid., 107.
3Perry, PPT, 316.
4Holt, ibid., 154.
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pluralism of terms and propositions, all of which have "dis-
tinct" . . • being, ""^ Since propositions involve terms in
relation they are complex. Therefore, complexes are ulti-
mate.
Though "simples" are neutral in quality, in the sense
that they are themselves neither material nor spiritual, hut
2
are constitutive of these two realms, they range widely in
the degree of their complexity. Neutral entities form class-
es whose differences in complexity and concreteness range
from logical and mathematical terms and propositions to ide-
als and values. There are "kinds [of entities] that are ir-
reducibly different, and there is an irreducible plurality
of these kinds,"4 Realists hold to an "ontological pluralism
• , . of entities, both simple and complex. . . , • But even
these simples must be relatively complex.
It can only be concluded that the argument against sub-
stance from the fact that the universe can be reduced to sim-
1
Holt, COC, 51, 66, 103, 104, Montague, Art. IV, 253.
2Perry, PPT, 316, 310, 277, 307, PCI, 372, Spaulding,
NR, 11, xviii, Holt, COC, 136, 103, 52, 64, Art. I, 372, 355;
Montague expresses some doubt about the efficacy of such a
notion (Art. IV, 275-276).
3Holt, COC, 154-160, Spaulding, NR, 494, WAI, 137-140,
143-144, 247, Marvin, PBM, 143-144, Perry, PPT, 311.
Spaulding, NR, 435.
5Ibid., 43, cf. Art. V, 221.
-
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pies carries no weight. The notion of complete simplicity
involves such abstractness as to make ultimate elements in-
distinguishable and evolution miraculous. "Relative" sim-
plicity, however, also means relative complexity. But since
neo-realists indicate in actual practice that simples are of
a determinate character, they can be only relatively simple.
Thus the elements in which analysis terminates are relative-
ly complex. Since substance is a complex, the possibility
remains that some of these elemental units may be substanc-
es,^" or even that they may be related to form one substance.
More direct criticisms of this concept may now be con-
sidered.
B. CRITICISMS OF SUBSTANCE
While the criticisms of substance in ontology are some-
what similar in logic to those already examined, they differ
in context and significance from the latter. Accordingly
separate consideration must be given to them.
In ontology, says the neo-realist, as well as in the
realms of mind and matter, the concept of substance repre-
sents an inveterate and "almost insurmountable" habit of
"Whether they actually are substances will be determined
below, pp. 274-278.
(
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thought. 1 To counteract this habit realists employ the
words "simple 11 and "neutral" when referring to ultimate en-
2
titles. That substance ijs a habit of thought in ontology
as elsewhere no one can deny.^ It is common to suppose that
the world of concrete fact roots in some underlying reality
or substratum. But not all habits of thought are vicious,
they often express a profound truth. If, therefore, the
habit of thinking in terms of substance is to be given up
neo-realists must show that the theory of "simple" and "neu-
tral" entities conserves its value and escapes its weakness-
es. Furthermore, any concept is a habit to some degree. It
must represent a reasonably well established form or conven-
tion of thought else it would be meaningless. In rejecting
the concept of substance realists are merely substituting a
newer habit for an old one. It is, as observed before, the
validity of the concept as a means for interpreting reality
which must determine its retention or rejection and not its
origin or presence in habit.
Holt, COC, 135, 62, 64, Spaulding, NR, xvii, 30, 31,
353.
2
Holt, ibid., 135, 64.
Whitehead indicates the fixity of this habit, but be-
lieves that the substance-attribute formula represents "a
high degree of abstraction." Hence it is an instance of
"the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. " (SMW, 74, 75, 77-
78.)
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The first relatively direct criticism passed on sub-
stance as an ontological concept or principle lies in the
argument that it is a speculative dogma. By this dogma is
meant "the assumption for philosophic purposes that there is
an all-sufficient, all-general principle . . , that adequate-
ly determines or explains everything, * . Such a concept
springs from "a purely rational source,"*0 and cannot be em-
pirically demonstrated. Belief in a "numerically single un-
derlying substance or substratum-like core" rests on a spec-
ulative idea. "Absolutism," whether idealistic or natural-
istic, "is the expression of this motive. . . . 1,4 The
assumption that there is "something of which everything is
a case" is an arbitrary speculation which lacks clear defi-
5
nition and proof.
That this criticism of substance cannot be serious may
be concluded from the fact that a speculative ideal of some
sort is inevitable. An ideal of thought is presupposed
Holt, et al., NR, 16-17, Perry, PPT, 64, 65, 165.
2
Spaulding, NR, 352, Perry, ibid., 165.
Spaulding, ibid., 553.
4
Perry, ibid., 165, 64, 65, 74, 75.
5
Ibid., 65.
Cf. Schilpp's discussion of alleged Standpunktslosig-
keit in philosophy (Art. I).

just as much in the denial as in the assumption that there is
a universal principle or substance out of which rocks and
rills, men and other mortals, may be derived. If one denies
that there is one underlying element of which every concrete
thing is a case, and asserts either that there are many such
elements, or that there are none at all, it is presupposed
that the speculative ideal is to reduce the facts of experi-
ence to a plurality of first principles, or to none. To
"demonstrate" either that there is or is not an ultimate sub-
stance would require an examination of every fact in the uni-
verse
1 from every conceivable point of view— an impossibility
for a finite mind. Some measure of dogmatism is, therefore,
present in any relatively general statement, for it is a con-
clusion from observation of a few facts about the nature of
many. A reasoned metaphysical view is the assertion of an
ideal which thought tends to approach and which it would at-
tain if a complete examination of the whole universe were
possible.
If this criticism means that belief in a universal sub-
stance rests on an unexamined and emotional demand or assump-
2tion that there be some changeless ground for the universe,
two rejoinders are appropriate. In the first place, the
1 Cf. Ayer, LTL, 24.
2Cf. Holt, et al., NR, 52-35.
V
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search for logical ultimates, the neutral entitles of neo-
realism, may as reasonably be said to arise from a similar
motive. 1 The logical and mathematical entities of realism
possess a fixity and aloofness from change comparable to an
absolute substance. In fact, belief in these entities is
ttone of the emotionally most comforting notions that i3 pro-
ducible by metaphysics. n Secondly, some thinkers who have
held to an absolute ground or substance have arrived at their
conclusion by rigorous analysis just as truly as these real-
ists have at theirs. The relentless logic and clear empiri-
cal reference of Hegel's PhSnomenologie des Geistes, the in-
tricate and detailed analysis apparent in Alexander's Space,
Time, and Deity, and the mastery of science shown by White-
head in Process and Reality, testify to this fact.
Whether there is a single underlying principle can,
therefore, only be determined by an appeal to experience. The
theory of substance is not to be rejected because it repre-
sents a speculative ideal.
A second criticism of substance by neo-realists is that
such a concept would be too formal, universal, and general to
1Sheldon, SSPD, 226, 227.
2
Parkhurst, RLR, 42.
3
For Hegel the underlying principle is the absolute idea,
for Alexander space-time, for Whitehead organic relation, or
creativity.
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serve any theoretical or practical purpose, "An ultimate
principle • • • in which every concession has been made to
generality, is grossly inadequate to everything to which it
applies, 9 The nature of concrete objects and their relation
to the first principle would be left out of account because
2
this view would be "consistent with anything." A universal
substance nby reason of being everywhere present is nowhere
«3
of interest. Nothing can be said or thought about it.
Even if the ultimate elements of the universe are held to be
many in number but all of one substance the term substance
"comes thereby to denote everything, and hence to connote
nothing, 1,4
A universal principle that possessed no other determi-
nation than that of complete generality would, it is true,
be a useless metaphysical notion. It would embody all the
difficulties found in the concept of bare being. But such a
concept could scarcely be called substance, for, as already
noted, substance can only be adequately defined as a notion
which refers to a definite and characterizable reality. This
criticism is, therefore, valid only against a concept of uni-
1Perry, PPT, 167, 168.
2Ibid., 167, 176.
5
Holt, COG, 63, 62.
4
Ibid., 136, 135.
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versal and vacuous "being, and not against substance when
properly defined.
If the argument is intended to show that substance can-
not be universal or general and also determinate and distin-
guishable, one may doubt its weight. There need be little
more difficulty in conceiving the generality or universality
of a basic substance than in conceiving a less general "uni-
versal." For example, the universals "man" and "animal"
possess wide generality, yet one may speak intelligently,
though in abstraction, about the definite class term "man"
as distinguished from the class term "animal." The more gen-
eral concept of substance could also be definite in charac-
ter even if present in all particulars. Naturally it could
not be defined in distinction from other concepts of equal
generality, for there would be none, but it could be defined
in contrast to less general ones. It would mean whatever is
included within it. 1 To say that a concept is more general
than all others means that it is determinate, as are they,
but that it differs from them in degree of generality.
Whether "the rich nature of concrete objects" would be
overlooked if one held to a universal substance, does consti-
I
tute a difficult problem. The great qualitative variety in
Hocking, TOP, 371.
Perry, PPT, 167.
f
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the nature and appearance of particular things makes it hard
to conceive how they can all root in one basic principle of
being.
But, two considerations help to meet this difficulty.
In the first place, many apparent qualitative differences
prove, upon analysis, to be only forms of a more fundamental
reality. The "loudness" of sound, for example, is reducible
to the intensity of vibrations, and the "weight" of a ball
may be considered the rate of attraction between two bodies.
Many such qualities are reducible to quantities. Hence there
can in no case be as many genuine qualitative differences as
one may at first suppose. Secondly, there is a certain prac-
tical and hypothetical element in one's thought about any
quality. For many generations it was practically advanta-
geous to assume the "impenetrability" of a material object,
but this is no longer the case. Matter can be better under-
stood, it is now thought, without assuming its impenetrabili-
ty. Qualities are to some degree instruments for dealing
1 2
with reality and not necessarily absolute forms of it. The
fundamental problem, therefore, is whether there are fewer
practical difficulties in construing reality as (qualitative-
The neo-realistic preference for a relational or quan-
titative statement of qualities indicates a belief that qual-
ities are largely of this character.
2Cf. Hartshorne, PPS, 207.
V
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ly) one substance or as many.
That belief in one qualitatively ultimate substance is
no more, and perhaps less, difficult to maintain than belief
in a qualitative pluralism, must be asserted. The relation
between a universal substance and concrete objects involves
the same problem that any theory of universals must solve.
Particular instances of any universal are alike, but they are
also unlike. If they were not unlike there would be no point
to calling them particular. Non-universality, i. e. particu-
larity, means distinctness or uniqueness. This uniqueness
must be reconciled with universality even by the neo-realist.
If, now, it be assumed that reality is qualitatively a plu-
rality of substances and not one fundamental substance, the
problem of how the diverse and particular is related to the
universal is multiplied by the number of qualities that are
taken to be universal. It would seem simpler to explain the
relation of particular and unique objects to one underlying
universal substance than to show their relation to many dif-
ferent universal entities. 1
In consideration of these facts, the generality involved
in the concept of ontological substance does not appear to be
a decisive argument against it.
The relation of universal and particular is further
discussed below (cf. pp. 261-263).
*J
— 0 1.x.
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As a third argument against ontological substance, neo-
realists maintain that substance presupposes a unity or one-
ness which reality does not possess. Substance is denied not
only by the plurality of qualities just observed, but also by
the fact that the fundamental elements of the universe are
numerically distinct. "No all-inclusive . . . One in
. . .
number is empirically discovered,""*" and hence "no one . . .
substance" can be considered basic in reality. Though the
3 4
universe has unity, it also has variety and disunity.
There is no more unity in it than in "a system of individu-
als, classes, series and the like, that subsist side by side"
but "do not imply one another," The unity discernible is
that of an aggregate and not of an organic whole. Evil, error,
and contradiction interfere with a theory of complete unity.
Furthermore, it is meaningless to speak of an absolute unity
for no provision would then be made for the proportion of
unity to the undoubted plurality and variety of the universe.
'Spaulding, NR, 436, 437.
Ibid., 435, 43, 317.
5Perry, PPT
,
245, 187, Holt, COC, 23, 165, 164, Spauld-
ing, ibid,, 436, 317.
4
Perry, ibid., 245, Holt, ibid,, 48.
5
Spaulding, ibid., 436, 437, Art. V, 221.
6
Holt, COC, 48, 51, Spaulding, WAI, 255, NR, 520.
7
Perry, PPT, 187.
1 •« »
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Thus "the new realism tends ... to he metaphysically plu-
ralistic rather than monistic. ""^
The problem here is to determine whether there is suf-
ficient unity in reality to justify belief in substance.
That reality possesses some unity, is correctly pointed out
by realists. The fact that it is a system of entities and
not a chaos makes this clear. But if system means only that
reality is an aggregate of externally related elements, then
substance truly cannot be the basic principle.
It is hard to avoid the persuasion, however, that real-
ity is more than a loose collection of independent entities.
The system within it indicates a significant underlying prin-
"'"Holt, et al., NR, 33. The neo-realistic interpretation
of God allows for some measure of unity in being, but such
unity is for most realists not thoroughgoing. Perry holds
that realism is "theistic," but God is for him merely "the
larger totality of life," a "collection of interests 1*1 (PCI,
379, 375). Marvin is persuaded that if there is a god, he
cannot be the highest or most universal entity or substance
(FBM, 162, 156, 159). Holt's view of God is not articulate,
though he does say that God is in and through the physical and
mental manifold (COG, 295). Spaulding considers God "the to-
tality of all values" and as such "the unity of their organi-
zation" (MR, 517) . God is both immanent in and transcendent
over the world (loc. cit., 514, 520, 521, WAI, 258, 257). Yet
the irreducible reality of evil prevents God from being the
unity of the world in a final sense (NR, 520). Montague, how-
ever, does hold that God is a genuinely universal and unifying
principle. Though God is not omnipotent but finite, he is
"an ascending force, a nisus, a thrust toward concentration,
organization, and life. ..." He is the "unitary and ...
infinite cosmic consciousness" (BU, 84), the ubiquitous poten-
tiality of being (ibid., 82). "That in God which is not God"
is his environment, i, e. the world (ibid., 84). Here is gen-
uine cosmic unity.
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ciple. First of all, the manyness of an aggregate implies an
underlying oneness. Before the elements in such a collection
can he counted as "first, second, third," etc, it is presup-
posed that each is a value of an underlying one."1' Secondly,
the external relations between these ultimate entities cannot
be the only relations which they have. The fact that an in-
dividual is not a universal or the fact that a class is not a
series exemplifying asymmetrical relations, indicates that
these terms, taken by Spaulding to be ultimate, are cases of a
reality that bears this character. It is a part of their na-
ture to typify this reality just as much as it is their na-
ture to be independent and externally related to one another.
One brick in a wall may be externally related to another brick
at its right and thus "make no difference to it," but "it is
something to the brick that it is in space" and thereby en-
dowed with the possibility of being to the right of its neigh-
2bor. These ultimate elements are related through the under-
lying reality or principle in which their natures are grounded.
Such an underlying reality is by no means an abstraction. 1
It is rather a principle manifested in definite ways, and is
therefore one that is capable of at least these manifesta-
tions. Nor does such a theory of unity leave the relation or
{ v*9i*s# fct cut! destroying J.to ultlft- i v
^Cf. Plato, Parm.
,
164, 165.
2Hoeking, TOP, 368.
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proportion of unity to plurality unexplained. It maintains
that all plurality is a case of the one unity. Consequently
this view has an advantage over the notion of an aggregate.
For how it happens that there is just the amount of unity
which realists allow is not explained by them. Unity and plu-
rality are left side by side as ultimate inexplicables.
This criticism has value therefore in calling attention
to the pluralistic aspects of experience, but it fails to
make necessary the abandonment of substance as the basis of
unity in reality.
Another criticism of substance is the argument by neo-
realists that simple entities do not "belong" together. A
theory of ultimate substance would require that simples form
some kind of exclusive organization and this they cannot do.
Materialists and idealists have both erred in making this as-
sumption. 0 The realist resists "every impulse to provide a
Belief that there is an ultimate unity in reality does
not commit one to a block universe in which a relative inde-
pendence and uniqueness is denied to finite beings, [The fact
that logical and moral errors occur may be taken to indicate
a measure of self-direction and independence on the part of
these beings. Moreover, every item or fact in the universe
possesses at the very least such individual uniqueness as
just that part of the whole and no other must contain. On
the other hand, evil may be given in the nature of the uni-
verse without destroying its ultimate unity,
p
Perry, Art. IV, 128.
3Spaulding, NR, 258, Perry, Art. IV, 128, Holt, Art. I,
366.
%
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home for the elements of experience."
1
In fact "the simple
elements are nowhere. They may enter into this or that group,
but they do not belong to it. . . .
"
2 Since these simples
are "the entities "at large" and belong . . . to no constitu-
ency" no ultimate "owner" of them exists (or subsists).
Such ultimates as "numbers, geometrical figures and . . . all
the abstract entities of science" are "accessible to all in-
dividuals" and thus "can be passed around like beetles or
postage stamps."4 It is "the fallacy of exclusive particu-
larity" to assume that "a particular term of any system be-
longs to such system exclusively,"
It is undoubtedly true that some simple notions, e, g.
number, difference, implication, are present in many, and
perhaps in all, complexes that can be mentioned. In this
sense they do not "belong" exclusively to any one complex in
which they appear. But what the presence of these simples
in a wide variety of complexes must mean is that the simples
are applicable to thought about many different complex things.
"'"Perry, PPT, 316.
2Perry, Art. IV, 128, PPT, 316.
5Perry, Art. IV, 129, cf. 119.
4Holt, COC, 120.
5Holt, et al., NR, 14.
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They are universal a and a universal has many particular in-
stances, each of which differs somewhat from all other par-
ticulars. To hold that a universal or simple, e. g. the
notion of "difference," as such enters into each complex and
individual thing about which "difference" can be asserted,
breaks down the distinction between universal and particular.
This would mean that there are as many universals as particu-
lars— a manifest absurdity. The only alternative rests in
the belief that universals refer, or apply to a number of
particulars. They are present in particulars but are also
i
different from them.
Prom this point of view a universal or simple is not an
autonomous entity that bears no intimate connection with its
particular instances. It actually belongs to or is dependent
upon those instances ."^ Not only is the universal "horse"
discoverable in its particular instances, i. e. in definite
and particular horses, alone, but it is also derived from
them. Its nature can only be determined by its concrete in-
stances. Formulation of a universal represents the observa-
tion of a limited number of cases where the same kind of
generality is present. Hence a universal is never known as
such, i. e. in all of its instances, or apart from any of
them. The construction of universals apart from particular
1Hasan, ROR, 310.
l. —
7
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complexes is a bit of rationalism unwarranted by logic
1
and
certainly contrary to the neo-realistic cause of radical em-
piricism.
If the universal elements of reality are intimately
bound to the instances where they occur, but still constitute
a relationship beyond those instances, the concept of sub-
stance remains a tenable notion. Particulars, e. g. golf
balls, are not loose collections of such universals as "dif-
ference," "implication," "whiteness," and so on. They are
complexes of a unique character, different in some respects
from every other simple or complex entity in the universe.
The presence of universals in them means that relations exist
between these unique complexes and the rest of the universe.
Substance is the ground of individuality, the means of recon-
ciling the oneness in raanyness, the uniqueness in generality,
which every particular thing manifests. The argument that
universals ultimately typify an underlying and universal sub-
stance has already been presented.
Another criticism which neo-realists make of substance
is that a basic activity or a causal agency in being, such as
the notion of substance provides, is an unjustifiable assump-
tion. It is a return to "animism" to suppose that reality
Royce observes that "any definition of absolutely in-
dependent beings
. . .
is, in all regions of the universe,
. . .
a hopeless contradiction" (WAI, I, 138).
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manifests an active, striving force, or substantial agency. 1
2
Hume showed the "irrelevance" of this notion to causality,
and scientists have "been gradually abandoning "the notion of
power or . . . activity" as an ultimate principle of expla-
nation. "Agency depends entirely upon the inner experience
of activity,"4 and the latter turns out to be "a manifold of
terms in relation." 5 Thus causality, to which activity is
fundamental, can only be a manifold of this type. Causality
is the law of succession or change which terms and relations
Q
manifest.
This criticism rightly emphasizes the fact that reality
must not be considered a vague reservoir of all imaginable
powers. Unless the causality resident in it is of a determi-
nate character, the postulate of causality is an appeal to
obscurity, a suggestion of indefinite potentiality. Reality
does manifest itself in changes, the nature of which can be
-'"Marvin, Art. V, 625-627, FBM, 117. Cf. Spaulding, NR,
515, WOG, v.
2
Marvin, FBM, 117.
3Perry, PPT, 99, Art. IV, 110.
Perry, PPT, 99.
5
Ibid., 100. Holt believes activity is intrinsic to
propositions (COC, 98, 17-18, 303-304, 164-165).
6
Perry, PPT, 100, Marvin, FBM, 117, Holt, COC, 285. Cf.
Spaulding, Art. V, 203, 196.

265
described as series or successions in which terms and rela-
tions shift. If the temperature rises above 32° Fahrenheit
a cube of ice will melt. The complex of terms and relations
constituting the cube assumes a different form, i. e. it be-
comes another complex because its terms and relations have
changed. This change may be considered a series of correla-
tions between the terms and relations that made up the cube
of ice and those that make up the resulting volume of water.
With such an eviscerated notion of causality, however,
certain difficulties arise. If causality were no more than
the mere succession of relations there would be no explana-
tion of why terms and relations change. Merely to assert
that they do leaves a fundamental question unanswered."1" Ei-
ther one must assume that terms and relations themselves pos-
sess the ability to terminate and consummate association, or,
that this function is accomplished by some third reality.
The first alternative would require a complexity in terms and
relations which is denied by their definition. It can only
be concluded that terms and relations change through the
agency of wholeness which is present in their conjunction.
It is a mistake to argue that this question is foolish
since it is tantamount to asking why the given facts are as
they are. The philosopher is obligated to look at every fact
from all possible angles, to raise all possible questions
about its origin and significance, and to propose an explana-
tion for all phenomena. Any other course would be philosoph-
ic incompetence.
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This element of wholeness also provides the factor of
permanence which change requires. If A through relation to
B causes B to become C, a series of relations arises. There
is a change in A when the relation to B occurs. But A does
not pass into B. When B is changed into C "by its relation to
A, there is no completely new creation of C. The latter is
B, plus a new element. The new complex is called C. This
element of permanence is required in order for change to re-
tain its genuine meaning. Change simply is not succession
alone. Causality involves the passage or "transeunce " of ef-
fects from one factor in a causal series to another. Unless
causal agency, an element of permanence in change, is assumed
at the beginning of the series, these effects would continu-
ally vanish into their successors. Cause and effect would be
identical.
To hold that there is no causal agency in reality leaves
the origin of activity in the physical world with no adequate
explanation. Nor does the process of evolution receive a
satisfactory interpretation. Growth and development do not
suddenly occur without some cause. It seems reasonable to
suppose that there is in reality a substantial agency which
is the ground of change and development, but which does not
itself pass into these changes. Causality is not creation
out of nothing, but it is change brought about by an abiding
agency.
w v/ ^ X -J- V *»r J~ -/ y > : / . ;
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The final argument which realists advance against onto-
logical substance is a repetition of the contention that the
concept of substance cannot express some of the truths pe-
culiar to relations. This assertion serves not only as a
criticism of substance, but also as a transition to the neo-
realistic substitutes for substance. The theory of sub-
stance, it is held, neglects "other and familiar types of
propositions such as, A is richer than B; A is cause of B
. . .
*"1 To call these relations predicates of subjects
"seems preposterous," since they clearly refer to two dis-
«3
2tinct entities. This "relational view of the universe . . .
stands in strong opposition to the substance
. . .
view.
4All exact thinking is dependent on this view of relation.
In reply to this criticism it may be observed once more
that the emphasis on relations does not make necessary the
abandonment of substance. Even if relations are held to en-
joy a separate and independent ontological character, some
5
of the terms which they relate may be substances. On the
other hand, the fact that relational propositions can be,
1Marvin, FBM, 173.
2
Loc. cit.
Spaulding, NR, 42-43.
4
Perry, Art. IV, 107.
5Lenzen, Art. I, 152.
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and perhaps must be, finally put into subject-predicate
form,"'' leaves reason to believe that substances with attri-
butes actually exist. Whether reality is at bottom one sub-
stance, the attributes of which make up the world of partic-
ular things, is a further question not to be finally settled
2
here. The factor of unity noted above, which must be basic
to plurality, indicates that this may be the case. If there
are many substances they are to some extent dependent on the
one ultimate substance. At any rate the universe is not
merely a congeries of relations.
Neo-realists have properly shown through their critique
of substance as a concept in ontology certain essentials.
It is plain that any ultimate principle or substance must be
definite, open to analysis, and capable of accounting for the
diversity of concrete objects. There can be no fixed and all
enveloping universal substance which robs finite beings of
every degree of independence. Nor can ontological substance
be the home of vague and mysterious powers or lawless causes.
Finally, the substances or substance of the universe, if
there be such, must admit of a relational interpretation.
Yet these realistic criticisms do not make it necessary
to reject substance entirely as an ontological or metaphysi-
^-Prall, Art. I, 42, 45, 49, 50, 55.
2
Cf. pp. 257-260.
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cal category. There remain good grounds for believing that
substance is an underlying principle of definite and distin-
guishable character. Its universality provides the generality
in which particulars root. The unity of reality rests with a
substance which makes its plurality intelligible. Substance
accounts for the activity and change as well as the self-
dependence and permanence in reality. It is the ground of re-
lations.
The next question is whether neo-realists supply an ac-
ceptable alternative to the theory of substance.
C. BEING AND SUBSISTENCE1
Instead of holding that there is a single ultimate sub-
stance or plurality of substances in terms of which the uni-
verse is to be explained, neo-realists advocate a realm of
subsistence. The ultimate components of the universe are
2terms and relations, and these are subsistents. What is
meant by this concept must be inquired.
Since the term subsistence appears to be synonymous with
"In this section the realm of subsistence is treated so
far as possible in abstraction from that of existence. The
relation between these two realms is considered below (cf. pp.
278-289)
.
2
Holt, COC, 26.
t—
i
—
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being, 1 it is a universal and all-inclusive class which em-
braces everything. "What
. . .
realism insists on is that
every content, whether term or proposition, real or unreal,
subsists of its own right in the all-inclusive universe of
being. This basic realm is the summum genus which includes
"any possible object of thought, whether universal or particu-
lar,
. . .
existent or non-existent."4
The most fundamental elements in this realm of subsist-
ence are logical and mathematical, "Logical principles are
logically prior to all else, , , , such logical principles,
namely, as include the principles of pure mathematics," At
this level of being are to be found those entities which stu-
dents of "order" are discovering. Number, a series of terms
or symbols representing an objective order in which the asym-
Yet this is scarcely a satisfactory statement, since
some "beings" exist, and others only subsist. To say that
some subsistents are existents tends to break down the dis-
tinction between subsistence and existence. The truth is that
these terms do not have an unequivocal meaning for neo-real-
ists. That this is the case will appear when the relation of
subsistence to existence is examined.
2Montague, WK, 522,
3
Eolt, Art. I, 366, 372, 358, 359, COC, 21, 22.
4Montague, ibid., 322, Art. IV, 253, Marvin, PBM, 107.
Cf. Spaulding, Art. V, 163, NR, 432, WAI, 154.
5
Spaulding, NR, 205, 494, Marvin, ibid., 142, 143, 120-
121. Cf. Perry, PPT, 311.
6Holt, COC, 155.
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metrical and transitive relations "greater than" and "less
than" are found, is presupposed "by all other types of beings."*"
2Such entities are neither physical nor mental, spatial nor
temporal. Consequently the sciences of logic and mathemat-
ics may be considered "non-existential."4 The realm of sub-
sistence "comprises all purely mathematical and logical enti-
ties.
. . «
"
Subsistents are related in propositions. It is the task
of the logician and mathematician to make plain these rela-
7 8
tions. Though the latter are indefinable the cases where
9they may be clearly discerned are almost innumerable. They
include such entities as "similarity" and "difference," "equal
to," "greater than," "less than," "before," "after," "like,"
1Spaulding, Art. V, 175, Holt, COC, 106.
2Holt, et al., NR, 41, 472(1), Montague, Art. IV, 261,
Perry, Art. IV, 129, PCI, 371-372.
Marvin, Art. II, 57, 59, Spaulding, Art. V, 175.
Marvin, PBM, 224, 229, 230, Spaulding, ibid., 174.
5
Spaulding, WAI, 154.
Q
Ibid., 154, 142, 141, Holt, COC, 106.
7
Marvin, FBM, 221, 229-230, Holt, ibid., 155.
8Perry, Art. IV, 106, Spaulding, Art. V, 175.
Spaulding, WAI, 141.
> -
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"unlike," and similar notions. 1 While relations hold between
things, processes, and qualities, they may also have other
2
relations for their terms. An independent ontological sta-
tus is intrinsic to them. Laws of being are assertions of
4
relations or propositions that hold between variables, and
5
as such they are implications present in objective facts.
The presence of relations between subsistents does not mean
their interdependence.
Subsistents form a hierarchy of progressive complexity
7
and value. In this "simple-to-complex series" the secondary
qualities, such as colors, sounds, and odors, come after the
Q
entities of logic and mathematics, at least according to
Holt. Next arises extension, time, motion, and mass. Small
masses arranged in geometrical forms constitute the subject-
matter of chemistry. Larger masses are the province of en-
107.
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gineering, geology, and astronomy. Organic life, the subject
matter of botany, biology, and physiology occupies a still
higher level in the series. Consciousness, which is treated
by the Geisteswissenschaften
,
appears on the next stratum."1*
Value for some neo-realists stands at the top of the
series of subsistents as their most complex and important il-
lustration. "A value is a still neutral property that is
added to some and not to others of those entities that lie in
the simpler regions of the ontological series." Or perhaps
values are to be considered '"relations" between individual
4
things. They are sui generis and thus are not to be defined
5in terms of anything else, nor to be given an exclusively
g
subjective definition. Ideals, the means of achieving val-
Por this ordering of subsistents and the sciences that
deal with them see Holt, COC, 155-159, Spaulding, Art. V,
205, 221, NR, 494, WAI, 157-140, Perry, PPT, 311, Marvin,
PBM, 143-144, 120-121.
2
Holt, ibid., 160.
3Ibid., 159.
4
Spaulding, WAI, 143-144.
5
Ibid., 146, 247.
Spaulding, NR, 500, 206, 207, 208. Perry, however,
denies to values a genuinely objective character. He "repu-
diates every spiritual and moral ontology" (PPT. 344), and
defines value in terms of "desire" or "interest" (ibid.,
335) . While values have a certain logical generality they
have no objective metaphysical status (ibid., 335, 340, 87).
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ue, are found in this realm. Perfect truth, justice, and
beauty subsist though they may never exist."1" Here is the
province of such normative sciences as aesthetics, logic (so
far as it deals with material truth), ethics, and even of
theology.^
It will be observed that all of these subsistent enti-
ties seem to have a definite, intrinsic, and self-dependent
character. This is just what neo-realists intend. Each sub
sistent has "a meaning, character, or essence that is objec-
tive" and "independent of whether or not it is actually ex-
perienced" or whether it "actually exists."3 It has a "full
ontological status . Subsistent entities "retain their dis
tinct self-identity whatsoever their context." "... A
certain serial order is often permanently intrinsic to
them. Since the simple subsistents are mutually independ-
ent and independent of the complexes of which they are mem-
7
bers, they must be self-dependent. Certainly the more com-
Spaulding, NR, 11, xviii, vi, 517, WAI, 154.
2
Holt, COC, 159-160, Spaulding, NR, 517.
Montague, WK, 529.
4Holt, et al., NR, 35.
5
Holt, COC, 104, 105, Perry, PPT, 316.
g
Holt, ibid., 107, 106.
7Perry, Art. IV, 118, 119.
<
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plex subsistents are "self-existent" or self-dependent. That
primary and secondary qualities are of this nature has al-
ready been observed. 1 Such ideals as the good and beautiful
are "efficient causes, forces, or powers" which "actuate"
finite beings. 2 Thus "subsistent entities . • . make a dif-
ference to the other entities of the universe. . , .
"
Further evidence that neo-realists assign a self-depend-
ent character to subsistent s rests in the fact that the model
4
for them is consciously derived from Plato. However, the
neo-realistic interpretation for this realm of subsistence
varies from that of Plato. It is probably true, as Perry
says, that "most modern realists
. . .
would accept • • , only
the mathematical and logical part of Platonic realism." 5
Montague believes that even in these respects the neo-realis-
tic view of subsistents differs from the Platonic conception.
1
Of. supra, pp. 157-159.
2Spaulding, WAI, 247, 249, NR, 516-517, 514, 450-451.
3Spaulding, NR, 516. Cf. Pitkin, Art. Ill, 415.
Montague says that "the world of subsistence was
. . .
discovered by Plato.
.
." (WK, 354). Spaulding believes that
Plato was at least "sympathetic to the doctrine of subsist-
ents," and in support of this claim he refers to the Republic
,
V, VI, VII, Theaetetus t Parmenides , Phaedo , and Cratylus jNR t
493n) • Each of the six neo-realists is willing to call him-
self "a Platonic realist" (Holt, et al., NR, 35).
5
PCI, 371. Cf. Pitkin's interpretation of Plato (Art.
VI) .
i
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First, subsistents are not separate from the world of exist-
1 p
ents, as Plato had held, and second, the realm of subsist-
ence is not restricted in its contents to ethical and logical
essences. It includes in addition all that is conceivable,
the logically specific as well as the logically generic, the
ethically base as well as the ethically good. Spaulding ac-
cepts the Platonic belief in the objectivity of ideals and
4 5
values, and Perry rejects it. But whatever interpretation
neo-realists give to Plato the motive of the latter in pro-
viding a realm of self-dependent and abiding beings which are
more or less indifferent to change, has been retained. Sub-
sistents are fundamentally self-contained and permanent.
Whether subsistents, assuming that there are such apart
from existence, are anything more than substances under a new
7
name now appears exceedingly dubious. As already observed,
1Cf. infra, pp. 278-289.
p
Cf. Rep
.
,
IX, 592. Other passages in Plato tend to ob-
literate this distinction (cf. supra, 31-32).
Montague, WK, 354.
4NR, 498, vi.
5
PPT, 344.
6
Ideals and values "do not change but remain eternal,"
according to Spaulding (NR, 508, 498, cf. 501). Numbers and
relations are of this same character (ibid., 512).
7Cf. pp. 58-59.
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the fundamental or primary meaning which substance has borne
in the history of thought has been that of a self-contained
or self-dependent and enduring reality that does not dissolve
in change. 1 Subsistents do not "subsist on" anything else.
They are clearly self-subsi stent or self-dependent for the
realists. Consequently they certainly appear to be "our old
friends the substances masquerading" under the title of neu-
tral entities." Some neo-realists even call subsistents "neu-
tral substancefs]" in order to distinguish them from so-
called material and spiritual substances. They are as self-
dependent as either material or spiritual substances ever
were
.
There is good ground, one may conclude, for considering
the realm of subsistence a realm of substances. But the as-
sumption of such a realm that appears to be separate from the
world of existence raises several crucial problems. In the
first place, it is not clear how abstract terms and imaginary
4
objects can be thus self-subsistent . What the relations of
Leighton (MAC, 189) and Loewenberg (Art. II, 13) agree
that this has been the primary meaning of substance.
2Leighton, loc. cit. Cf. Haldane, ROR, 263, Evans, NROR,
104.
Perry, PCI, 372, Holt, Art. I, 372, COC, 102, 52, 75-76,
132, 124, 126, 163.
4 sHoemle, Art. I, 263.
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universal to particular, of abstract to concrete, of subsist-
ent to existent, of unreal to real, may be, are questions
still to be answered. The construction of such an extra
province of substances seems, at first thought, to be a su-
perfluity?" One may, therefore, challenge the neo-realist to
make some disposition of these problems.
Logically, the first question to be answered is what
the relation of subsistence to existence may be.
D. SUBSISTENCE AND EXISTENCE
Since "full ontological status" is ascribed both to
2
existents and to subsistents the problem of their distinc-
tion is no easy one. Nevertheless neo-realist s assume that
such a division is valid. Subsistence is considered "logi-
cally prior to the existent as the genus is prior to the
species.
. , .
"3 The realm of subsistence is "even more
varied and extensive than the realm of existential enti-
H4ties." There is profit in studying the former for one may
justly hope to gain through that means further knowledge of
1
It is certainly a departure from the common sense
espoused by neo-realists (Lovejoy, RAD, 56).
2
Holt, et al., NR, 55.
3
Montague, WK, 354, 355, Spaulding, Art. V, 180.
4Spaulding, NR, 11, Marvin, PBM, 107.
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the existent world.
^
If subsistence were coextensive with being, as the dis-
cussion in the last section seemed to indicate, it would be
the realm proper to objects of pure thought or conception,
and existence would include objects of actual or possible
sense-perception. This division would be unjustifiable on
two counts, however. It would require a negative definition
p
of subsistence, since it could only be defined as the realm
of objects not perceptible to the senses, and it would over-
look the fact that the universals of perceptual experience
are actually found in and derived from particulars of sense.
Perhaps some light on the relation between these two realms
can be found in the neo-realistic conception of existence.
Commonly, existence is taken by realists to be synony-
mous with "reality" since this definition accords with "the
universal and persistent usage of common sense. ...
Reality is in turn considered the province which includes
Marvin, PBM, 114.
gThis would allow an infinite number of possibilities
as to what subsistence really is (cf. Creighton and Smart,
AIL, 87-88). —
°Hoernle, Art. I, 262-263.
4
Montague, WE, 295n, 294, Art. IV, 255, Holt, Art. I,
366.
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true propositions, and excludes contradiction. 1 From this
point of view existence would mean the real and true, sub-
sistence the unreal and untrue. Yet this definition of ex-
istence as distinct from subsistence is vitiated by the re-
alistic inclination to use the terms "reality" and "real"
2
when referring both to existence and subsistence, or even
to subsistence alone. Furthermore, "the realm of truth" is
not confined to the existent, it is made synonymous with sub-
4
sistence hence inclusive of existence, according to Marvin.
A second definition or requirement of existence sug-
gested by neo-realists is that it must refer to that which is
individual and particular. "individuation ... is neces-
sary to existence," says Montague. Any existent must have
"that full quota of characteristics, or be that full quota,
7
which the sciences
. . .
find it empirically to have," The
1 Holt, Art. I, 366, COC, 339, Montague, WK, 399, Art.
IV, 252.
2Spaulding, NR, 513, 442, 520, Perry, PPT, 311, PCI,
372, Marvin, FBM, 116, Art. II, 45n, Montague, Art. IV, 255.
3Spaulding, ibid., 498, Holt, COC, 339.
4FBM, 107.
5Spaulding, ibid., 516, Marvin, FBM, 122-123, 148, 149.
6
WK, 355.
7
Spaulding, ibid., 491.
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presumption is that subsistence is the province of univer-
1 2
sals from which particulars are distinct. That subsistents
s
are universals has already been shown.
Here, once more, the distinction between existence and
subsistence is not satisfactory. If universals are actually
present in the individual and the particular the realm of
subsistence becomes a superfluous assumption. On the other
hand, if they are distinct from particulars the problem of
4individuation becomes insoluble. For either it would have
to be assumed that universals as such enter into association
with each other to form particulars, in which case there
would be as many universals as particulars, or, new rela-
tions between separate universals must be assumed in order to
account for the rise of particulars. But in the latter case
the origin and status of these new relations would present a
further mystery.
1Spaulding, NR, 488. Marvin holds that "some universals
exist" (FBM, 110, 114), though it may be questioned whether
he means anything more than that they "subsist" independent
of the knower.
o
Ray concludes that "the relation between subsistence
and existence turns out to be the relation between universal
and particular.
. (CNR, 8).
5Cf. also Spaulding, Art. V, 255, 256. (Note that on
p. 256 Spaulding also calls individuals subsistents.)
4Sheldon, SSPD, 254, 256.
Cf. supra, pp. 261-265.

282
Existence means, thirdly, that which can he located in
space and time, or in time alone. In addition to "complete
logical individuation" every existent must "possess for its
final differentia a definite position in the continua of
space and time," To exist is to have this position or to be
implied as a condition of it. This conception of existence
makes it necessary to suppose that subsistence includes what
4
cannot be located in space and time.
Now if location in space and time be taken as the dif-
ferentia of existence from subsistence, the status of space
and time thereby becomes ambiguous. Either space and time
themselves exist or they do not. If they do exist, they must
be said to exist in space and time and this is meaningless.
If, on the contrary, they do not exist they must subsist.
^
But this would mean that existence is defined by subsistence
and the distinction between the two lapses. There seems to
Spaulding, NR, 490.
2Montague, WK, 355-556, Spaulding, ibid., 11.
3Montague, ibid., 294-295, Art. IV, 255, Marvin, PBM,
40, 112.
4Montague, WK, 297, Art. IV, 255, Spaulding, ibid.,
490.
Spaulding seems to argue that time "subsists" (Art. V,
223) .
Hoernle, Art. I, 262.

283
be no way out of this dilemma so long as the distinction be-
tween subsistence and existence is retained."1"
There is some evidence for concluding that subsistence
2
is the realm of all possibilities, some of which become ac-
tualities or existent s. Those which are not actual or exist-
ent but remain merely objects that can be referred to in
thought though not located in space and time, are subsistents.
Such objects include round squares, perpetual motion machines,
the satyrs of the Greeks, the phlogiston of the eighteenth
century, and kindred illogical and fantastic notions. Sub-
sistence embraces the irrational, illusory, and contradic-
tory. Consequently "all existents subsist, but not all sub-
sistents exist."5 The world of subsistence contains the
world of existence "as the ocean contains its waves,"
A. W. Moore points out the further difficulty of ex-
plaining the changes which a subsistent undergoes in becoming
an existent, i. e. in becoming located in space and time.
How, for example, does a universal "hotness which is not hot
become so when located in space and time? (Art. I, 282.)
o
Montague, WK, 354, Marvin, PBM, 107.
3Spaulding, NR, 492, Holt, Art. I, 364, COC, 259, Marvin,
loc. cit., Montague, Art. IV, 255.
4
Montague, loc. cit.
5
Spaulding, ibid., 490, cf. 499, 508, 517, 516.
6
Montague, WK, 354. This inclusion of existence by sub-
sistence must be ontological and not merely logical (A. W.
Moore, Art. I, 281). Spaulding observes that subsistents
cannot be "psychological in character" since consciousness is
no substance or "container" (NR, 492).
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Nor can this distinction between existence and subsist-
ence be accepted. Aside from the fact that subsistence would
be negatively defined, since it is considered that realm of
all possible beings'*" which cannot be located in space and
2
time, the status of possibility itself would become unclear.
Possibility and actuality seem both to be present in exist-
ence. An actual egg is a possible chicken. A possible
chicken makes the actual fox's mouth water. Actuality and
possibility are intimately related in the existent world.
£ven the fantastic possibilities that can never become actu-
alities always stand in relation to an actual and existent
mind, else the supposition of their "subsistence" could not
occur. Neo-realists do not make plain this relation. To
consider existence the realm of actualities that is derived
from the realm of subsistent possibilities is to overlook
the fact that many exist ents are also possibilities. Such a
view of possibility, furthermore, offers no explanation of
3
how subsistent possibilities become existent actualities.
To consider in ontology everything that can possibly be
put into a proposition, true or false, makes ontology an end-
less discipline in which an infinite number of speculative
absurdities must be examined, instead of a study of the uni-
verse as it is. (Cf. Evans, NROR, 101, Hocking, TOP, 342-
346, 366-367, Calkins, Art. I, 454.)
2
A. W. Moore, Art. I, 282.
3
Loc. cit.
\
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Moreover, neo-realists do not consistently hold to the
view that errors and illusions reside in the realm of sub-
sistence. 1 Montague asserts that they are perceptions of
"non-existent objects,"2 i. e. subsistents. Yet these non-
existent obiects are "determinate functions of the real or
existent objects." The illusion of the ' converging railroad
tracks can be explained in terms of "purely physical (opti-
cal) laws,"^ i. e. in terms of laws that apply to existents.
There is "a plurality of causes" 5 for a given conscious state
and error occurs through the distortion of these causes in
the environment or in the cerebral area of the nervous sys-
tern. "Distortion" is caused by existents. Error must
therefore find its locus among existents. Again, if the
Perry and Marvin appear to deny altogether that errors
and illusions are subsistents, for they give to them a defi-
nitely subjective reference. Perry believes that errors
arise from "the practical discrepancy . . . between subjec-
tive manifolds and the manifolds of some independent order"
(PPT, 325). An error is the failure of a belief to result
in proper adjustment to one's environment (ibid., 526, 327,
528) . For Marvin the task of knowledge is "interpretation"
(ISP, 356), and hence error is an incorrect interpretation of
fact (ibid., 350, 356, 357, 360-361, PBM, 104, 105).
2
WK, 341, 342, 328, Art. IV, 255, 270n.
3
WK, 328, 329.
4
Ibid., 243.
6
Art. IV, 298.
6Ibid #
, 291, 287, 288, WK, 244-245.
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likelihood of error is reduced by the number of effects
which the knower receives,"
1
' error must rest with the knower.
He must have the capacity to compare and combine these ef-
fects else he could not realize the importance of their num-
ber. Error would be due to an incomplete assimilation of
effects
.
Spaulding also holds that errors and illusions are non-
p
existents or subsistents. Yet he says that they have a
locus in time and space, and arise from the fact that one
entity is taken (by an existent knower) to be another that
4
it is not. What the distinction between a non-existent and
an existent error would be, is not explained. This same dif-
ficulty runs through Holt's writings. Errors and illusions
are features of the subsistent world. But since "all errors
6
are cases of contradiction" they are "plentifully manifested
7in the objective physical world. . • , 11 i. e. in existence.
For Pitkin error is constituted by non-spatio-temporal rela-
1Montague, Art. IV, 298.
2
NR, 377, 442.
3Ibid., 375, 442.
4
Ibid., 429, 377, 378.
5
C0C, 269, 270, Art. I, 363, 370, 356.
6
Art. I, 361.
7Ibid., 365, 364, 362, 354, COC, 275, 279, 271, 276.
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tions in which objects that are in space and time may also
stand. ^ Error rests in the cognitive field, which is a new
or (4-f-a)th dimension, and it arises because two spatial ob-
jects may occupy at the same time the spatio-temporal and the
spatio-temporal-cognitive spheres. Illusions, hallucina-
tions, and errors are "necessary features of a projected
physical system."
Subsistence does not appear to be the exclusive prov-
ince of errors and illusions. The latter do not enjoy a sep-
arate subsistence waiting from all eternity to be perceived
4by an unfortunate existent knower. On the other hand, they
seem to be produced by existents themselves. Real and exist-
ent processes in space and time, such as those in the brain,
the ether waves, or a qualitatively distinct and unique con-
sciousness, produce unreal and non-existent subsistents.
Once again the distinction between subsistence and existence
becomes ambiguous.
One must at last conclude that there can be no clear and
Aitkin, Art. Ill, 466.
2
Ibid., 465, 466, 461, 458-459.
3Ibid., 377, 458, 463.
4Even if neo-realists held consistently to this view
they would be embarrassed by the fact that errors could not
then be avoided or eradicated (Evans, NROR, 136, A. W. Moore,
Art. I, 283)
.
4
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unequivocal distinction "between subsistence and existence. 1
If all existents really subsist the real and existent world
is swallowed up in the subsistent. On the other side, sub-
sistents, even errors and illusions, are present in, and per-
haps created by, existents. The function of an independent
2
realm of subsistence has not been made clear. While the
"neutrality" ascribed to subsistents emphasizes the fact that
they may be used in interpreting both mind and matter, they
have no status apart from these two realms.
Yet it still remains true that neo-realists have per-
formed a valuable analysis in advocating the world of sub-
sistence. By reducing the data of experience to their lowest
terms, and by making articulate the vague notions that often
pass for insights, this school has made a permanent contribu-
tion to philosophy. But to hypostatize concepts and to bap-
tize them with the name of subsistents is to assume a realm
of being the status of which cannot be made clear. The con-
ceptual may have its own appropriate kind of reality, but
what that reality is has not been explained by providing it
with a new name. There appear to be fewer difficulties in
affirming that the conceptual world is resident in and cre-
1Cf. Love joy, RAD, 58.
2Cf. Rogers, Art. I, 157, Pratt, Art. II, 89.
3Lewis, MWO, 71-72.
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ated by existent beings. 1
It will "be remembered that subsistents appeared to be
substances so long as they were thought of in abstraction
from existents. If now subsistents are shown to be resident
in existents what becomes of the theory of substances which
neo-realists seemed to be presupposing? Are all existents
substances? Certainly realists, with the exception of Mon-
tague, would be the first to deny that any existents are true
substances. As already observed, they have denied substance
to matter and to mind, the two branches of existence. That
they were not successful in escaping all forms of substance
has, however, been shown.
It remains to inquire how the forms of mind and matter
arise. Since realists have failed to demonstrate that sub-
stance is absent from mind and matter as they are now given
in existence, one may inquire whether they are able to con-
struct a satisfactory theory of their origin and development
in which no concept of substance is necessary. Whether the
origin of the particular forms which mind and matter have as-
sumed requires some theory of substance, may now be consid-
ered .
It seems an inescapable fact that the data of logic and
science have a clear metaphysical and existential reference
(cf. Meyerson, IAR, 384), in spite of arguments by positiv-
ists.
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E. CAUSALITY AND EVOLUTION
However unsuccessful neo-realists may have been in dis-
tinguishing existence from subsistence, reality from unreal-
ity, universality from particularity, they have at least made
clear that for them the basic elements of the universe are
logical and mathematical entities. The theory of substantial
1
agency in reality has been rejected. If there is activity,
growth, and evolution, they must arise from these logical ul-
timates.
The terms and relations which neo-realists consider the
2
ultimate components of the universe, generate the complexi-
ties of concrete experience through logical activity. It
is in the proposition that Holt finds the ground of activi-
4
ty. Between one proposition and another there is also ac-
cording to Marvin, "logical power" and this can be "only an-
other name for implication.
. .
.
"
5 Activity is "a manifold
Q
of terms in relation," a law of connection. Thus "the laws
•"•Of. supra, pp. 263-264.
2
Holt, COO, 26, 51, 155.
3
Ibid., 164, 104, 161.
4Ibid., 29, 51, 104, 17-18, 98.
5
PBM, 118, 116.
6Perry, PPT, 99-100.
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of nature are . . . propositions, which are the active ele-
ments of
. . • being. 0 Mathematical entities and relations
are active in the sense that "they make a difference to the
other entities of the universe." Activity in reality is an
asymmetrical series of logical implications.
This fundamental premise of science and philosophy that
propositions imply one another, is what neo-realists mean by
3
I*
causation. The power of the cause must mean logical pow-
er."
4
"Causality and logical necessity are one." 5 Causality
is a discrete series, succession, or law of implicative rela-
tions. It may "be considered "those other values which to-
gether with time determine the value of a future complex,
"
though temporal antecedence is not always essential to causa-
Holt, COC, 305, Marvin, PBM, 120.
2
Spaulding, NR, 516, Pitkin, Art. Ill, 415.
^Marvin, ibid,, 116. For Montague causality is the
universal fact of potentiality or implication. Each entity
has "its inner, or mental, potentialities, and its outer
• • • actuality, and each has its measure of self-affirming
spontaneity or primary causality" (BU, 83, 82, Art. IV, 288).
4Marvin, ibid 0 , 118.
^olt, ibid., 132, Marvin, ibid., 118, 116, Perry, Art.
IV, 110.
6Perry, PCI, 374, PPT, 100, Marvin, ibid., 117.
7Perry, Art. 110, cf. Ill, 112, 124.
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tion,"1" Explanation is the description of logical succes-
sion, not the discovery of causal agents.
Apparently neo-realists argue that complexity, the ex-
istent world of mind and matter, arises through the logical
series of relations which proceed from ultimate terms and re-
lations. Holt asserts that ultimate entities develop in this
fashion "without break or discontinuity into the more and
more complex, even down to the infinite diversity of concrete
being* 1,3 The series "develops unceasingly of its own motion
. • •
•
"
4 For Spaulding "organizing relations" generate the
5
new wholes.
This theory of causality has already been criticized.
To consider causality, and thus activity, a matter of rela-
7tions is merely to state the problem. It is precisely the
Marvin, FBM, 119, 120, Holt, COC, 18, Yet Spaulding
considers time "absolute and not relative," subsistent,
whether anything exists in it or not (Art, V, 223, 224).
This would seem to imply that time is relevant to every oc-
currence.
2Perry, PPT, 100, 99, Marvin, ibid., 36, 37, Holt, ibid.,
285.
3C0C, 164, 98.
4Ibid., 165.
5NR, 488, 500.
6Cf. pp. 264-266.
7Sheldon, SSPD, 237.
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nature of the causal relation that is to be explained. The
neo-realist merely says that when A causes B to become C,
A, B, and C stand in a relation of succession. JAirthermore
,
the change which causation presupposes, is not merely an
affair of succession. Change presupposes an element of per-
manence which does not dissolve into the series of successive
states. The change in A and B when B is caused by A to be-
come C does not mean that A becomes B or C, but that B de-
rives some factor from A. As already intimated, the identi-
ty of the elements in this series is preserved if a factor
of organic wholeness or agency which is more than the sum of
the elements, is postulated,, This active whole is capable
of assuming and terminating relations, and is thus the per-
manent element in succession. It guarantees permanence to
A, B, and C, while negotiating their changes. In short, one
must resort to agency in order for the succession of rela-
tions in causality to be explained.
The complexity of the existent world appears then, to
indicate a causal agency which operates according to logi-
cal laws."
5
" That the agency in activity and causality is of
the nature of substance has already been indicated.
Lamprecht maintains that causality and contingency or
novelty are to be reconciled through the assumption that cau-
sality is an agency operating upon definite materials (Art.
II, 685).
c<
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But a more fundamental question than that of how the
mere complexities of the existent world arise, is still to be
answered. The real problem is to explain the qualitative
novelty and distinctness that attaches to these existent com-
plexes. On the face of it there seems no possibility of in-
terpreting novelty and qualitative development from the real-
istic premises so far presented. If the ultimate entities of
the universe are simple terms related in propositions there
is no justification for deducing qualitative diversities from
them. In logic there can be no more in the conclusion than
there is in the premises. Certainly no adequate "premises"
for the purely logical deduction of the existent world have
been provided by neo-realists. There is mathematical conti-
2
nuity in reality but there is also novelty.
Holt and Perry, through their argument that wholes are
reducible without residue to their parts, deny that there
-•Knudson, POP, 208.
2Hartshorne argues that qualitative novelty occurs
through "the dimension of degree of definiteness or speci-
ficity" which reality approaches as an ideal limit (PPS, 207-
208)
.
3
Perry, PCI, 374, PPT, 519, Holt, Art. I, 340, 368, COC,
164.
c
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can be any genuine novelties"*" in the existent world. What
appear to be such are merely new organizations of old ele-
2
ments, but not cases of new qualities. The case for unique
properties of organic wholes, which has already been present-
ed, constitutes a criticism of this view. That organisms
such as electrons, atoms, chairs, men, act as wholes in ways
distinct from those of their parts has already been shown.
Such values as moral integrity and the appreciation of Wag-
ner's Parsifal certainly cannot be reduced without residue to
logical and mathematical entities, the ultimate elements of
being. Qualitative diversity is too patent a fact to be so
easily passed by.
Marvin recognizes the need for a theory of novelty.
Particular things and events are not only results of univer-
4
sal causes, but are also constituted by particular causes.
Continuity between types of existence cannot be established,
"^Consistency would demand that Perry deny all novelty.
Yet he does say it is "correct" to assert "that there is a
real contingency and novelty in the world" (PPT, 252) . He
also observes that the world manifests "not a gain here or
a gain there, but a gain on the whole" (ME, 126). But his
conclusion that the hope of progress must be "limited" (PPT,
246) minimizes the probability of genuine evolution in value.
2
Holt, COC, 163, 107, Art. I, 368.
3
Cf. pp. 108-111.
4
PBM, 120, 123, 148-149, 130, 122.
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though increased knowledge will doubtless reveal more of it
than is now evident.-*- "New things, new events, and perhaps
even new elementary constituents of these things and events,
are potentially in the present." This fact of newness and
the impossibility of knowing the future fully may be called
"creative evolution."3 "The existent actually grows or buds,
. . .
Evolution is an ultimate trait of existence." 4
For Spaulding there is genuine novelty in the scheme of
5
things, indicating a break with the past. Properties of new
wholes which are irreducible to their parts, arise through
g
"creative synthesis." The principle of creativity rests in
"organizing relations" which generate the new qualities of
7
these wholes. Between any two levels in the evolutionary
Qseries there is no contradiction but a correlation. While
Marvin, PBM, 140, 142, 143-144.
2Ibid., 135.
3Ibid., 135, 130.
4
Ibid., 134.
WAI, 62, NR, 514. Spaulding' s purpose in his last
book, A World of Chance , is to emphasize especially the fac-
tor of contingency in reality and thus the probability that
novelty will arise (cf. pp. v, vii, xviii, xix)
.
6Art. V, 240, NR, 500, 512.
7NR, 500, 488, 512.
8Ibid., 449, 450.
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the "universe" is the mere totality of entities related addi-
tively, the "cosmos" is the realm of non-additive wholes,
and it is these which embody novelty. 1 Value is created and
2
to some extent preserved in the evolutionary process.
Montague holds that "evolution is wrought" by "the fi-
nite God." In the evolutionary ascent from the lower to
the higher "the constituent forms" of cosmic energy become
4
qualitatively more and more unique. The present result of
evolution is that there are four levels of organization,
namely, the mechanical or inorganic, the vital or vegetative,
the animal or sensory, and the personal and rational. Prom
chaos the universe is undergoing a gradual amelioration so
Q
that there is a progressive increase in value.
1
Spaulding, NR, 488.
o
Ibid., 517, 508, 514. Spaulding's theory that ideals
and values are "efficient" and thus capable of bringing about
the realization of value in man, seems inconsistent with the
theory of "creative synthesis." The former presupposes a po-
tentiality in reality which is becoming gradually more actu-
al, whereas the latter implies that novelties arise without
this antecedent potentiality. (Evans, NROR, 189). Prob-
ably this difficulty arises from Spaulding's reliance upon
a metaphysical theory of causality without realizing it (cf.
Brightman, Art. II, 52-53).
3BU, 84.
4
CSD, 90.
5
Ibid., 74.
6BU, 84, 66, 85.
1o
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If neo-realists deny novelty and qualitative development
they are liable to two criticisms. First, they fail to pro-
vide an adequate theory of individuality, for the particular
and individual is the unique. The individual is more than a
complex of universals, it is something in and for itself
which is explicable in no other terms. Secondly, the scien-
tific facts of evolution strongly suggest that new individu-
als have appeared in the course of history. While they may
resemble their predecessors they cannot be reduced to them
without residue. Substance, which is presupposed by the
theory of individuality, is, therefore, not satisfactorily
accounted for. The appearance of new substances in the
course of evolution seems probable.
On the other hand, if novelty is recognized by neo-
realists the presence of substance must also be recognized.
Whether it be held that the novelties in evolution are new
manifestations or new forms of the one underlying reality,
new actualities of the potentiality basic in reality,"1" or
whether they be construed as the birth of new individualities
So far as neo-realists believe in teleology such a po-
tentiality would seem to be presupposed. Montague (BU, 73-
74, 85, Art. IV, 284) and Spaulding (NR, 515, 516, 521, 509,
WAI, 257) clearly indicate belief in it. Holt admits pur-
pose but considers it only the fact of law in nature (COC,
295, 294, 303, 36) . Marvin is skeptical about its presence
(PBM, 164-165, 252), and Pitkin confesses agnosticism about
the answer to this question (Art. I, 214).

from old universalities, they presuppose a theory of sub-
stance. What is unique, individual, relatively self-contain-
ed and constant through time must he a substance. Evolution
is either a process in which the one substance assumes new
forms, or else a development in which new substances are gen-
erated.
The realistic view of evolution either presupposes sub-
stance or fails to account for its salient functions.
F. CONCLUSIONS
Prom this critique of substance as a basic concept in
ontology the following conclusions appear to be justifiable.
First, the attempt by neo-realists to reduce reality to ulti-
mate simples does not make necessary the rejection of sub-
stance, since completely simple elements would be indistin-
guishable from bare being and evolution from them would be
j
miraculous. Second, the failure by all neo-realists consist-
ently to maintain the doctrine of simplicity permits the con-
I
elusion that complexes are even for them ultimate, and hence
that substances, which are complexes, may be ultimate. Third
the rejection of substance because it represents a specula-
tive dogma is unnecessary, for a speculative ideal is presup-
posed in the denial as well as in the assumption of substance
Fourth, neo-realists have shown that a fixed and all envelop-
-1
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ing universal substance which robs finite beings of every
degree of independence cannot be a tenable notion. Fifth,
the view that ontological substance is the home of vague and
mysterious powers or lawless causes is justly shown to have
no validity. Sixth, neo-realists do not demonstrate that
substance must be given up when interpreted as a determinate
underlying principle which provides the unity, generality,
permanence, and activity in reality. Seventh, it remains
true that relations, particularity, plurality, and change
find their ultimate ground in a universal substance in spite
of the realistic critique. Eighth, the endowment of sub-
sistents by neo-realists with such properties as self-depend-
ence, permanence, and universality makes subsistents them-
selves appear to be substances, when they are considered
apart from existent s. Ninth, the failure of neo-realists to
establish an unequivocal distinction between subsistence and
existence deprives the theory of subsistent "substances" of
importance and validity. Tenth, the origin of new forms of
existence, recognized by Spaulding, Marvin, and Montague,
but denied by Perry and Holt, requires a theory of substance
for novelty is either the generation of new and individual
substances or the appearance of new manifestations of a sin-
gle ultimate substance.
€
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
Though conclusions have been stated at the end of each
chapter in this investigation, they need finally to be pre-
sented in relation to each other. The significance of the
neo-realistic critique may then be viewed as a whole. Since
the neo-realistic denial of substance has been shown to be
quite general but the criticisms more implicit than explicit
no attempt will be made to separate conclusions about these
two types of criticism.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The argument by neo-realists that the method of
analysis requires one to abandon the concept of sub-
stance need not be accepted as conclusive, for this
method results in undue abstractness and either ig-
nores or leaves unexplained the properties which are
unique with organic wholes. Hence it cannot be made
the final and ultimate means of philosophic investi-
gation.
2. Since all relational propositions can be, and per-
haps must be, finally translated into the subject-
predicate or substance-attribute formula, the rela-
tional logic espoused by neo-realists does not make
necessary the rejection of the concept of substance,
though it suggests an alternative to the latter which
is in many instances useful.
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3. Failure by neo-realists finally to demonstrate the
view (not accepted by Montague) that all relations
must be external, permits the hypothesis that some re-
lations are internal and that the concept of substance
provides the ground or synthesis of these relations.
The probability that there are also some external re-
lations makes the existence of a single absolute sub-
stance dubious.
4. Neo-realists justly conclude that recent develop-
ments in physics and chemistry make it necessary to re-
ject the notion that the physical world is one fixed
block of material substance, an aggregate of solid, in-
destructible, and substantial atoms, or an inert and
inconceivable substance which supports qualities and
relations though itself distinct from them.
5. The attempt made by neo-realists to transfer the
functions once performed by material substance to
qualities and relations alone, fails through its in-
ability to provide satisfactorily for identity and in-
dividuality in concrete physical things, or for their
permanence in change.
6. Despite the neo-realistic critique, there is ade-
quate ground for maintaining that a material sub-
stance is that unique, organic, and relatively self-
contained unity of properties and relations within
the space-time world which is active in and through
those properties and relations according to a defi-
nite law, plan, or purpose.
7. As neo-realists contend, spiritual substance, de-
fined as a transcendent, non-empirical, unanalyzable,
and unknowable soul, or as a soul which is the posses-
sor of data that have no objective reference, must be
rejected.
8. The behavioristic and materialistic trend of neo-
realism, in spite of the opposition by most neo-real-
ists toward naturalism, makes impossible an adequate
explanation for memory, prediction, and uniqueness or
self-identity in conscious experience, but substance,
considered the presence in the stream of conscious ex-
perience of such factors as organic unity, relative
privacy, activity, self-identity, and self-transcend-
ence, would afford an escape from these difficulties.
9. Montague argues directly for a theory of substance
in consciousness, while Spaulding, Pitkin, Marvin, and
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Perry ascribe such attributes of uniqueness to con-
sciousness through its definition as a new dimension
or as a complex relation that the rudiments of a
concept of substance are virtually restated. Holt re-
mains loyal to materialism, thus encountering the dif-
ficulties that arise when the uniqueness of conscious-
ness is denied.
10, The neo-realistic plan to reduce all substances to
ultimate and complete simples or neutral entities is
unsuccessful, for it results in a concept of bare and
vacuous being from which definiteness
,
complexity, and
novelty could not arise, or in a plurality of entities
with such attributes as virtually to make substances
of them, or else in a realm of being in which univer-
sality and particularity, possibility and actuality,
subsistence and existence, the conceptual and percep-
tual, the real and unreal, are assigned no unequivocal
meaning.
11. A fixed and all-enveloping or universal substance
which robs finite beings of every degree of independ-
ence, or a universal and absolute substance which is
the home of vague and lawless powers or causes, must
be denied as neo-realists assert; but the concept of
a determinate, underlying principle or substance
which provides unity, generality, and permanence, in
spite of the plurality, particularity, and creative
process in reality, remains a tenable doctrine.
B. SUMMARY
It has been the purpose of this inquiry to examine the
implicit and explicit criticisms of the concept of substance
by "the six" American neo-realists, namely, Perry, Montague,
Holt, Marvin, Pitkin, and Spaulding. The importance of
evaluating these criticisms has arisen from widespread dis-
agreement about the validity of the concept of substance.
Others besides neo-realists have looked upon the notion with
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suspicion though two important schools in American philoso-
phy, viz. critical realism and idealism, have retained it.
The neo-realistic criticism is the more remarkable be-
cause traditional realism was associated with the doctrine
of substance and because the notion has held such an impor-
tant place in the history of philosophy. Prom the time of
Thales until the present the concept of substance or its
equivalent term has stood, with varying emphasis, for a self-
dependent reality which persists in spite of its changing
accidents, relations, or qualities.
As an object of definition the history of the term sub-
stance begins with Aristotle. For him it designated the
material substratum, the form or nature of an object, and
the union of form and matter in particular individual things.
The scholastic controversies over the status of universals,
the relation of mind and body, and over the principle of in-
dividuation, were elaborations of the Aristotelian view of
substance. In modern times continental rationalists defined
substance primarily as that which is self-existent, while
British empiricists considered it a useful, and Kant a nec-
essary, category for the ordering of experience. It has been
interpreted as the active and the passive, known and unknown,
conscious and unconscious, ground of changing phenomena.
Recent developments in science have focused attention
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once more upon the doctrine of substance and have tended to
show the need for revising it. With the downfall of classi-
cal physics the notion that matter was a stuff-like substra-
tum manifested in such attributes as mass, extension, motion,
and impenetrability, was given up. The nature of substance
has in fact become less and less a problem for the physicist
since mathematical formulae have been substituted for it.
Furthermore, the discovery that all measurements are rela-
tive to the measurer's frame of reference has made it impos-
sible to establish the fixity of a material substratum. De-
velopment of the atomic theory and the conclusion that within
the atom there is a vast amount of empty space, undermined
still more the belief in solid material substance. Electrons
or fields of force have come to be regarded as the basic
units of matter. Whether these achievements by physicists
have made necessary the rejection of substance in every sense
has not been finally settled.
The theory of evolution has raised the question of
whether species are all related to one genus as forms of the
one substance or whether they may be considered Real Kinds
or eternal substances themselves . Their origin may be the
creation of new substances or new manifestations of an old
one. In recent psychology there has been a strong tendency
to explain consciousness by reducing it to its parts. "Struc-
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turalists" have considered it a compound of mental states
and not a substance. Gestalt, functional, and dynamic psy-
chologists have emphasized factors in consciousness which
may, however, be consistent with a kind of substance. The
interpretation by neo-realists of these developments in sci-
ence constitutes a partial basis for their critique of sub-
stance.
Neo-realists find the concept of substance to be incom-
patible with the method of analysis. Through this method
they explain complexes by reducing them to ultimate simples,
and organic as well as additive wholes by their reduction to
constituent parts. Though every trained thinker employs the
method of analysis the abstractness in explanations result-
ing from its use requires that it be supplemented. It is
also incapable of explaining the unique properties of organ-
ic wholes. The presence of such wholes in wide areas of
reality and the importance attaching to them indicate the
seriousness of this weakness. Organic logic need not lead
to the skepticism which neo-realists allege. Aristotelian
logic, with its emphasis on the substance-attribute formula,
may still be considered an alternative to the relational
method. The mathematical or symbolic logic employed by neo-
realists does not commit them to any particular type of meta-
physics, and hence not to one in which the concept of sub-
••
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stance plays no part. Since the identity of terms is not
sacrificed through their internal relations, belief in such
relations is justifiable. There are, however, some external
relations. Substance has been associated with the doctrine
of internal relations.
Accepting the findings of recent science neo-realists
consider matter reducible to atoms and electrons. These in
turn are reduced by them to neutral qualities and relations,
and no substance which underlies or transcends these quali-
ties and relations is believed to exist. Material substance
is condemned because it represents an indefinite potentiali-
ty, signifies the exclusive ownership of qualities, and lies
beyond experience. Consequently its traditional functions,
namely, potentiality, identity or individuality, permanence,
and activity are assigned by neo-realists to qualities and
relations. Realists provide a theory of individuality but
do not explain sufficiently how loose aggregates of quali-
ties and relations function in unified and particular wholes.
It is not clear on realistic premises how one material ob-
ject may be distinguished from another, or how the unity and
connection of the states of an object during change are to
be construed. A theory of material substance would clarify
these issues.
Though neo-realists differ in their own conceptions of
••
•
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mind, all, save Montague, unite in denying that there is a
permanent, self-existent, soul, subject, or substratum which
supports or joins together the processes of consciousness.
Valid grounds for retaining the introspective method exist,
hence the possibility remains that the consciousness discov-
ered through the use of this method may be a substance. Neo-
realists criticize the theory of spiritual substance because
it illustrates the fallacies of pseudo-simplicity and exclu-
sive particularity, and because it over-emphasizes the pri-
vacy, organic wholeness, and activity of consciousness. This
critique calls attention to the superfluity of assuming a
transcendent, unknown, and unknowable substantial soul. How-
ever the de facto unity in conscious experience itself which
accounts for the elements of privacy, activity, organization
and self-identity must not be ignored. Montague argues di-
rectly for a concept of spiritual substance which expresses
the self-transcendent reference of present brain-states to
the past and future and to distant objects in space. Other
neo-realists attempt to assimilate consciousness to the phys-
ical world but ascribe such attributes to it when they define
it either as a complex relation or a new dimension, that it
still retains some unique features. The materialism con-
sciously espoused by Holt and intimated, perhaps unwittingly,
by Perry, Marvin, and to less marked degree by Pitkin and
i j
1
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Spaulding, must "be rejected. Memory and prediction indicate
the presence in consciousness of a time-transcending element
which may be considered substance.
Neo-realists contend that ultimate reality involves no
basic substance interpreted either as a substratum or an or-
ganic whole to or within which particular entities are re-
lated. They reject substance in ontology because it is a
speculative dogma, a purely formal notion, and because it
implies a unity, exclusive organization, and causal agency
which cannot be validated. Instead of substance neo-realists
find neutral entities or subsistents to be basic in the uni-
verse. These entities vary in complexity from logical and
mathematical concepts to ideals and values. Considered apart
from existence such entities possess the attributes of per-
manence and self-existence
,
which have generally been as-
signed to substances. Logical implication is substituted for
causality by neo-realists but the difficulties in this pro-
cedure require the reinstatement of substance as the ground
of activity and change in reality. The theory that substance
is an underlying principle of definite and distinguishable
character which provides the unity, generality, and activity
in reality may be retained.
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